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INTRODUCTION

We live in a highly polarized political and moral environment. In this
environment, the proper scope of religious liberty has become a hotly contested
matter in courts, legislatures, agencies, the legal academy, religious
communities, and public discourse. There are those who argue that a special
status for religion violates basic notions of equality or causes harm; they support
greater Establishment Clause restrictions and fewer free exercise exemptions. I
Others consider the religious involvement in culture war battles of the last 40
years over abortion, contraception, and same-sex marriage an imposition of faith
or even a manifestation of "discrimination and bigotry." 2 Those who defend
robust religious freedom argue that religious rights form the foundation on which
limited constitutional government is built, and that governmental attempts to
limit religious exercise to the inside of heads, homes, and houses of worship is
proof of the state's tendency to overreach. 3 Others emphasize the stability and

1 See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); Caroline Mala Corbin,
Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277 (2015); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An
Unfirm Foundation: The RegrettableIndefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LIrrLE
ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women's Equality, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 1831
(2011); B. Jessie Hill, Kingdom Without End? The InevitableExpansion ofReligious Sovereignty
Claims, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1177 (2017); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious
Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35 (2015); Micah
Schwartzman, What IfReligion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).
2
The Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Martin R. Castro, asserted that
"[t]he phrases 'religious liberty' and 'religious freedom' will stand for nothing except hypocrisy
so long as they remain code words for discrimination, intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia,
Islamophobia, Christian supremacy or any form of intolerance." U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 29

(2016),

http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Peaceful-Coexistence-09-07-16.PDF.

For discussion

of

political activism on abortion and same-sex marriage, see Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and
the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2014) [hereinafter Laycock, Culture Wars] (advising
churches and their secular opponents to stop seeking legislation that imposes their values on the
other).
3

See, e.g., KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW:

INSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS AND RELIGION: COMPETING SUPREMACIES 42 (Leora Batnitzky

&

RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 177-82 (2015) (noting hostility to religion and to
religious liberty due to a focus on conservative causes); Richard W. Garnett, Religious
Accommodations and-andAmong-Civil Rights: Separation,Toleration, andAccommodation, in

Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017); Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REv. 903 (2014).
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virtue that religious communities contribute to civil society.4 Both sides are
concerned about the larger societal impacts of the scope of religious freedom,
and the debate unmasks the reality that church-state disputes are not about a
church and a state. They are about the many different communities whose
concerns are implicated. We are operating in a highly polarized environment, but
also a highly contextualized one.
Within this environment, we find a major moral, political, and legal
actor: the Catholic Church in America.' The Church is not exclusively a religious
body that serves its members. With almost 68 million Catholics worshipping in
thousands of parishes within 195 dioceses, the Church sponsors about 6,500
elementary and secondary schools; 221 colleges and universities; and 549
hospitals serving 88 million patients annually, 6 employing over half-a-million
full-time workers and almost 225,000 part-time,7 and providing substantial
community benefit.8 Numerous Catholic Charities entities, organized at the
diocesan level, provide over $3.8 billion in social services (much of that as
contractors for government agencies),9 serving over 8.5 million people annually
4
See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, The Harold J. Berman Lecture: Religious Freedom-A
Second Class Right?, 61 EMORY L.J. 971 (2012).
5
There is no single entity that is the Catholic Church in the United States. This term will be
used to refer to the aggregate of Catholic institutions, which often take shared positions on politicallegal matters under the general coordination of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
("the Conference"). Catholic institutions include those sponsored by (or affiliated with) not only
dioceses but religious orders as well.
6
Catholic Health Care, Social Services andHumanitarianAid, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS,
http://usccb.org/about/public-affairs/backgrounders/health-care-social-service-humanitarianaid.cfmn (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) [hereinafter USCCB Statistics] (differing slightly on the number
of hospitals, numbering 645); Frequently Requested Church Statistics, CTR. FOR APPLIED RES.

APOSTOLATE, http://cara.georgetown.edu/frequently-requested-church-statistics (last visited Oct.
5, 2017) [hereinafter CARA Statistics] (80 million people identify as Catholics; 68 million are
connected to a parish. An additional 25 million people identify as former Catholics).
See USCCB Statistics, supra note 6.
8
For some examples, see David Barkholz, Ascension/Presence Exemplifles How Catholic
Systems
Look
After
Their
Own,
MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Aug.
25,
2017),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170825/NEWS/170829902 (noting that in 2016
Ascension provided $495 million in charity care, and Presence provided $45 million); CHI's
Lofton Ranked No. 20 on Modem Healthcare's AnnualList of "Most Influential"Industry Leaders,
CATH.

HEALTH

INITIATIVES

(Aug.

22,

2016),

http://www.catholichealthinitives.org/documents-public/news%20releases/8-2216%20LoftonRanked%20No.%2020.pdf (noting that in 2015 CHI provided "almost $970 million
in charity care and community benefit"); Melanie Evans, Catholic Hospitals HearPope Francis'
Call

to

Help

the

Poor,

MOD.

HEALTHCARE

(Sept.

24,

2015),

http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150924/NEWS/150929924 ("Among
Catholic
systems with at least $200 million in revenue, community benefit in 2014 ranged from less than
2% of operating expenses to nearly 19%. The average was about 8%."); see also Community
Benefit Standards, CATH. HEALTH Ass'N U.S., www.chausa.org/communitybenefit/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2017).
9
See CARA Statistics, supra note 6.
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"in the areas of hunger, health, housing, education and workforce development,
and family economic security." 10 Health care and social services, offered in
every state, include hospice and home health assistance, assisted living and
housing for the elderly, health care centers, orphanages, day care, and specialized
homes and centers for all types of social and health care needs." Countless other
Catholic organizations offer charitable services as well. With so many
parishioners, and so many institutions and employees to manage and populations
to serve in increasingly regulated environments, it should come as no surprise
that the Church has been heavily involved in political advocacy and litigation,
for itself on issues of religious freedom, as well as on a whole host of topics
relevant to its moral and social teachings, such as immigration and refugees,
marriage and family, poverty and the economy, abortion and contraception, and
the death penalty and torture, to name a few. Its institutions play a significant
mediating role in civil society and have as their broad mission the promotion of
the common goodl 2 and human dignity.13 Indeed, the Church views itself as a
bulwark against secularism and as "a sign and a safeguard of the transcendent
character of the human person."14
The American Church takes a maximalist view of religious freedom,
litigating extensively to ensure the fullest possible participation of its institutions
in civil society and to preserve the religious identity, mission, and assets of those
institutions. In the language of the Religion Clauses of the United States
Constitution, the Church prioritizes Free Exercise Clause protections and
subordinates the Establishment Clause only to serve the goal of free exercise.
This primacy of free exercise reflects the Church's own teaching on church-state
relations, the Declaration on Religious Freedom, one of the most significant

10

See USCCB Statistics, supra note 6; see also CARA Statistics, supra note 6.

1

See USCCB Statistics, supra note 6.
[T]he common good is the totality of goods that create the conditions in which
persons flourish. In its fullest sense, the common good describes social
conditions designed to enable the 'total human development' of the person,
such as human rights for individuals, social health and development of the
community, and a just, stable, and secure order.
Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law andJustice, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT 255, 266 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001).
13
See infra Parts II (schools), IlH (schools and other service organizations), and IV (health
care, social services, and higher education).
PastoralConstitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes) § 76, VATICAN
14
Spes]
et
Gaudium
[hereinafter
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/iivaticancouncil/documents/vatii-const 19651207_gaudium-et-spes en.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). The "transcendent
character" refers to the dignity of the human person. See Nigel Zimmerman, Safeguarding the
Transcendence of the Human Person: From the Council to Francis,NEWMAN RAMBLER 46, 47http://newmancentre.org/wp/wp(2014),
48
content/uploads/2016/0 1/Rambler_2014_NigelZimmermann.pdf.
12
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documents to come out of the Second Vatican Council of the 1960s.15 The
Declaration rejected the ideal of a confessional state1 6 (which had been the
previous teaching) and endorsed a broad and constitutionally guaranteed right to
religious freedom "for persons, families, communities, and religious bodies
when engaged in worship, education, observance, practice, witness and
institutional governance." 17 The right entailed no coercion in matters of faith and
no restraint to prevent a person from acting in accordance with faith (subject to
public order limits).18 Further, the Declaration made clear that there must be
equality of citizens before the law, no discrimination among citizens,9 and no
government action that directs or inhibits religious acts.20
Catholic institutions seek protection for their religious exercise in a
variety of ways, and the examples are plentiful: a Catholic school defends a sex
discrimination suit by a teacher fired for violating a "morals clause" in her
contract;2 1 a Catholic university challenges a federal requirement to provide
insurance coverage for contraception; 22 a Catholic hospital challenges a federal
mandate to offer gender transition surgery; 23 a Catholic diocese defends a
negligent supervision action brought by a victim of sexual abuse by a priest; 24 a
Catholic social services agency seeks a legislative exemption from antidiscrimination law so that it will not lose its adoption license or government
contracts because it refuses to process adoptions for same-sex couples; 25 a
Catholic hospital defends a suit for medical malpractice brought on the grounds

15
Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae), VATICAN [hereinafter
Declaration]
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/ii-vatican-council/documents/vatii decl_19651207 dignitatis-humanae en.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). See generally JOHN W.
O'MALLEY, WHAT HAPPENED AT VATICAN 11 (2008) [hereinafter, VATICAN II].
16
A confessional state privileges a particular church by law and prohibits
(or fails to protect)
other churches. See Angela C. Carmella, John Courtney Murray, S.J (1904-1967), in 1 THE
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY: ON LAW, POLITICS, & HUMAN NATURE 115, 130-31 (John

Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006) [hereinafter Carmella, John Courtney Murray].
17

Id. at 135.

1s

Id.

19

Declaration,supra note 15, § 6.
Id. §3.

20

21
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1172 (N.D. Ind.
2014) (discussed infra note 205 and accompanying text).
22
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussed infra note 455
and accompanying text), vacated 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016) (mem.).
23
Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (discussed infra note
398 and accompanying text).
24
Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213 (Miss. 2005) (discussed
infra note 259 and accompanying text).
25
See infra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
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that the patient should have been counseled to have an abortion;2 6 the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops files an amicus brief opposing the
legalization of same-sex marriage; 27 or a state Catholic conference lobbies the
state legislature for the inclusion of religious schools in its educational voucher
program.2 8
For over 50 years, Catholic institutions-frequently and consistently29
have pressed a maximalist position on the Religion Clauses. This litigation
activity, as plaintiff, defendant, or amicus, has influenced the general arc of
jurisprudential development, which is now manifest through cobbled-together
federal statutes and Supreme Court decisions. While any assessment of the
"state" of the Religion Clauses is precarious at best, at the moment one can
enumerate those elements that echo the Catholic position: vigorous statutory
protection of religious exercise, and conscience claims in particular; a broad
Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2016) (discussed
infra note 377 and accompanying text).
27
Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in Support of
Respondents and Supporting Affirmance, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1519042 (discussed infra note 406 and accompanying
text).
26

28

See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, OUR GREATEST AND BEST INHERITANCE:

CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND PARENTAL CHOICE, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-

&

(last visited Oct. 5, 2017)
teach/catholic-education/upload/Our-Greatest-Inheritance.pdf
(advocating parental school choice); see also infra note 137 and accompanying text.
29
But see Kevin C. Walsh, Addressing Three Problems in Commentary on Catholics at the
Supreme Court by Reference to Three Decades of CatholicBishops' Amicus Briefs, 26 STAN. L.
POL'Y REv. 411 (2015). Professor Walsh has written that:
The Conference's briefs supply the closest thing one can find to the Catholic
position on questions of constitutional law, but it is important to note at the
outset that there is no such thing. To be clear: there is no "Catholic answer" to
questions of federal constitutional law (or any questions of federal law, for that
matter). There is ... a Catholic teaching about the necessity for the Church to
have the freedom to be a Church: to administer sacraments and to gather the
People of God. But there is no Catholic teaching about the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. And so on. When bringing Catholic
teaching to bear on questions of federal law before the Supreme Court of the
United States, the Bishops' Conference makes prudential, strategic, tactical,
and legal judgments in deciding whether to file a brief and what to include in
it.

Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added). This is, of course, correct on one level. There must be room to
make shifts in legal argumentation, and ossifying current argumentation by calling it official
teaching would be a mistake. But legal arguments are made, consistently, publicly, and with
authority (and even posted on the website of the Bishops' Conference). See News Releases, U.S.
CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/news/index.cfn (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see
also Amicus Briefs, U.S. CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/news/index.cfin (last

visited Oct. 9, 2017). Over time, the Church has quite clearly marked positions on given
controversies to bring moral judgment to bear. And over time, the consistency of those positions
in similar cases gives rise to what I refer to as the maximalist position on religious freedom, or the
Catholic position on the Religion Clauses. Thus, while there may be no "Catholic answers" to the
questions posed, Catholic leaders have never shied away from offering tentative ones.
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constitutional autonomy on ecclesiastical matters to select church leaders and
manage institutions; permissible aid to religious schools so long as it results from
private parental choice among a broad set of options; certain types of funding
and accommodation of church institutions involved in temporal pursuits (while
preserving religious uniqueness); robust participation of churches in discourse
on virtually every moral-political issue; and equal access for religious groups to
public resources in certain contexts.30 Of course, many other religious groups
and special-interest litigants helped to articulate and influence the jurisprudence,
as have conservative shifts in Court composition; and surely, the limits to each
of these positions are fiercely contested. Yet Church institutions in litigation have
ensured that particular arguments have been frequently and consistently
presented, contributing in many ways to the solicitude with which churches are
regarded-as well as to the boundaries of that solicitude.
But the specter of endless litigation is wearying. While Catholic
institutions may enjoy some relaxation of culture war conflict at the federal level
under the Trump Administration, a new set of polarizing conflicts is emerging
on immigration, refugees, the environment, health care, and the economy.
Further, the culture war issues may shift to the state level and become more
inflamed than ever. Catholic institutions may find themselves embroiled in
battles with liberals at the state level and in a new set of battles with conservatives
at the federal.
Endless litigation is not only wearying; it brings risks to government and
to the Church. Litigation hardens positions on each side; the litigation dynamic
emboldens government to impose aggressive policies on churches without
considering the consequences and encourages Catholic institutions to invoke
extreme legal arguments that might backfire or weaken the cause of religious
freedom in other contexts.3 1 It also threatens to impede efforts to cooperate on
30
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017);
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical

Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT TO THE AWARD OF A
GRANT PURSUANT TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (2007), 2007 WL

5633562.
31
In this type of litigation, lawyers may be involved in important decision making that
involves theological matters. For instance, some have argued that lawyers representing Catholic
entities might present excessively rigid and controversial versions of church teachings in order to
prevail in litigation. See Cathleen Kaveny, Law, Religion, and Conscience in a Pluralistic Society:
The Case of the Little Sisters of the Poor (March 29, 2016) [hereinafter Kaveny, Law, Religion,
and Conscience], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2756148 (Boston College
Law School legal studies research paper); see also Edward A. Hartnett, The Temptation ofHobby
Lobby (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Or lawyers representing Catholic entities
might make arguments that run counter to church teaching in order to prevail in litigation. See Ben
Brumfield & Kyung Lah, Lawyersfor CatholicHospitalArgue that a Fetus Is Not a Person,CNN
(Jan. 27, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/26/us/colorado-fetus-lawsuit/ (wrongful
death suit against hospital for deaths of mother and twins in utero).
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matters of common concern. Further, the rush to litigate takes a toll on the
Church's identity as a religious-moral community, as its public presence begins
to mirror that of any political actor. The loss of distinctive public characteristics
of a moral community risks narrowing some of the very constitutional and
statutory protections it seeks. And most disconcertingly, endless litigation
creates a tension between harsh public adversarial positions taken on some topics
and the need for merciful and compassionate pastoral ministry in parishes and in
service ministries.
Theologian and public philosopher John Courtney Murray, S.J, the
principal drafter of the Church's Declaration on Religious Freedom, noted that
the Religion Clauses were intended to be "not articles of faith but articles of
peace." 32 He wrote that they "have no religious content. They answer none of the
eternal human questions . . . . Therefore they are not invested with the sanctity
33
that attaches to dogma, but only with the rationality that attaches to law." The
Religion Clauses were born of "social necessity"-to ensure a social
34
environment in which people of different faiths "might live together in peace."
Murray wrote at mid-20th century, lauding the fact that, in a nation of Catholics,
Protestants, and Jews, "political unity and stability are possible without
uniformity of religious belief and practice."3 It is all the more critical today,
amid the nation's staggering diversity, that the Religion Clauses work to ensure
a social environment in which people of many different fundamental convictions
"might live together in peace." 3 6
The interpretation of the Religion Clauses (and the complement of
related statutes) as "articles of peace" resides in a "middle ground" somewhere
between the polarized arguments of the litigators. It is not the case that over time
any one group or constituency consistently prevails. It is simply not reasonableor prudent-for any church to expect that its claims to resources, to autonomy,
and to exemptions will prevail in every situation. There are jurisprudential
compromises, resulting from judicial, legislative, and regulatory activity,
reached after conflict and revisited over time. For Catholic institutions, that
means the freedom to set up schools, and even access to public resources, but not
direct taxpayer funding. It also means broad operational autonomy for the
selection of clergy and most employment matters, but not when these matters
involve sex abuse or certain kinds of discrimination. These compromises might
be unacceptable to both the Church and its antagonists; yet such adjustments are
a natural part of the political and legal balancing of the claims of multiple
constituencies. Where the lines will be drawn on culture war exemptions remains

32

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE

AMERICAN PROPOSITION 62 (2005) [hereinafter MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS].
33
34
35
36

Id.
Id. at 69.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 69.
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to be seen for Catholic institutions that have public ministries in health care,
higher education, and social services. But lines will inevitably emerge to define
the contours of religious freedom in a large and diverse society.
One framework for thinking about compromise is the "accommodation"
that was crafted for religious nonprofits in the recent debate over the Affordable
Care Act's contraceptive mandate (hereinafter, the Accommodation). 37 The
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) required most employers to
provide contraceptives and sterilizations as part of employee health insurance
packages. 38 A religious exemption initially applied only to churches and their
close affiliates. This meant that Catholic hospitals, colleges, and service
ministries were required to abide by the mandate, with refusal resulting in great
financial penalty. 9 American bishops considered this an attempt to conscript
Catholic institutions into the service of an ideologically secularist agenda and
claimed that "religious liberty [was] under attack . . . ."In response, HHS
returned with a compromise position that attempted to respect the conscience of
the nonprofits but also ensure contraception coverage to employees of those
nonprofits. 41 The Accommodation required the insurer-not the nonprofit
employer-to provide the coverage directly to the employees. 42 Thus, the
Accommodation sought to simulate an exemption from the perspective of the
religious employer, but without any negative impact on third parties-the
employees-as would be the case with an exemption.
Many Catholic institutions fought the Accommodation fiercely, on a
complex theory of complicity with evil, filing nearly two dozen lawsuits against
HHS, only to be turned away by eight out of nine federal courts of appeal and to
be told by the Supreme Court (refusing a decision on the merits) that the parties
should work out their differences. 43 But this Accommodation frameworkwhich shifts the objectionable conduct to a non-objecting party to ensure the
delivery of those services to employees or students or the public-may hold the
key to legislative middle ground. This framework breaks from the typical binary
choice between coercing (or, more likely, penalizing) religious institutions or

3
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012); see generallyZo6 Robinson, The ContraceptionMandate
and the Forgotten ConstitutionalQuestion, 2014 Wis. L. REv. 749, 757-761 (2014) (detailing the

chronological history of the mandate and its amendments). The Accommodation has been amended
under the Trump administration. See infra note 462.
38
See Robinson, supra note 37, at 757-59.
3
Id. at 759-60; see also Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559-60 (2016).
40
MOST

U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS: AD Hoc COMM. FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
OUR FIRST,
CHERISHED
LIBERTY:
A
STATEMENT
ON
RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
(2012),

http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/our-first-most-cherished-liberty.cfm
[hereinafter MOST CHERISHED LIBERTY].
41
Robinson, supra note 37, at 760-61.
42
Id. at 761.
43
See infra notes 448-61 and accompanying text.
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exempting them entirely (with third party impacts). And yes, Catholic
institutions may balk at such compromise frameworks in particular contexts. But
many Church entities also fought against refusals to fund parochial schools and
44
against the imposition of tort liability for abusive priests -and yet these entities
live with the compromises and may even come to accept them. Indeed, these
compromises are generated by a system of constitutionally guaranteed rights the
Church itself endorses. The Declaration recognizes "the need for the effective
safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts
of rights . . . ."4 It understands that "[t]he right to religious freedom is exercised
46
in human society: hence its exercise is subject to certain regulatory norms."
The Church "declares itself to be a claimant and a supporter of this order of
liberty, both with respect to the duties of the state and the wider and deeper order
of human society." 47
The Article is organized as follows. Part II provides a brief look at
controversies of the 19th and 20th centuries, with an emphasis on funding
parochial school education. It describes the Church's critique of and efforts to
reshape the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which ultimately gave birth to
the school choice paradigm in effect today. Part III focuses on litigation
arguments regarding the ability of Church institutions to claim autonomy in their
decisions regarding clergy and employment matters more generally. The efforts
of Catholic entities, primarily dioceses and schools, to shape the Church
Autonomy jurisprudence have led to judicial interpretations that offer broad
protections, but have also given us some of the clearest boundaries to autonomy
doctrine, especially on the topic of clergy sex abuse. Part IV discusses the culture
war litigation and the attempt by Catholic nonprofits involved in health care,
social services, and education to influence the Free Exercise jurisprudence in
favor of broad exemptions, both legislative and judicial.
All three Parts illustrate the consistent press of a maximalist religious
freedom argument and the remarkable degree to which Church institutions enjoy
autonomy and access to resources, even as their challengers advocate for the
imposition of secular norms and accountability to third parties. The process of
jurisprudential compromise still prioritizes free exercise protections-to the
benefit of Catholic institutions. While the Church will continue its advocacy and
defense of its place in American society-as it should when prudence dictatesthe concerns associated with endless political antagonism and litigation suggest
it may be time to reimagine additional modes of engagement within and outside
of law that draw more deeply on its role as "a sign and a safeguard" of the dignity

See infra Parts II (parochial school funding) and III (tort liability for clergy sex abuse).
Declaration,supra note 15, § 7.
46
Id. (emphasis added).
47
Russell Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, Religious Liberty, and Ecclesiastical SelfGovernment, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1035, 1044 (2000).
4

45
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of the human person.4 8 Such reflection might usher in a new era for Catholic
contributions to American law.
II.

THE POLITICAL-LEGAL COMPROMISE ON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE: FREEDOM, AUTONOMY, AND LIMITED AID
TO CATHOLIC EDUCATION

Funding for its parochial school system has long been a priority of the
American Church. Starting as an embattled minority in a Protestant culture, the
Church throughout much of the 19th century tried to obtain state support for its
school system as well as rights for its children who were in the common schools.
The Church continued to argue for school funding through the mid-20th century,
even adding federal funding to its demands. But the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board of Education4 9
set unequivocal restrictions on direct aid to parochial schools. This, to the
Church, signaled the secularization of culture and portended the loss of religious
pluralism. But it might be more accurately viewed as the jurisprudential
compromise among the many demands arising from that pluralism. 50
The no-aid separationism of Establishment Clause interpretation has
eroded and given way to a private choice paradigm, much to the benefit of
Catholic education. Yet the Church has never obtained the full parity with public
education that it sought for so long. School choice is marred by many political
and legal obstacles, and the patchwork of vouchers, scholarship tax credits,
tuition tax credits and the like represents-like the obstacles of a generation
ago-a jurisprudential compromise among many constituencies. The direction
of the compromise, based on the federal involvement promised by the Trump
Administration and the Supreme Court's renewed interest in the topic, remains
to be seen.
A.

Nineteenth to Early Twentieth Century: InstitutionalGrowth and
Constraint

The period of the 19th and early 20th centuries was characterized by a
growing Catholic population (predominantly poor immigrants from Europe), and
with it, increasing anti-Catholic rhetoric, mob violence, and discriminatory laws
throughout much of the nation.5 ' The Pope's anti-modem statements, including
See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, § 76.
49
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
so
See generallyJohn C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A PoliticalHistory of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279 (2001) (offering a political understanding of Establishment Clause
interpretation).
51
Id. at 299-300. From 30,000 Catholics at the time of the Revolution, the population
increased to 600,000 in 1830, to 3 million in 1860, to 12 million in 1900, and to 24 million by
1930. Id.
48
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the 1864 Syllabus of Errors and 1870 encyclical on papal infallibility, created
suspicion that Catholics could not be loyal citizens. 52 In much of this period,
Catholic children suffered harsh consequences when they refused to participate
in the Protestant practices of Bible reading and prayer in the public, or common,
schools. Bishops' demands for public funding of an alternative parochial school
system were met with enormous resistance. 3 Indeed, numerous laws were
enacted to prohibit the state funding of "sectarian" institutions and activities,
intended not only to prevent Catholic schools from having access to public
funding, but also to keep Catholic influence out of the common schools. In short,
hostility toward Catholics and other religious minorities characterized the
growing nativism of the post-Civil war period.54
Despite these difficulties, this era also saw the enormous growth of
Catholic institutions: dioceses, schools, orphanages, colleges, hospitals, old age
homes and veterans' homes. Church leaders actively sought civil incorporation
for their various entities to provide the requisite legal existence for acquiring
property, entering into contracts, and litigating to protect assets and defend
claims. Some of the earliest and largest dioceses were incorporated by special
acts of legislatures, but over time various Catholic institutions took advantage of
the corporate forms existing in state law. 56 Further, bishops and religious orders
chose to give separate corporate existence to numerous charitable, educational,
and healthcare institutions. By 1885, there were over 154 Catholic hospitals in

52

Brett G. Scharffs, Religious Majorities and Restrictions on Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L.

REv. 1419, 1438 (2016) (The Syllabus of Errors attacked "modernism, secularization, separation
of church and state, and religious freedom." It also denounced "indifferentism, communism, Bible
Societies, and modem liberalism."); Anna Su, Catholic Constitutionalismfrom the Americanist
Controversy to DignitatisHumanae, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1445, 1450 (2016).
53

Su, supra note 52, at 1451.

See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1879) (finding Mormon polygamy
ban does not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
54
s5

Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, in RELIGIOUS

ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 223 (James

A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Gerstenblith, Associational Structures]; Patty
Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, in
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW

315 (James A. Serritella ed., 2006); Viceng Feliti, Corporate "Soul": Legal Incorporation of
Catholic EcclesiasticalProperty in the United States: A HistoricalPerspective, 40 OIo N.U. L.

REV. 441, 442 (2014).
56

See Gerstenblith,AssociationalStructures,supra note 55, at 234-36. Over the course of the

19th century, the "corporation sole" became available and widely used by many Catholic dioceses
as the form of incorporation. Id. This form, which designates the office of the bishop to embody
the corporation (and owner of property), was a good fit for the hierarchical nature of church
governance and episcopal control. Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/4

12

Carmella: Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Politica

2017]

Catholic Institutions in Court

13

the United States, and by 1910, there were over 400.57 Religious orders of women
were particularly active in these areas. In addition to the many Catholic schools
they built and staffed, they also built institutions to provide for the needs of
people more generally, caring for children, the sick, the elderly, the poor, and
victims of war and epidemics. They were often invited by clergy who could not
take care of the social and medical needs of their communities; at other times
they were "entrepreneurial pioneers who were highly educated and devoted to
their ministries" and would get down to work.58
Throughout this period, Catholic institutions (and individuals with
church backing) demanded religious equality with the dominant Protestant
churches and were not afraid to sue to vindicate rights and to advocate for the
passage of beneficial laws. They sought acceptance on equal terms. Demands for
protection of practices and institutional needs drew on quintessentially American
values that undergird religious freedom: equality of all churches before the law;
freedom of choice to join a church; and autonomy for all churches, which flowed
from a separation of religious and governmental jurisdictions. 59 These values did
not reflect Church teaching of the time, which was founded on a long-standing
claim to a privileged legal position. Indeed, the very notions of "religious
'liberty"' and the "separation of church and state" were viewed as an aspect of
evil modernism. 60 But Catholics in America had the experience of living as a
minority within a messy pluralism and a free society in which their political
participation was permitted. 61 As early as 1830, de Tocqueville observed, "These
Catholics are faithful to the observances of their religion; they are fervent and
zealous in the belief of their doctrines. Yet they constitute the most republican
and the most democratic class in the United States ....

5
Stephanie M. Wurdock, Doctors, Dioceses, and Decisions: Examining the Impact of the
Catholic Hospital System and Federal Conscience Clauses on Medical Education, 6 PITT. J.
ENVTL. L. & PUB. HEALTH L. 179, 186-87 (2012).
58
Elizabeth Wilda, Catholic Sisters' Remarkable Role in EstablishingHealthcareAcross the
Country, MASS. FOUND. FOR HUMANITIES (July 7, 2009), http://masshumanities.org/ph-catholicsisters-remarkable-role-in-establishing-healthcare-across-the-country/.
59
DANIEL 0. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (2016). Indeed, there had
been some Catholic leaders in the 19th century who praised church-state separation as beneficial
to the Church's freedom. Su, supra note 52, at 1451.
60
Carmella, John Courtney Murray, supra note 16, at 129-30.
61
Id. at 133-34. Prohibitions against Catholics in office in the founding period were abolished
over
time.
Massachusetts,
NEw
ADVENT:
CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10024c.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). The Massachusetts
prohibition was abolished in 1821. Id.
62
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 384 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve
trans., Boston: John Allyn 6th ed. 1876) (1835). De Tocqueville pointed to qualities such as
equality of lay people and obedience to religious doctrine but openness to debate on political
matters, referring to Catholics as "the most submissive believers and the most independent
citizens." Id. at 385-86.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4

14

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[
120
[Vol.

Catholic legal argumentation in the 19th and early 20th century
contributed mightily to the later-20th century jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses, helping to frame the claims and defenses that continue to be made to
this day. Catholics made the first arguments in favor of free exercise exemptions
and against the targeting of a single faith; their public school litigation helped
highlight the fact that the schools were indeed religious and inhospitable to
religious minorities; they also highlighted the legal distinction between churches
and schools on the one hand and nonprofit charitable ministries on the other; and
they helped reinforce a church's right to found institutions and to select clergy
free from government interference. But by far the most significant contribution
was in setting the framework for argumentation for school aid. They attempted
to gain equal standing for parochial schools alongside public schools in their
efforts to obtain funding and support for Catholic parents. These efforts failed,
provoking a hostile separationist critique and restraints on aid to "sectarian"
schools, but also resulted in an important recognition of taxpayer concerns and
some movement toward a nascent "private choice" paradigm.
From the 1840s, it was a very common grievance that Catholic children
were required to read from the King James Version of the Bible (KJV), without
comment, often along with Protestant prayer, hymns, and instruction, with severe
penalties for refusal.63 Catholic parents argued against any Bible reading or asked
that their children be able to read from an acceptable translation.6 4 The litigation,
which began in 1854, claimed that coerced religious instruction and practice
violated religious equality, establishing a preference for Protestants over
Catholics and excluding students based on religious beliefs.
Bible reading in common schools was allowed in a total of thirty-seven
states during this period.66 Fourteen state courts had explicitly upheld the
practice, and only eight had struck it down.6 7 Courts typically found no religious
preference and, indeed, no religion at all: the KJV was merely a book for reading
instruction. Where the challenges were successful, Bible reading of any sort was
held to be "sectarian instruction" and therefore in violation of state constitutions

63
Most Catholic children attended public schools. Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church-State
Litigation, 44 DuKE L. & CONTEM. PROBS. 83, 95-96 (1981). Expulsion and beatings occurred.
Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417, 423-26 (Police Ct. Mass. 1859) (teacher charged
with assault on student, but it was found not to be excessive or inflicted by malice; student's
religious liberty was not violated because no one made him assent to any religious teachings).
6
See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 386 (1854) (Lawyers for the student asked, "[W]hy
in the name of common sense and [C]hristian charity, did not the [school] allow the child to use
her own translation? The moral teaching of each is the same.").
65
See id. at 399-400, 407-08; see also Curran v. White, 22 Pa. C.C. 201, 201-02 (1898)
(nearly identical claim; court did not reach the merits).

66

JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE: CASES, HISTORY, AND

OTHER DATA BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 411 (1987).
67
Id.
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or statutes that prohibited such activity in tax-supported schools.68 Yet the notion
that this was sectarian defied the common assumption that the Protestantism of
the schools was a lowest common denominator faith.69 Indeed, Catholics who
identified the sectarian nature of the practices in public schools were ahead of
their time: it would be another century before these practices would be struck
down as devotional practices inconsistent with non-establishment values.70
Catholic objections to the Protestantism of the public schools fueled the
call for public funding of parochial schools. 7 ' The Church made a religious
equality claim that parochial schools should be funded alongside common
schools so that one school system was not preferred over the other, and it made
the voluntarist claim that parents who choose Catholic education for their
children should not be penalized for their religious choice. But these claims to
public funding were met with intense opposition. After the Civil War, President
Grant resolved to fund only the common schools and to keep them free of
sectarian intervention.72 Senator James G. Blaine offered a constitutional
amendment that would forbid public monies from being controlled by any
religious group. 73 The Senate made the language even more demanding, banning
any type of aid to any institution controlled by a religious organization or any
institution in which any religious beliefs would be taught.74 Although the
amendment was never adopted, 29 states out of 45 had enacted state statutes or
adopted "Little Blaine Amendments" to their constitutions to prohibit the
funding of "sectarian" institutions and activities by the late-19th century.75
Indeed, separating public education from any Catholic influence became
important, with some states even banning nuns from teaching in the public
schools. 7 6 The anti-funding position has had significant influence on
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; the flat prohibition on direct school aid has
68

See State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8 of Edgerton, 44 N.W. 967, 968 (Wis.

1890).
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 50, at 298-99.
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer).
n
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 50, at 300-05.
72
Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada's "Little Blaine
Amendment" and the Future ofReligious Participationin Public Programs,2 NEv. L. J. 551, 551
(2002).
73
See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 38
(1992); C.M.A. Mc Cauliff, Distant Mirror or Preview of our Future: Does Locke v. Davey
PreventAmerican Use of CreativeEnglish Financingfor Religious Schools?, 29 VT. L. REV. 365
(2005).
74
NOONAN, supra note 66, at 191-92.
75
See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 50, at 305; see generally Green, supra note 73; Mc Cauliff,
supra note 73.
76
See, e.g., O'Connor v. Hendrick, 109 A.D. 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905); contra Hysong v.
Sch. Dist. of Gallitzin Borough, 30 A. 482 (Pa. 1894).
69
70
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survived from the Blaine era and even today, questions remain as to the proper
scope of state Blaine acts."
Despite the harsh restrictions on public funding of Catholic schools at
the state level, the United States Supreme Court protected the Church in two
fundamental ways during this early period: it permitted the federal funding of
charitable ministries, and it recognized the Church's right to establish its own
schools.7 8 These significant decisions-both involving religious orders of
nuns-paved the way for cooperative arrangements between governments and
churches in public ministries in health care and social services and also clarified
that while states could refuse to finance Catholic schools, they could not prohibit
them. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 79 a taxpayer brought an Establishment Clause
challenge against the federal funding of a building at Providence Hospital in
Washington, D.C., that would be owned and operated by the Sisters of Charity
of Emmitsburg, Maryland.so In the wake of the Blaine amendment, many
taxpayers fought the flow of government aid to any Catholic institution, not only
parochial schools. The challenger claimed that the hospital's "sectarian
character" involved the appropriation of money for the use and support of a
religious organization.81 The Court noted that Providence Hospital, incorporated
decades before as a private, eleemosynary corporation, was a secular
corporation; the mere fact that the members of the corporation were Sisters of
Charity did not "change the legal character of the hospital, or make a religious
corporation out of a purely secular one as constituted by the law of its being." 82
The funding, then, was for a hospital, not for a religious activity or institution.
The distinction between the Church and its schools, on the one hand, and its
public charitable ministries, on the other, had been set-and has continued

7
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017);
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also Brief of U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops et. al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-577), 2016 WL 1639726.
78
The Mormon Church, with its practice of polygamy, suffered losses in the Supreme Court
of the same era when the Court endorsed federal efforts to suppress that church and interpreted the
Free Exercise Clause to protect beliefs, but not actions. See generally NOONAN, supra note 66, at
194-207. In contrast, the Catholic institutions were law-abiding.
7
175 U.S. 291 (1899).
80
Id. The federal government entered into a contract to fund the construction of the building
for isolating contagious patients. Id. at 293 Once built, two-thirds of the ward had to be used to
care for poor patients, whose care would be paid for with public monies. Id. at 294.
81
Id. at 292-93.
82
Id. at 298. The institution has no powers beyond those of a hospital, and it is managed
"according to the law under which it exists." Id. at 299. "In respect, then, of its creation,
organization, management, and ownership of property it is an ordinary private corporation whose
rights are determinable by the law of the land, and the religious opinions of whose members are
not subjects of inquiry." Id.
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relevance for the many public contracts and grants Catholic institutions
administer for state and federal governments. 83
The second Supreme Court decision, Pierce v. Society ofSisters,84 came
at the height of anti-Catholic sentiment. Oregon sought not simply to prevent the
funding of Catholic schools, but to outlaw them altogether "to preserve and
perpetuate a homogeneous American culture." 85 A unanimous Supreme Court
struck the law on liberty and property grounds, using the substantive due process
rationale available at the time in constitutional jurisprudence.86 Finding that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state," Pierce held that the law
"unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control" and unreasonably
interfered "with their patrons and [led to] the consequent destruction of their
business and property." 87 The Catholic parochial school had been saved.
B. The Modern Periodand Limited Aid to ParochialSchools
1.

Everson: Rejecting Non-Preferential Aid to Religious Schools

In the 1930s, when the concept of federal aid to education emerged, the
Church began to ask for federal money; in the next decade, when federal school
aid legislation was proposed, the inclusion of Catholic schools was met,
predictably, with fierce Protestant opposition.88 But John Courtney Murray,
prominent theologian of the period, noted that this debate was about more than
money: it was about "the juridical status of parochial schools." 89 The Church
sought equal juridical status of its schools alongside public schools, an issue that,
as Murray argued, was "antecedent to all questions of financial support of any

83

See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672

(1971).
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (discussed in NOONAN, supra note 66, at 220).
Robert
Bunting,
Pierce vs.
Society
of Sisters, OR.
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/pierce vssocietyof sisters_1925_/#.WMrhaTvys2w
(last updated Sept. 25, 2017) (describing Klan support for the law and Church's Wall Street lawyers
to challenge it).
86
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (citing U.S. at Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))
(holding that liberty means "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
87
Id. at 535-36.
88
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 50, at 312-15.
89
John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 35 n.49
(1949) [hereinafter Murray, Prepossessions?] http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/voll4/iss1/2.
Murray argued that resources should be available in "some just, proportional measure." Id.
84
8
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kind[.]" 90 But the Supreme Court in the post-war period would insist that while
the Constitution protected the Church's right to create and maintain its own
91
schools, funding was a highly problematic proposition.
By mid-20th century, the Church had begun more systematic efforts to
offer a common position on legal issues, rather than relying on piecemeal legal
action of individuals and individual institutions. The National Catholic Welfare
Conference (the predecessor to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops) made
it possible for the Church to pursue a more visible and centralized church-state
agenda and made it easier to file amicus briefs and participate in advocacy with
one voice. 9 2 Litigation and advocacy regarding parochial school aid focused on
prioritizing free exercise and setting out an "accommodationist" historical
narrative of the founding period, which was intended to demonstrate that aid to
religious groups on a non-preferential basis was consistent with the
93
Establishment Clause.
The seminal Establishment Clause decision, Everson, involved a
challenge to a local school board plan to reimburse bus fares paid by parents of
94
students commuting to Catholic schools on city buses. About half the states had
such programs. 9 5 Although the program was upheld as a general benefit available
on non-discriminatory grounds, the Court rejected the concept of non96
preferential aid to all religious groups in favor of a no-aid position. The
historical narrative set forth by majority and dissenters alike sided entirely with

9
91

Id. at 33-34.
But we cannot have it both ways. Religious teaching cannot be a private
affair when the state seeks to impose regulations which infringe on it
indirectly, and a public affair when it comes to taxing citizens of one faith

to aid another, or those of no faith to aid all. If these principles seem harsh
in prohibiting aid to Catholic education, it must not be forgotten that it is
the same Constitution that alone assures Catholics the right to maintain
these schools at all when predominant local sentiment would forbid them.

Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing to
Pierce, 268 U.S at 510).
92
Pfeffer, supra note 63, at 93; see generally Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Indifferentism
Redux: Reflections on Catholic Lobbying in the Supreme Court of the United States, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 993 (2001).
93
ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950); CHESTER JAMES
ANTIEAU, ARTHUR T. DOWNEY & EDWARD C. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT:
FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964)

(scholarship regarding the non-preferential accommodation of religion in the founding period)
(criticized in Sullivan, supra note 92, at 1005-07).
94

Everson, 330 U.S. at 3; Su, supra note 52, at 1459-60.

9

Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 50, at 306-07.

96

The reimbursements did not breach the wall because the program was not "aid" but rather a

benefit that was generally available to students attending public and nonpublic schools, much like
police and fire protection. Indeed, to deny the reimbursement on the basis of belief or nonbelief
would actually discriminate against Catholics. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/4

18

Carmella: Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Politica

2017]

Catholic Institutions in Court

19

the "strict separationist" camp, detailing Madison's experience with Virginia
disestablishment to provide authoritative guidance.97 Despite the explicit focus
on the founding period, the Court was undoubtedly influenced by the Blaine
battles of the 19th century and the concern of church-state union. 98 It interpreted
the Establishment Clause to prohibit laws that "aidone religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another."99 A year later the Court applied Everson in
McCollum v. Board ofEducation100 to strike down a public school program that
offered children whose families consented once-a-week religious instruction by
a minister, priest, and rabbi according to their faith.
John Courtney Murray provided an extended critique of these decisions,
which he saw as embracing a "separation of church and state" that reflected the
anti-religious secularism of France, rather than the benevolence of America,
toward religion.10 1 First, the Court had assumed an unprecedented role in
education and in the parent-child relationship. 102 Second, in rejecting the concept
of non-preferential aid, the Court's historical analysis looked not to the founders
but only to Madison, who had argued that religion had to be free of government
restriction and free from government aid. 103 Indeed, Murray contended that the
Court had actually adopted a Madisonian theologicalposition that religion is "a
personal, private, interior matter of the individual conscience, having no
relevance to the public concerns of the state," 10 for him "an irredeemable piece
of sectarian dogmatism.""0 ' Everson officially subordinated Catholic schools to
the ideal of the public school, rather than considering all schools on equal

97
The wall of separation had been invoked only during polygamy cases. See Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (Jefferson had written to the Danbury Baptist Association,
noting that the adoption of Religion Clauses "buil[t] a wall of separation between church and
State . . . Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.").
98
See generally Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 50, at 297-318.
99
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
100
Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1948). In contrast to the
Protestant practices in the common schools of the previous century, this program was acceptable
to Catholics because it included their instruction along with other faiths in the community and
enabled public school children to have their own religious instruction. Challenged as a violation of
the Establishment Clause by the mother of a boy who was a non-participant, the Court found the
program unconstitutional as it directly supported religious instruction and aided "sectarian groups"
by delivering students through the public school compulsory education machinery. See also Zellers
v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (N.M. 1951) (nuns in charge of public school unconstitutional); Cf Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); see generallyNOONAN, supra
note 66, at 410 (for descriptions of other unusual arrangements favoring Catholics).
101
See generally Murray, Prepossessions?,supra note 89.
102
Id. at 24.
103
Id. at 29.
104

Id.

105

Id. at 30.
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juridical footing, whether public or religious, with benefits distributed
equitably. 10 6 And McCollum deprived public school children of the right to
religious instruction.10 7 Recalling Pierce, he wrote, "Apparently the child is not
108 For
a creature of the state-until he crosses the threshold of a public school."
Murray, the concern was no longer the anti-Catholic bigotry of the previous
century, but rather the loss of religious pluralism and the embrace of a "unifying,
democratic secularism." 1 09
In Murray's view, these decisions (and the historical narrative of
separation on which they were based) gave priority to the Establishment Clause
over the Free Exercise Clause in contradiction to the proper design of the
Religion Clauses. Noting the widespread accommodation of religion on a nonpreferential basis in the founding period, he argued that the history, text and
tradition of the First Amendment prioritized the Free Exercise Clause, and
subordinated the Establishment Clause to function in service of free exercise
values.1 10 "First, the concept of 'no establishment' is subordinated to the concept
of 'free exercise' as means to end; second 'no establishment' means 'no favor,
no preference in law."'" Neither school program violated the values of
"political equality regardless of religion, no one national religion, equality before
12
the law of all consciences or religions."
After McCollum, a stunning shift occurred: Catholic leadership no
longer opposed religious practices in public schools as they had throughout the
19th and early 20th centuries. Before McCollum, Catholic parents, with Church
assistance, had brought nearly every challenge to religious practices in public
schools. 1 13 But in the post-war period, as Catholicism and Judaism became more
widely accepted as "American" faiths,1 14 ecumenical efforts among religious
communities were on the rise. No longer battling a dominant Protestant culture
but rather an increasingly secular one, Catholic leaders came to support
voluntary, non-denominational and multi-denominational religious exercises.
Indeed, when school prayer and Bible reading were held unconstitutional in the

106

107

108

Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 36.

110

Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 31, 41-43 ("Historical Note"). See also Su, supra note 52, at 1459.

ill

Murray, Prepossessions?,supra note 89, at 41.

112

Id.

109

Pfeffer, supra note 63, at 96.
In 1952, the Supreme Court approved a release time program in public schools which
14
allowed students to leave school during school hours to attend religious instruction at their church
or synagogue. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952). Wall Street attorney Porter Chandler
represented a Catholic family in Zorach, in support of the program. Pfeffer, supra note 63, at 93;
113

see also WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEw: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS

SOCIOLOGY (1955).
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early 1960s, Cardinal Spellman of New York expressed his fear and outrage,
claiming that it "strikes at the very heart of the Godly tradition in which
American children have so long been raised."' 15 The alliance of Catholics and
other religious conservatives had been cemented.
2. The Lemon Test: Restricting Aid to Protect Church Autonomy

"

The mid-1960s marked the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council,
which involved the world's 2,000 bishops and produced profound reforms of
every aspect of church life-liturgy, sacraments, scripture, the priesthood, the
laity, relations with other churches and with non-Christians, and relations with
governments-thereby transforming the Church from a medieval institution to a
"Church in the Modem World." 1 l6 The Declaration on Religious Freedom was
issued during the Council, with Murray its principal drafter; in rejecting the
teaching of civil privilege in favor of religious freedom for all, the Declaration
was considered the great American contribution to the Council.
The mid-1960s also marked the high point of enrollment in Catholic
schools, with 5.5 million children in almost 11,000 parish schools and 1,500 high
schools.11 7 By this time, bus fare reimbursements and textbooks were the
allowable forms of state aid. But with the decreasing population of religious
sisters who for a century had provided a ready and inexpensive pool of teachers,
many schools had to hire lay teachers at a dramatic increase in cost. State aid
programs were being worked out, as states sought to avert the closure of Catholic
schools and the inundation of students into unprepared public schools. Thus,
Catholic legal resources were put toward lobbying and defending these
innovative types of school aid. In response to the concerns of how no-aid
separationism and secularism would affect parochial schools and the whole of
society, state defendants consistently pressed the alternative historical narrative
in the education cases, one that promoted accommodation along the line of the
argument Murray had set out in response to Everson and McCollum to allow aid
to be distributed to religious schools on non-preferential and non-religious
criteria.1
In a clear rejection of Catholic arguments in favor of aid, the Court
announced its three-pronged test in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman,119 which struck

115
Pfeffer, supra note 63, at 96. As in Zorach, Wall Street attorney Porter Chandler represented
Catholic parents who were interveners in Engel v. Vitale in support of the prayer. Id. at 93.
116
See generally, VATICAN II, supra note 15.
17
CARA Statistics, supra note 6.
118
See generally Sullivan, supra note 92, at 1005-07.
119
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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several state programs of salary aid to parochial school teachers. Lemon held
that in order to comply with the Establishment Clause, the aid had to have a
secular purpose, could not have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, and could not excessively entangle the state in the affairs of the
Church. 12 1 Most surprising was not that the Court held the programs
unconstitutional, but that it found that these programs could be of great harm to
the Church and the integrity of the Church's educational mission-despite the
fact that church leaders had sought the aid. The state's inspections and
assessments of records and curriculum, and other measures for surveillance and
control, would create "a relationship pregnant with the dangers of excessive
1 22
government direction of church schools and hence of churches." In contrast to
the bus fare reimbursements in Everson where aid flowed to parents, the aid in
Lemon flowed instead to a sectarian institution. 123 The Blaine era designation
and restriction were now employed not only to protect the taxpayer from funding
Catholic schools, but also to protect the schools themselves. Over the next 15
years, the Court struck many programs under an increasingly rigid reading of
Lemon, and special concern over the union of church and state remained a
persistent theme. 124 Indeed, even an official rejection of such a union at Vatican

Id. The National Catholic Education Association participated as amicus curiae. See Motion
for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the Nat'l Catholic Educ. Ass'n et. al., Amici
Curiae, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Nos. 89, 569, 570), 1971 WL 134362.
121
The entanglement prong came from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), in which
the Court upheld a property tax exemption for churches on the grounds that the exemption
precluded the entanglement of the state into church affairs that would have "inhibited [the
churches'] activities" by taxation or enforcement. Id. at 672. The Court found it constitutional for
a legislature to classify and exempt nonprofits, including churches, that have "beneficial and
stabilizing influences in community life." Id. at 673. While the Court referred to the exemption as
an appropriate "benevolent neutrality" of the state towards the church, the emphasis on nonentanglement is also an expression of the autonomy doctrine, which insists on institutional
separation to promote free exercise. Id. at 676-77; see also infra Part III.
122
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
123
Id. at 616. Secular and religious functions could not be separated; the parochial schools are
"an integral part of the [church's] religious mission" and "involve substantial religious activity and
purpose." Id.
124
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruledby Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). As intricacies developed over
what types of aid might be diverted to religious mission, some absurd inconsistencies emerged: the
state could not provide maps, but could provide atlases. In 1985, the Court in Aguilar v. Felton
struck down a federal program that aided poor children regardless of the school attendedcompletely distinguishable from other cases in which aid programs had been crafted to support
120
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II and specifically in the Declaration on Religious Freedom did not resolve that
longstanding suspicion.
Although the wooden application of Lemon became easy to criticize, the
Supreme Court's restrictive signals on aid did provide the Church with freedom
and autonomy to make decisions regarding curriculum and school culture;
Lemon also informed legislative and judicial notions of autonomy regarding
employment decisions in Catholic schools, which will be discussed in Part III.
Nonetheless, overturning Lemon became a goal of Catholic litigation,
not only in the school aid context, but also on issues of religion in public schools.
Catholic leaders, echoing Murray and the Declaration, continued to voice
concerns over the secularizing of the public schools and the wider society and
supported the return of prayer to schools.1 2 5 A more receptive Court under Chief
Justice Rehnquist began to reject Everson's separationist history, adopting
instead (on occasion) the accommodationist historical narrative proffered by the
Catholics (and, over time, by other religious conservatives). 126 And, indeed, the
rigid reading of Lemon began to wane by the mid-1980s in parochial school aid
cases, although it has remained quite strong in the public school context.1 2 7
C.

School Choice and Its Limitations

As reliance on Lemon eroded under the Rehnquist Court, the
jurisprudence shifted toward a "school choice" paradigm and the freedom from
church-state entanglement it offers. 128 A nascent school choice argument had
Catholic schools. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414. For U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops amicus
participation in many of these cases, see Sullivan, supra note 92.
125
Sullivan, supra note 92, at 1007 n.76 (describing Bishops' Conference amicus participation
to support of clergy prayers at public school graduation in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 579
(1992)).
126
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Cty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Area, 492 U.S. 573, 679 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), abrogatedby Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
127
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (no prayers at public
school-sponsored football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (no prayers at public
school graduation ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (no moment of silence
explicitly for prayer in public school); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (no posting of Ten
Commandments in public school); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (no teaching biblical
creation in public school). At the same time, protections for student-initiated religious exercise
were developing. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(finding Equal Access Act constitutional); DEP'T OF EDUC., GUIDELINES ON RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1995), http://bjconline.org/department-of-education-guidelines-on-religiousexpression-in-the-public-schools/ (last updated May 1998).
128
School choice programs typically require no additional state monitoring, supervision, or
oversight beyond what is already required by law to operate a private school-"performance,
reporting, and auditing requirements, as well as ... applicable nondiscrimination, health and safety
obligations." Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 619 (Wis. 1998) (state voucher program creates
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been percolating from decades before. 129 But by the 1980s the Court began to
uphold various forms of aid to religious educational entities against
Establishment Clause challenges on the grounds that these forms of aid resulted
from neutral programs of private choice.130 This school choice line culminated

&

no excessive entanglement). In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), for instance,
religious schools were eligible to participate in a voucher program as long as they met state
educational standards and agreed not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, or
"advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion." Id. at 645. Catholic schools already conformed to these
requirements. Id. at 647.
129
In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81 (1908), the U.S. Supreme Court allowed tribal
monies to flow to Catholic mission schools because it was the private, independent choice of the
Sioux to have their children educated there with their own trust and treaty funds. Churches had
been involved in educating Native Americans; after 1870, the federal government funded contract
schools for this purpose. Catholics had become the primary suppliers of education through mission
schools, and in the face of opposition to "sectarian" funding, suggested that the federal government,
with the tribe's consent, use tribal funds to pay for mission schools. Id. at 56 n.12. For the details,
see NOONAN, supra note 66, at 214-16. In Cochranv. La. State Bd. ofEduc., a taxpayer challenged
as a taking for private purposes a Louisiana law requiring tax monies be used to pay for school
books for all school children (to the extent non-public school students received the books). Cochran
v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1930). The Court found that the schools were not
the beneficiaries of the free textbooks; the children and the state were the beneficiaries. Id. at 375.
130
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011) (taxpayers lack standing to
challenge a tax credit as opposed to government spending); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639 (2002) (voucher program that includes parochial schools is constitutional); Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (parochial schools entitled to received state-owned computers as part of broad
benefit program); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (students allowed to receive remedial
education inside parochial school building); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993) (disabled students in Catholic schools entitled to receive generally available assistance,
even for devotional exercises); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(student can participate in state funding program for disabled even though money will be used for
religious studies); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (parents entitled to take parochial school
tuition deductions as part of a generally available deduction for school expenses). The U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops filed the following amicus briefs: Brief Amici Curiae of U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, Christian
Legal Soc'y, Council for Christian Coils. & Univs., Ctr. for Ariz. Policy, & Ass'n for Biblical
Higher Educ. in Support of Petitioners, Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125
(2011), (Nos. 09-987, 09-991), 2010 WL 3535061; Brief of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos.
00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 WL 1480726; Brief Amici Curiae of Christian Legal Soc'y
Nat'l Ass'n of Evangelicals in Support of Petitioners, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No.
98-1648), 1999 WL 638626; and Brief Amicus Curiae of the U.S. Catholic Conference in Support
of the Petitioners, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553), 1997 WL 86237;
see generally Sullivan, supra note 92; Walsh, supra note 29. On notions of equal access to public
resources more generally, the Conference filed the following amicus briefs: Motion for Leave to
File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the U.S. Catholic Conference Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (No. 80-689), 1981 WL 390038; Brief of
the U.S. Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Bender v. Williamsport,
475 U.S. 534 (1986) (No. 84-773), 1985 WL 669821; Brief of the U.S. Catholic Conference as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496
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in 2002, when in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,3 ' the Court blessed a school
voucher program that had 96% of its students in religious schools (most of which
were Catholic).1 32 Since then, states have experimented with a variety of broadly
available, neutral aid programs in addition to vouchers, including scholarship tax
credits, tuition tax credits, opportunity scholarships, and education savings
accounts.1 3 3 Without a doubt, the erosion of Lemon and the development of
school choice is due in large part to the consistent press of political and legal
arguments by Catholics and other religious conservatives.
School choice has renewed prominence in the news because of President
Trump's selection of Betsy DeVos for Education Secretary and her commitment
to support charter and religious schools. Sixteen states fund about thirty school
choice programs,' 34 but recently Trump has asked Congress to consider federal
support. ' A bitter national battle is ahead, between supporters of public
education and supporters of increased options. The lines are no longer
exclusively "public" versus "Catholic" schools. There has been an increase in
non-Catholic religious education, especially Jewish and Muslim schools.
Moreover, charter schools have emerged as a formidable competitor to Catholic
education, with conversions of Catholic schools to charter schools becoming a
common occurrence.1 3 6
Catholic leaders support school choice programs and are particularly
pleased with the prospect of federal intervention.' 3 7 Catholic school enrollment

U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 88-1597), 1989 WL 1127379; see also Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment
Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools-An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 5 (1987).
31
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
132

Id. at 647.

1
134

See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125 (2011).
John Schoenig, ParentalChoice, CatholicSchools, and EducationalPluralismat the Dawn

of a New Era in K-12 Education Reform, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 513, 516,
535-36 (2013); Dana Goldstein, School Choice Fight in Iowa May Preview the One FacingTrump,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/us/school-choice-fight-iniowa-may-preview-the-one-facing-trump.html?_r-0
(noting a total of 31 states currently
proposing to expand or create such programs).
135
Michael D. Shear, For Trump and DeVos, a Florida Private School Is a Model for Choice,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/politics/trump-devos-school-

choice-florida.html.
136
Many of the Catholic schools that close reopen as secular charter schools. See Janet R.
Decker & Kari A. Carr, Church-State Entanglement at Religiously Affiliated CharterSchools, 2015

BYU. EDUC. & L.J. 77 (2015) (Catholic schools close and reopen as a secular charter school,
usually with the same student body but without religious instruction and symbols); see generally
Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Charter Schools, and Urban

Neighborhoods, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2012).
137
See Timothy Michael Dolan, Opinion, How Trump Can Expand School Choice, WALL
STREET J., Mar. 9, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-trump-can-expand-school-choice-

1489016469 (Cardinal Dolan is archbishop of New York); see also Kimberly Scharfenberger, State
Catholic ConferencesPush Legislators to PrioritizeSchool Choice Programs,CARDINAL NEWMAN
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is only about two million, one-third the enrollment of 50 years ago, and 1,600
schools closed in the last 20 years. 13 8 In comparison, 50 million children are
enrolled in public schools and 2.5 million in charter schools. 139 Choice programs
that include religious schools are considered critical to maintaining and
increasing a Catholic educational presence and to stemming the conversions of
Catholic schools to public charter schools. 140 The Conference of Bishops and
individual bishops in various states have participated as amici in litigation to
support school choice; state Catholic conferences have lobbied for choice
programs. 14 1 Yet the nationwide implications cannot be overstated. The
financing and provision of education is an enormous task of state and local
governments. This is not simply about whether Catholic schools will be eligible
to participate in a choice program. The very creation of these programs has ripple
effects throughout all of public and private education, and any major
reassessment of public policy must include the participation of multiple
constituencies.
Indeed, there have been numerous political and legal obstacles to
developing more choice programs, given the concerns regarding the impact on
public education. One of the biggest obstacles is the Blaine (or similarly

Soc'Y (Feb. 4, 2016), https://cardinalnewmansociety.org/state-catholic-conferences-pushlegislators-to-prioritize-school-choice-programs; U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, OUR
GREATEST

AND

BEST

INHERITANCE:

CATHOLIC

SCHOOLS

AND

PARENTAL

CHOICE,

http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/catholic-education/upload/OurGreatest-Inheritance.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
Enrollment has fallen to about two million, down from five and a half million in 1965. See
'3
Schoenig, supra note 134, at 533; see generally Brinig & Garnett, supra note 136. The decline,
most rapid in the last twenty years, has involved not only loss of students but also the closing of
more than 1600 schools, most of which has occurred in urban areas. Id.
139
NATIONAL
CENTER
FOR
EDUCATION
STATISTICS
(Oct.
2016),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl6/tables/dtl6 216.20.asp. Out of 56 million school age
students, those benefiting from some school choice program are estimated to be 446,000. See
Goldstein, supra note 134.
140
Brinig & Garnett, supra note 136, at 53-57. Empirical research suggests that urban Catholic
schools have positive effects not only on students but on entire neighborhoods (for instance, by
suppressing crime), while charter schools do not. Id. These authors conclude that school choice
programs that include religious schools are preferable. Id. at 42-53.
141
The Conference joined others in an amicus brief in Brief Amici Curiae of U.S. Conference
of Catholic Bishops et al. in Support of Petitioners, Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563
U.S. 125 (2010) (Nos. 09-987, 09-991), 2010 WL 3535061; Diocese of Colorado Springs filed an
amicus brief in Brief of Amici Curiae Catholic Diocese of Pueblo, CO, and CO Legislators in
Support of Petitioners, Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo.
2015) (Nos. 15-556, 15-557, 15-558), 2015 WL 8009735; Indiana Catholic schools of Dioceses of
Indianapolis, Evansville, and Fort Wayne-South Bend filed an amicus brief in Meredith v. Pence,
984 N.E.2d 1213, 1215 (Ind. 2013); see also Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appellants by
Florida Catholic Conference et al., Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (Nos. SC04-2323,
SC04-2324, SC04-2325), 2004 WL 3202638.
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restrictive) language in 39 state constitutions or statutes. 14 2 State courts have
been actively deciding the constitutionality of their own choice programs for
decades, with mixed results as to the inclusion of religious schools. 14 3 The United
States Supreme Court has also gotten involved. While a decision on whether
Blaine restrictions on school choice programs are constitutional will likely issue
in 2018, the Court has addressed similar questions in related areas: it upheld one
aid program and struck another under the Free Exercise Clause. In 2004, Locke
v. Davey1 4 4 held that explicitly singling out theology majors for exclusion from
a state scholarship program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 145 Many
Blaine states have assumed that Locke meant that they are free to exclude
religious schools from private choice programs without violating the federal
Constitution. 14 6 In contrast, the 2017 decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer1 4 7 found that disqualifying churches from applying for

142
See Lutheran Trinity Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2041
(2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
143
For decisions finding voucher programs unconstitutional, see, e.g., Cain v. Home,
202 P.3d
1178, 1180 (Ariz. 2009) (violating constitution's prohibition on "public money made in aid of any
church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation" because program allowed
state aid to private schools); Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461,
480 (Colo. 2015) (choice scholarship program violated Colorado Constitution which bars aid to
sectarian schools), cert. granted, No. 2013SC233, 2017 WL 4052212 (Colo. Sept. 8, 2017); Bush
v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 412 (Fla. 2006) (scholarship voucher program violated Florida
constitution not because it breached a no-aid provision but because it diverted public funds to
provide an alternative education in private schools that are not subject to the "uniformity"
requirements for public schools); see also Eulitt v. Me., Dep't. of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 351-56 (1st
Cir. 2004) (parents of Catholic school students challenge statute providing tuition aid only to
nonsectarian private schools; court held they lacked third party standing to raise claim on behalf
of Catholic school and that there was not a Free Exercise or Equal Protection Clause violation).
For decisions finding voucher programs constitutional, see, e.g., Gaddy v. Ga. Dep't. of Revenue,
802 S.E.2d 225, 231 (Ga. 2017) (upholding scholarship tax credit program for low-income
children); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1226-27 (Ind. 2013) (choice scholarship provides
direct benefits to low-income families, not schools, and money is directed based on independent
choice of parents). The state constitution provides that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury,
for the benefit of any religious or theological institution." IND. CONST. art. I, § 6; Jackson v. Benson,
578 N.W.2d 602, 618-23 (Wis. 1998) (Milwaukee voucher program expansion to include religious
schools is constitutional under both state and federal constitutions because money is directed based
on independent choice of parents).
144
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
145
In Locke v. Davey, the Court held that under a state Blaine amendment, a state could
decide
not to fund religious training of clergy, and that such "targeting" of religion was not discriminatory
or in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 725; see also Brief of U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops et al. at 7-8, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315) 2003 WL 22087619.
146
These states might reject school choice programs altogether, or if they do sponsor
such
programs, might exclude religious school participation because their Blaine amendments forbid it
or because it is not politically feasible.
147
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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grants for playground resurfacing materials violated the Free Exercise Clause.14
The Court did not hold that the church was entitled to the grant; rather, it held
that the church must be eligible to compete with secular organizations for the
grant. 14 9 It is unclear whether the holding will apply to benefit programs beyond
safety grants. In the context of choice programs that explicitly exclude religious
schools, it is unclear whether Trinity Lutheran will be read to mandate inclusion
(because the schools are excluded expressly on account of religious identity) or
whether Trinity Lutheran will be read not to apply (because choice programs
differ from institutional grant programs, or perhaps because Trinity Lutheran did
not intend to address this particular type of exclusion). But the uncertainty will
soon be resolved: the day after Trinity Lutheran was decided, the Court granted
certiorari on two school choice cases and remanded them for reconsideration in
light of the decision. 50
Were he still alive, John Courtney Murray would likely say that the move
to a choice paradigm in Zelman is a better reading of the Establishment Clause
than in Everson and Lemon; the Zelman Court gave primacy to free exercise
values and interpreted the Establishment Clause as supporting parental and
institutional free exercise.151 Surely, choice programs give Catholics a chance to
compete for students and money, but school choice still does not represent the
"win" that Catholic leaders have historically sought: the juridical and financial
parity of Catholic schools alongside the public schools, as well as the
148

Id. at 2024. The American Bishops had supported the church's participation in the
playground resurfacing program. See Brief of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al.

at 16, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016) (No. 15-577) 2016
WL 1639726 (supporting petition for certiorari and arguing that the law discriminates against
religion without compelling justification).
149

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022. A plurality distinguished Locke as a case of exclusion
based on religious use as opposed to religious status. Id. at 2018-19. It noted that students could
apply for the scholarship program in Locke; they simply could not use the funds for ministry study.
Id. at 2023. In contrast, in Trinity Lutheran, no church or religious organization could apply for the
playground resurfacing grant program: the exclusion was based entirely on religious status. Id. at

2015. The same plurality suggested that the scope of the holding was to be limited based on
Footnote 3, but it is unclear how such a limitation will be understood. Footnote 3 reads: "This case
involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing.
We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination." Id. at 2024 n.3.
150
The Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a school choice grant program in Taxpayersfor

Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty., 351 P.3d 461, 473-75 (Colo. 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to three separate challenges to this decision. See Doyle v. Taxpayers for Pub.

Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2324 (2017) (mem.); Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137
S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (mem.); Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2325
(2017) (mem.). Additionally, certiorari was granted in N.M. Ass'n of Nonpublic Schs. v. Moses,
137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017) (mem.) (holding that longstanding practice of textbook loans to religious
schools violates Blaine language in state constitution).
151
Moreover, the Court's awareness of the 19th-century Blaine separationism played a role in
the jurisprudential shift. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (noting anti-Catholic hostility).
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accommodation of religious practices within the public school system, both of
which were mourned by Murray after Everson and McCollum. The constitutional
law is settled that there can be no direct financing of parochial schools and no
devotional religion in our enormously diverse public schools. Instead, a
patchwork of vouchers, scholarship tax credits, tuition tax credits and the like in
less than one-third of the states represents a jurisprudential compromise, in that
(1) Catholic schools have an equal claim to participate in choice programs that
include religious schools, and (2) parents can direct aid to Catholic schools where
allowed. Even if there is federal intervention in an attempt to bolster nonpublic
options-and even if the Supreme Court ultimately requires the inclusion of
religious schools in school choice programs-the battle on both legal and
political fronts will continue, with some states resisting choice programs entirely.
State-to-state variation and continued political compromise is likely. 15 2
III. THE POLITICAL-LEGAL COMPROMISE ON CHURCH AUTONOMY
JURISPRUDENCE: CHURCHES AND SCHOOLS,

1970s TO PRESENT

The Supreme Court began its line of "church autonomy" cases with its
1879 decision in Watson v. Jones,153 which prohibited civil courts from
intervening in any church's internal adjudication as to "discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law." 154 Forty years later, the Court addressed an
autonomy defense by a bishop in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila,155 holding that his decision not to name the plaintiff to an ecclesiastical
office, made under canon law, could not be adjudicated by a civil court.156 A
church's right to select its clergy remains a central part of the autonomy
doctrine. 5 1

152
While some call for a move toward an educational pluralism in which government
funds
only private schools, see, e.g., ASHLEY ROGERS BERNER, No ONE WAY TO SCHOOL: PLURALISM

AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 135 (2017), the current system (a state-supported, dominant
public school system and other schools funded through choice plans) inevitably will experience
continued tensions.
153

80 U.S. 679 (1871).

Id. at 727. Under this decision, civil courts were required to accept the
decisions of church
tribunals in hierarchical churches under an implied contract theory, as was the case for other
voluntary associations. Id. at 708.
154

155

280 U.S. 1 (1929).

156

Id. at 16-17. The Court held unanimously that the interpretation of
a trust (involving

appointment to and terms of pay for a chaplaincy) was left to the Catholic Church's canon law, but
that the civil courts still had jurisdiction to override any church tribunal's decision in which "fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness" had occurred. Id. at 16. This exception was later abandoned in Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); see also infra note 184.
157
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196-97
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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At the same time John Courtney Murray was decrying the
"separationism" of Everson and McCollum, the Supreme Court of the early
1950s was employing the notion of separate jurisdictions to promote institutional
free exercise as a constitutional matter. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
15 8
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, the Court held unconstitutional
a New York law that attempted to transfer control of the church from one group
to another, and interfere with selection of clergy. 159 Murray obviously accepted
the "separation" of church and state in the sense of two jurisdictions that are
inherently independent, a fundamental principle which has deep roots in Church
history and Western political theory. 160 Echoes of it were present in Lemon's
entanglement prong. The autonomy doctrine of Watson-Gonzalez-Kedroff was
embedded in this jurisdictional independence, and offered powerful protections
for hierarchical churches: courts would defer to final decisions made by official
bodies. Under this system, Catholic institutions enjoyed considerable freedom
throughout the 20th century.
Growing up alongside the church autonomy doctrine, which was rooted
in both Religion Clauses, was the modem interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, which began in 1963 with Sherbert v. Verner.161 The Warren Court,
casting itself in the role of protector of minority faiths, held that a burden on
religious practice had to be justified by a compelling state interest and no less
restrictive means to advance that interest. 162 This "strict scrutiny" standard of
review was the highest standard any constitutional right could enjoy. A few years
later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 163 the real implications of strict scrutiny became
clear: it established a system by which religious exemptions from general laws
would be mandated if a court found that the state did not justify the burden on
religious practice. 1 64 The vexing problem was, of course, precisely how to

158

344 U.S. 94 (1952).

Id. at 107.
See generally Richard W. Garnett, "The Freedom ofthe Church": (Towards) An Exposition,
Translation, andDefense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013).
159
160

161

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

162

Id. at 406-07.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).

163

Id. at 235-36. Allowing Seventh-day Adventists in Sherbert (whose Saturday Sabbath
16
practice created unemployment) to receive state benefits and allowing Amish parents in Yoder to
pull their children from school at age 14 rather than 16 (to preserve integration within the
community) did not undermine the larger goals of the unemployment compensation law and the
compulsory education law. But a Catholic conscientious objector who sought to be excused from
fighting in the Vietnam War by claiming it was an unjust war under Catholic teaching lost his claim
under a statutory exemption for such objectors. In Negre v. Larson, 401 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1971),
the Court held that he did not qualify for conscientious objector status under the statute because he
was not a pacifist opposed to all war but was opposed only to unjust wars. See also Brief of the
Exec. Bd. of the Nat'l Fed. of Priests' Councils, Negre v. Larsen 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (No. 70325), 1970 WL 122465.
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determine when curtailment of religious freedom is justified. Murray had
struggled with this question and offered a careful analysis, not unlike the kinds
of analyses in which courts engaged under Sherbert-Yoder scrutiny, requiring of
government "that the violation of the public order be really serious; that legal or
police intervention be really necessary; that regard be had for the privileged
character of religious freedom, which is not simply to be equated with other civil
rights; that the rule of jurisprudence of the free society be strictly observed,
[namely], as much freedom as possible, as much coercion as necessary." 165
In the 1970s, the heightened Sherbert-Yoder standard of free exercise
review, together with heightened separationism under Lemon, was rooted in the
understanding of religion as unique among human activities. This understanding
is reflected in legislative and judicial openness to promoting church autonomy,
the ability of churches to "manag[e] their own institutions free of government
interference."l 6 6 Exclusively religious matters are off limits to government. This
umbrella concept of church autonomy is operative in the Watson-GonzalezKedroffline, Lemon's non-entanglement prong, and school choice programs; the
concept has continued to develop in the last half century. Warranted by both
Religion Clauses, autonomy promotes institutional free exercise and avoids the
distortion of teaching and mission that results when government intervenes in
internal matters. As a civil law concept, autonomy embodies the Church's
understanding of its role (and the role of families and church-related actors) as
mediating institutions in civil society that promote human dignity, contribute to
the con-non good, help limit secularism, and ensure the "penultimacy" of the
state.167
Section III.A details the kinds of autonomy and exemption claims
Catholic institutions have been making over the last 40 years and the remarkable
latitude the Church enjoys to make employment decisions regarding its leaders
and employees, even as individual employees, particularly women, suffer the
harsh impacts of termination without legal recourse in most cases. 168 The Section
John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Problem of Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 127, 153-54 (Leon Hooper, S.J. ed. 1993) [hereinafter
Murray, The Problem ofReligious Freedom];see also Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Civil Procedure
165

and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the MinisterialException, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction,
and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BLL RTS. J. 43, 60 (2008) (noting that the more
recent standard under Emp 't Div. v. Smith (discussed infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text)
is problematic because it makes for an easier assertion of "public order").
166
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1373 (1981)
[hereinafter Laycock, General Theory].
167
See generally Kalscheur,supra note 165, at 93-94 (describing the "penultimacy of the state"
as developed in Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in our
ConstitutionalOrder, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37 (2002)).
168
See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of UnanimityofHosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1265, 1310 (2017)
[hereinafter Mystery of Unanimity] (describing a feminist critique of the church autonomy
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focuses predominantly on autonomy claims made in the context of employment
decisions regarding clergy and parochial school teachers, which often involve
issues of sexual morality. Even with fewer Catholic schools, the Church remains
intensely committed to controlling the employment decisions of those associated
with Catholic education. Section III.B describes how autonomy claims in sex
abuse cases, in contrast to employment cases, have been largely unsuccessful,
thus representing the boundary to the doctrine in a jurisprudential compromise.
Further, the Sections together demonstrate that while the Church claims-and
often obtains-institutional autonomy for its decisions regarding clergy and
school employees, there is continuous pressure to narrow the autonomy doctrine
and to provide recourse for discrimination that has no basis in religious exercise.
A.

The Autonomy Doctrine in Employment: Shared Mission and Morals

John Courtney Murray had appreciated that the founders understood the
ancient roots of the jurisdictional distinction the Constitution created between
church and state, recognizing the church's independence from the state and the
incompetence of the state in religious affairs. 169 When the Vatican attempted in
1783 to obtain permission from Congress for the right to appoint bishops (as it
had been required to do in Europe for centuries), Congress replied that it had no
jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters. 170 Regarding this story, Murray noted
that "in the United States the freedom of the Church was completely unfettered;
she could organize herself with the full independence which is her native
right." 171
This institutional autonomy is given its most profound legal expression
in employment law, which provides considerable statutory and constitutional
protection of a church's right to choose its ministers (broadly understood) and its
employees.1 72 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
employment discrimination, exempts certain religious employers from the
prohibition on religious discrimination.173 This exemption, as amended in 1972,
allows a church to discriminate in favor of co-religionists on any type of

doctrine); Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions,
Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 403 (2007); Angela C. Carmella,
After Hobby Lobby: The "ReligiousFor-Profit"and the Limits ofthe Autonomy Doctrine, 80 Mo.
L. REv. 381 (2015) [hereinafter Carmella, After Hobby Lobby].
169
Kalscheur, supra note 165, at 55.
170
Id. at 62.
171
Id. at 63 (quoting John Courtney Murray, S.J.).
172
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Note that churches and religious
organizations, including Catholic entities, are required to, and do, comply with numerous
employment regulations.
173
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).
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employment position, religious or secular. 174 It was intended to protect a
religious employer's right to select employees who share in its mission and its
right to define the positions needed for promoting that mission without state
interference.175 Held constitutional in 1987 against an Establishment Clause
challenge in Corp. of PresidingBishop v. Amos, 176 the exemption is viewed as
closely tied to promoting free exercise of religion by both institutions and
individuals, and to be a necessary precondition for a church's "process of selfdefinition."' 77 The Title VII exemption covers no other types of discrimination,
such as race, sex, sexual orientation, pregnancy, disability, among others.
The 1970s also ushered in the judicial development of the "ministerial
exception," which protected churches from any discrimination claim-not just
religious but also sex, race, and the like-brought not only by clergy, but also by

174

Id.

"This subchapter shall not apply to ... a religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e)(2) (2012) (specific protections for religiously-affiliated education).
176
483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (janitor and seamstress who were no longer church members were
fired from jobs with Mormon Church; Court found that exemption "alleviate[d] significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their
religious missions" and did not advance religion but only created space for religion to advance
itself). The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' amicus brief had made the same argument that
exemptions do not involve government action. Brief of the U.S. Catholic Conference as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appellants at 10-13, Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(Nos. 86-179, 86-401), 1987 WL 864775.
177
Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 342. Justice Brennan's concurrence voiced this
rationale:
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from
participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere
aggregation of individuals. Determining that certain activities are in
furtherance of an organization's religious mission, and that only those
committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by which a
religious community defines itself Solicitude for a church's ability to do so
reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations
often furthers individual religious freedom as well. ... The [church's] authority
to engage in this process of self-definition inevitably involves what we
normally regard as infringement on [an individual's] free exercise rights, since
a religious organization is able to condition employment in certain activities
on subscription to particular religious tenets. We are willing to countenance
the imposition of such a condition because we deem it vital that, if certain
activities constitute part of a religious community's practice, then a religious
organization should be able to require that only members of its community
perform those activities.
Id. at 342-43 (emphasis added).
175
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employees with religiously-intense functions." 8 Like the Title VII exemption,
this constitutional doctrine sought to avoid state interference with a church's
mission, specifically by protecting a church's autonomy in selecting employees
with religious functions. After four decades of lower federal court decisionsSupreme Court finally
many of them involving Catholic litigants 179-the
Tabor v. EEOC, 180
Hosanna
in
in
2012
decision
weighed in with a unanimous
which held that the ministerial exemption, as an affirmative defense to
discrimination claims, is constitutionally compelled by both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses.' 8 ' The Court found the exemption necessary to
prevent state intrusion in internal church governance regarding ecclesiastical
decisions and to ensure church control over "the selection of those who will
personify its beliefs." 1 82 Of course, the definition of "minister" goes well beyond
clergy; it is not without irony that for Catholics and other churches that do not
ordain women, many women employees find themselves considered "ministers"
18 3
under the law and therefore without recourse under discrimination statutes.
Together the Title VII and ministerial exemptions offer remarkably
broad autonomy protections. The exemptions obviously share close affinities
with the Watson-Gonzalez-Kedroff line, especially as reinforced by the 1976
Burger Court decision that a state court had no power to reinstate a defrocked
bishop. 184 Both exemptions also share close affinities with Lemon's notion that
the state should remain "separate" from churches to avoid "excessive
entanglement" in their affairs, lest the state intrude on their identity and
mission.' 8 5 These exemptions allow the church employer to defend its

178

McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).

See infra note 220.
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
181
Id. at 195-96 (2012) (former teacher sued for reinstatement, claiming she was fired in
retaliation for threatening to sue under Americans with Disabilities Act; Court found that her duties
and official church "call" to the teaching position made her a "minister" within the meaning of
17

180

exception). For discussion of the decision, see generally Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 168
(church autonomy doctrine is restricted to ecclesiastical questions, which the state is incompetent

to address).
182
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. A court entertaining such actions would constitute
government interference in faith and mission. Id. "By imposing an unwanted minister, the state
infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith
and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which

individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions." Id.; see also Kennedy v. St. Joseph

Ministries, 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011) (exception includes harassment and retaliation in addition
to termination and refusal to hire).
183
See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins ofHosanna-Tabor,88 IND. L. J. 981 (2013) [hereinafter
Griffin, Hosanna].
184

Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698, 713-16 (1976).

s85 Indeed, the Bishops' Conference amicus brief in Hosanna-Taborargued that:
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employment decision as a legitimate action to further identity and mission
without having to demonstrate a religious basis for the decision. And as with all
the autonomy cases, the implied consent of those participating in the church's
mission-the legal fiction that all involved consent to be governed by the rules
and structures of the religious community-is quite central to the doctrine.1 86 Yet
the jurisprudential compromise is at work. The Title VII exemption is limited to
religious discrimination only. Further, the ministerial exemption, which must be
raised as an affirmative defense (and not as a jurisdictional bar), involves
questions of both fact and law, which must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.187 In those cases of employment discrimination or other action in which
the exemptions do not function, the goals of promoting autonomy and avoiding
entanglement are not relevant.
The law protects Catholic institutions as broadly as, indeed perhaps more
broadly than, Church teaching asserts. The Declaration on Religious Freedom
emphasizes the public, associational, and communal nature of religion and makes
clear that "religious bodies" have rights. Those rights include the freedom to:
[G]overn themselves according to their own norms, honor the
Supreme Being in public worship, assist their members in the
practice of the religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and
promote institutions in which they may join together for the

[I]n its simplest and most obvious application, the principle of [church-state]
separation, rightly understood, means this: there are some areas in which the
church has no control-for example, whether a candidate is eligible for state
office; and some areas in which the state has no control-for example, whether
a person is eligible for church office.
Brief of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
8, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2011) (No. 10553), 2011 WL 2470845. The Bishops argued that the decision of "who will transmit church's
teaching to the young" is an area of absolute church control. Id. at 22. No religious justification is
needed "because the minister's function is itself religious, even if the reason for excluding someone
from that function is not." Id. at 25.
186
This doctrine has come under criticism. See Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 168, at 1299.
But see Carmella, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 168, at 399-405 (describing injustices to
individuals that result from autonomy in employment, especially when "consent" is questionable,
but noting broad acceptance of its justifications).
187
[T]he exception requires more than a defendant's status as a religious entity
and its assertions of the employee's role. Whether the employee is actually
engaged in "ministry" to the faithful-a matter "strictly ecclesiastical"-may
involve disputed questions of fact. The plaintiff-employee is entitled to contest
the characterization of her role as ministerial by offering proof of facts that
would show that she does not engage in ministry. Accordingly, contested
assertions that a case is governed by the ministerial exception must be resolved
through a separate motion for summary judgment, or a separate evidentiary
hearing with the opportunity for both sides to present evidence of the
employee's role.
Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 168, at 1279.
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purpose of ordering their own lives in accordance with their
religious principles.188

Specifically, the Declaration claims the right for all religious bodies not
to be hindered "in the selection, training, appointment, and transferal of their own
189 While the Declaration ties these freedoms specifically to the
ministers . . .
promotion of religious conduct, the ministerial exception does not; the
ministerial exception does not require Catholic institutions to establish that their
employment decisions are rooted in preservation of religious mission or identity.
The Church entity is required to convince a court that the employee is a
"minister" under the law; if it does, then whether the decision is in fact based on
religion is irrelevant. This arguably contradicts the Declaration, which provides
for intervention in situations of feigned religious exercise: "society has the right
to defend itself against possible abuses committed on pretext of freedom of
religion. It is the special duty of government to provide this protection." 90
Bishops and other leaders seek to control the religious mission of
Catholic institutions, so it is not surprising that they drew on the autonomy
doctrine when challenging the National Labor Relations Board's assertion of
jurisdiction over Catholic schools in the 1970s.191 The Board sought to allow lay
faculty to unionize and bargain collectively.' 92 At the Supreme Court, the
bishops-using the language of entanglement that it had eschewed in the school
aid context-contended that Board jurisdiction over these pervasively religious
schools created unconstitutional church-state entanglement that will "inevitably
alter the religious character of the Church's schools."l 93 The Court held for the
Church but on grounds of statutory interpretation.' 94

188

Declaration,supra note 15, § 4.

189

Id.

190

Id.

§ 7.

Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (NLRB did not
assert jurisdiction over schools that were "completely religious" but did over others that it
determined to be "merely religiously associated"). The Seventh Circuit had concluded on the
merits that NLRB jurisdiction over these pervasively religious schools "would impinge upon the
freedom of church authorities to shape and direct teaching in accord with the requirements of their
religion" and control the "religious mission of the schools" in violation of both Religion Clauses.
Id. at 496.
192
Id. The record disclosed that in some dioceses under NLRB jurisdiction, churches had been
required to reinstate teachers who rejected or challenged basic theological tenets, like sacraments,
in the classroom.
193
Brief for Respondents at 27, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S.
490 (1978) (No. 77-752), 1978 WL 207227. "Such intimate and continuing Government
interference with the administration of religious schools is precisely what this Court condemned
in Lemon, and Lemon's entanglement is plainly de minimis compared to that found here." Id. at
31.
194
See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 440 U.S. at 507. Note that the NLRB has recognized
unionized part-time adjunct faculty (except for Theology faculty) at Duquesne University. See
191
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Catholic leaders also require employees of parishes and schools to
comply with Church teachings. For Catholic schools, there is a heavy emphasis
on such compliance, especially in connection with teachings on sexual
morality.195 The Church does not always require that employees be Catholic, 19 6
but it typically requires employees (especially teachers) to agree to a "morals
clause" in their contracts, which prohibits life choices like a pregnancy outside
of marriage, a marriage not recognized by the Church, the use of reproductive
technology or contraception, a sterilization or abortion, or the public support for
any cause that opposes church teaching. 197 Courts have held that the Catholic
employer can invoke the Title VII exemption in situations where employees
agree to a morals clause. 198 This frees Church employers from the oversight of a
federal or state agency' 9 9 and allows them to avoid jury trials. The Bishops'
Conference has expressed particular concern over juries deciding personnel
questions, thereby "undermin[ing] the church's ability to safeguard and control

Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Spirit, NLRB Case No. 06-RC-080933 (Apr. 10, 2017) (decision on
review and order), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/06-RC-080933; Debra Erdley, Duquesne University
Loses
Bid for NLRB
Oversight Exemption,
TRIBLIVE
(Apr.
11,
2017),
http://triblive.com/local/allegheny/12183718-74/duquesne-university-loses-bid-for-nlrboversight-exemption.
195
But see Cathleen Kaveny, How About NOT FiringHer?: Moral Norms and Catholic School
Teachers, in A CULTURE OF ENGAGEMENT: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY 186-88 (2016)

(suggesting prudence on these matters, and noting that "sexual issues are the only issues that are
enforced under the morals clause").
196
Sometimes there is a Catholics-only policy. See, e.g., Newbrough v. Bishop Heelan Catholic
Schs., No. C13-4114, 2015 WL 759478 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (Title VII exemption protects school
that fired Lutheran finance director because of its policy to make the school "more Catholic").
197
See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (non-Catholic parochial school teacher
was fired because she married a divorced Catholic; morals clause provided grounds for
termination, which was protected under exemption). The teacher's contract provided that the
"[e]mployer has the right to dismiss a teacher for serious public immorality, public scandal, or
public rejection of the official teachings, doctrine or laws of the Roman Catholic Church" and
incorporated the handbook which had provided that "[eixamples of the violation of this clause
would be the entry by a teacher into a marriage which is not recognized by the Catholic Church,
or the support of activities which espouse beliefs contrary to Church teaching, e.g., advocacy of a
practice such as abortion." Id. at 945-46 (emphasis added). See also O'Connor v. Roman Catholic
Church of the Diocese of Phoenix, No. CV 05-1309 PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 1526736 (D. Ariz.
2007) (morals clause required employees to be in full communion with the Church; Title VII
exemption barred Catholic female employee who married non-Catholic from claiming retaliatory
discharge). Contra Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind.
2014).
198
See, e.g., Little, 929 F.2d at 944. Such a clause makes an employee Catholic by contract,
much like secular hospitals that agree to be bound by the Ethical and Religious Directives when
they merge with a Catholic hospital. See infra notes 362-63 and accompanying text.
199
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171 (2012).
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its teachings." 2 0 0 But policies and personnel decisions that focus on strict
enforcement of morals clauses, even when the violation is not flagrant or likely
to be a cause for scandal, run the risk of eroding the distinction the Church has
sought to maintain between itself and secular employers. 20 1
Employees alleging discrimination seek their day in court-and want to
get in front of a jury-by contending that (1) they are not ministerial employees,
and (2) the discrimination is not religious but falls into one of the unprotected
categories under Title VII. On the one hand, if a church fires a person for entering
a same-sex marriage or for having a baby outside of marriage-in violation of
the applicable morals clause-the church views this as coming within its
permitted religious discrimination, which gives it the right to employ "only those
committed to [its] mission."2 0 2 But the employees in these situations try to argue
that the employment decision is instead sex discrimination or pregnancy
discrimination. Courts have been willing to entertain these arguments on
occasion and to treat churches like a secular employer, especially when the
morals clause is arbitrarily or selectively invoked.20 3 Indeed, the most dramatic
of these involved a jury trial that recently awarded a fired Catholic school teacher
almost two million dollars in Herx v. Diocese ofFort Wayne-South Bend.2 0
Emily Herx, a teacher at a parochial school in Fort Wayne, Indiana,
underwent in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatments without knowing that these
violated church teaching and the morals clause in her employment contract.20 5

Brief of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops et al., supra note 185, at 27.
201
But see Joseph R. LaPlante, Officials Defend Teacher Morality Clauses: Dioceses Stand Up
to Criticism as New Contracts Direct Educators to Abide by Catholic Teachings, OUR SUNDAY
200

VISITOR

NEWSWEEKLY

(June

4,

2014),

https://www.osv.com/More/MediaRoom/Item/Tabld/90 1/ArtMID/1 3959/ArticlelD/1 5454/Offici
als-defend-teacher-morality-clauses.aspx.
202
Amos, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
203
See, e.g., Cline v. CatholicDiocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000). The court drew
this distinction in assessing the church's defense to a sex discrimination claim by a teacher fired
who had a baby outside of marriage. Id. at 669. The statutory exemption would apply if she had
been fired for premarital sex, which contravened the church's teaching, but the exemption would
not apply had she been fired because of the pregnancy. Id. at 667. The court held that because of
the factual dispute, the Title VII claim for sex discrimination should not have been dismissed. Id.
at 668. See also Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2012).
204
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind. 2014); see also
Rebecca S. Green, Jury Sides with Fired Teacher, J. GAZETTE (Oct. 2, 2017),
http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/courts/Jury-sides-with-fired-teacher-4094706.
205
The contract provided:
Acknowledging and accepting the religious and moral nature of the Church's
teaching mission, the undersigned agrees to conduct herself or himself at all
times, professionally and personally, in accordance with the episcopal teaching
authority, law and governance of the Church in this Diocese. Charges of
immoral behavior, or of conduct violative of the Teachings of the Church shall
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After her contract was not renewed for "improprieties related to church teachings
or law," 20 6 Herx sued for sex discrimination, arguing that a male teacher whose
wife had undergone similar treatments would be treated differently.20 7 The
diocese defended the suit on grounds of the ministerial exception and the Title
VII exemption. The federal district court rejected both and, in the process,
disregarded the morals clause.208
The court deferred to Herx's characterization of the claim as illegal sex
discrimination, rather than permitted religious discrimination; it rejected the
diocese's motion for summary judgment and allowed the trial to proceed. 20 9
Despite the church's contention that anyone, male or female, would be fired for
being involved with the use of reproductive technology, the court held that a
reasonable jury "could infer that Mrs. Herx's contract would have been renewed
had she been male and everything else remained the same." 210 The Court was
concerned that no process or standards existed for enforcing the morals clause. 211
The Court understood that with such discretion comes the potential for illegal
discrimination.212 Thus, the triable issue was whether the employer refused to
renew her contract because of a sincere belief in the immorality of IVF (and the
freedom to employ only those who share that belief) or because of her sex.2 13

ultimately be resolved exclusively by the Bishop, or his designee, as provided
in the Diocesan Educational Policies.
Herx, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1171-72. Also in effect during Mrs. Herx's tenure was Diocesan
Educational Policy No. P3020, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

Since the distinctive and unique purpose of the Catholic school is to create a
Christian educational community, enlivened by a shared faith among the
administrator(s), teachers, students and parents, the highest priority is to hire

Catholics in good standing in the Catholic Church who demonstrate a
commitment to Christian living, are endowed with and espouse a Catholic
philosophy of life, and believe in the Catholic Church and her teachings. Both
Catholic and non-Catholic teachers who are employed in a Catholic school
must, as a condition of employment, have a knowledge of and respect for the
Catholic faith, abide by the tenets of the Catholic Church as they apply to that
person, exhibit a commitment to the ideals of Christian living, and be
supportive of the Catholic faith.
Id. at 1172.
206

Id. at 1173.

Sex discrimination includes pregnancy discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
On the school's ministerial exception claim, the court found that nothing in Herx's job as a
teacher of secular subjects suggested a religious function; teachers of religion had different
contracts and religious requirements. Herx, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1176-77.
209
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014). The federal
appellate court rejected the diocese's interlocutory appeal of the denial of its motion for summary
judgment. See id. The appeal had been brought under the collateral order doctrine. See id.
210
Herx, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
207

208

211

Id. at

212

Id.

213

Id. at 1179.

1181.
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Further, the Court held that this issue was triable by jury, rejecting the diocese's
contention that a jury trial would involve an unconstitutional inquiry into
religious teachings.2 14 At trial, Herx succeeded in establishing sex
discrimination; the jury determined that her non-renewal would not have
occurred had she been a man.2 15
Of course, not all employment disputes are based on violations of morals
216
clauses-there are countless reasons for negative employment action. But
when the employee claims that discrimination has occurred, Church attorneys
frame defenses under the broadest possible readings of the ministerial
9
exception,2 17 the Title VII exemption,2 18 or both.2 1 A survey of decisions

214

The court explained:

In the ordinary Title VII trial, the judge instructs the jury along these lines: "In
deciding Plaintiffs claim, you should not concern yourselves with whether
Defendant's actions were wise, reasonable, or fair. Rather, your concern is
only whether Plaintiff has proved the Defendant [adverse employment action]
him [because of race/sex] . . . ." The Diocese has given the court no reason to
think a jury is likely to disobey that instruction in a case in which a religious
employer claims to have acted for religious reasons.
Id. at 1183 (internal citations omitted). But see Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 F.3d 130 (3d
Cir. 2006) (to allow sex discrimination claim to proceed would undermine school's ability to
maintain community of faithful and would involve the court in evaluating plausibility of the
school's religious justifications; pretext could not be considered because teacher failed to present
sufficiently similar comparators-males who spoke out, and were not harshly disciplined, did not
do so on topics comparable to abortion). For a discussion of the issues these cases provide for the
courts, see Stephanie N. Phillips, A Text-Based Interpretationof Title VII's Religious Employer
Exemption, 20 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 295 (2016) (concerned that courts and juries are entangled in
religious doctrine).
215
Pastor's testimony regarding hypothetical violation of morals clause showed that a male
teacher would not be disciplined, a male teacher who in fact violated morals clause was not
disciplined, there were no standards for enforcing the morals clause, and the amendment to morals
clause on assisted reproduction applied only to women. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2015 WL 1013783 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2015). The jury awarded
Herx $1.95 million, which has since been lowered to about $400,000. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend, No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2015 WL 10934320 (N.D. Ind. July 7, 2015).
Diocese has been ordered to set aside the award, pending appeal. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend, No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2015 WL 1093421 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2015).
216
Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (barring
religious discrimination claim of Wiccan technician even though hospital did not hire Catholics
exclusively or require a morals clause).
217
See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177-79 (5th Cir. 2012)
(finding a ministerial exception where a church argued a music director is a minister because of
the music director's important role in the celebration of Mass).
218
See, e.g., Kennedy v. St. Joseph's Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189, 190-91, 196 (4th Cir.
2011) (exempting a Catholic church from Title VII claims where the church fired a nurse for
wearing attire inappropriate for a Catholic facility).
219
See, e.g., Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 48 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1176-79 (N.D.
Ind. 2014) (rejecting (1) a ministerial exception, where a diocese argued a female teacher to be a
minister because she participated in prayer and religious services with her students and (2) a Title
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involving Catholic institutions shows mixed results.220 As to the ministerial
exemption, courts often find that non-clergy employees with liturgical roles and
parochial school teachers, in addition to clergy, should be considered
"ministers." 22 1 The Church has argued that parochial school teachers should as a
general matter qualify as "ministers" because they are aware of the church's
mission and are subject to morals clauses, but this strategy has not been
VII exemption, where a diocese argued firing a female teacher for undergoing in vitro fertilization
was a gender-neutral view of immorality). When claims against Catholic institutions do not involve
discrimination (and where the ministerial exception and Title VII exemption are not applicable),
the Church continues to argue for general principles of autonomy. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc. ofN.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of a church, where the church argued the right to exercise religion freely entitled
it to engage in the practice of shunning). Courts have been receptive to the autonomy defense in
breach of contract and torts cases. See Marc 0. DeGirolami, FreeExercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 105, 125 n.84 (2016); see also Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy:
FurtherReflections About What Is at Stake, 22 J. L. & REL. 153 (2007); Kathleen A. Brady,
Religious Organizationsand Free Exercise: The Surprising Lesson of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV.
1633 (2004).
220
For successful uses of the ministerial exception defense, see, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic
Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (barring music teacher's age discrimination
claim); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming
dismissal of director of religious formation's gender and age claim); Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic
Archbishop, 627 F.3d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 2010), aff'd on reh'g,No. CVO6-0028 IRSM, 2006 WL
3791370 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2016) (affirming dismissal of seminarian's wage claim for work
performed as part of seminary training); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2008)
(against priest's race discrimination claim); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir.
2006) (affirming dismissal of college chaplain's sex discrimination claim); EEOC v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 805 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of music
director's claim); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming
dismissal of claims by nun teaching canon law); Ginalski v. Diocese of Gary, No. 2:15-CV-95PRC, 2016 WL 7100558, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 2016) (granting motion for summary judgment
against parochial school principal's sex, age and disability claim); Fratello v. Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of N.Y., 175 F. Supp. 3d 152, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (granting motion to dismiss
against parochial school principal's sex discrimination claim); Assemany v. Archdiocese of
Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Mich. App. 1988) (affirming holding against church organist's race
and age discrimination claims); Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 768
N.W.2d 868, 888-92 (Wis. 2009) (holding against Catholic elementary school teacher's age
discrimination claim).
For unsuccessful uses of the ministerial exception defense, see, e.g., Guinan v. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F.Supp.2d 849, 854 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding a parochial
school teacher was not a minister under exemption); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206,
216-18 (N.J. 1992) (holding computer science instructors are not ministers simply because of their
status as nuns).
For the need for factual inquiry, see, e.g., Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus College, 93 F. Supp.
2d 200, 211 (D. Conn. 2000) (finding genuine issues of material facts to exist as to whether
teacher's responsibilities were religious); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756 N.W.2d
483, 499-500 (Mich. App. 2008) (remanding to trial court to decide whether teacher's functions
were religious; if so, retaliation claims would be dismissed, and if not, a trial would be held).
221
See cases cited supra note 220.
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successful after Hosanna Tabor, which requires lower courts to scrutinize the
222
religious functions of the individual claimant on a case-by-case basis.
Teachers have resisted efforts of the San Francisco Archdiocese to rewrite its
223
Moreover, church
employment contracts to define them all as "ministers."
attorneys continue to invoke the ministerial exception as a defense in seemingly
inappropriate contexts, even to discrimination claims brought by a cafeteria
worker whose offer of employment was rescinded because he was in a same-sex
marriage.224 Of course, if the ministerial defense to a discrimination claim is not
225
successful, the Title VII exemption defense might be.
Herx may indicate a shift in judicial attitudes. Perhaps courts may be
becoming less concerned with jury entanglement in religious doctrine. Perhaps
the numerous discrimination cases litigated over the last 40 years (not limited to
Catholic defendants) have resulted in some demythologizing of "church," as
courts and juries have gotten a window into the intricacies of employment
relations-which, in some cases, may not look significantly different from those
of non-religious organizations. Since both the ministerial exception and Title VII
exemptions are affirmative defenses and not jurisdictional bars, a church bears
226
the burden to establish one or both defenses in court and may not be able to

See, e.g., Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F., 136 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1114-15
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding a biology teacher with campus ministry and related duties is not a
minister under the exemption); Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168
(N.D. Ind. 2014) (rejecting a ministerial exception, where a diocese argued a female teacher to be
a minister because she participated in prayer and religious services with her students); Hough v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie, No. 12-253 Erie, 2014 WL 834473, *3-5 (W.D. Pa. 2014)
(finding a parochial school teachers were not ministers under the exemption); Dias v. Archdiocese
222

of Cincinnati, No. 1:11 -CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355, *7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (holding a nonCatholic computer technology coordinator was not minister under the exemption).
223
Mandy Erickson, San Francisco's 'teachers as ministers' debate continues, this time in
judiciary hearing, NAT'L CATH. REP. (July 24, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/news/parish/sanJim McDermott, The
franciscos-teachers-ministers-debate-continues-time-judiciary-hearing;
Hardest Year: Understanding the Contract Disputes in San Francisco, AMERICA: JESUIT REV.
https://www.americamagazine.org/content/dispatches/hardest-year2015),
12,
(June
understanding-contract-disputes-san-francisco.
224
Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., 33 Mass. L. Rptr. 287, *1, *10 (Super. Ct. 2015).
225
See, e.g., Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331-32
(3d Cir. 1993) (finding that federal age discrimination law applies to lay teachers, and would not

raise constitutional issues). In a case filed recently against the Archdiocese of Newark, plaintiff
employee claims sexual orientation discrimination under state law. See Daniel Hubbard, Paramus
Catholic School Had The Right To Fire Gay Guidance Counselor, Archbishop Says, PARAMUS
PATCH (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:37 AM), https://patch.com/new-jersey/paramus/archbishop-newarkcatholic-church-had-right-fire-paramus-catholic-guidance. A high school guidance counselor who
is lesbian was fired when the school discovered that she was in a same-sex marriage, in violation
of the morals clause in her employment contract. Id. The church is arguing that the Title VH
exemption protects its decision to fire on religious grounds. Id.
226
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 n.4

(2012) (discussing the conflict of whether ministerial exception is a jurisdictional bar or a defense
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stop a matter from proceeding to a jury trial.2 27 Given the greater transparency
brought on by the litigation process, courts may begin to interpret the scope of
the exemptions more narrowly.
B. Rejecting Autonomy in Sex Abuse Cases

Churches, though incorporated and open to tort actions, generally
enjoyed charitable immunity throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, with civil
authorities reluctant to make charities pay for torts and thereby divert resources
from the charitable activities. With the advent of insurance, however, state courts
and legislatures have been less committed to immunity. Churches began to
realize that they had become vulnerable to tort actions and began to defend
themselves with a line of constitutional argument as follows: churches enjoy
autonomy that allows them to manage their internal affairs free from the
interference of government; lawsuits entangle the state into the affairs of the
church; therefore, lawsuits violate autonomy. This defense has been ironclad
against some tort actions-like clergy malpractice-that would clearly involve a
court and jury in evaluating religious doctrine and practice.22 8
However, two Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on the automatic
success of an autonomy defense in tort actions. 2 29 The Court had, in 1979,
declared in Jones v. Wolf 3 0 that courts could adjudicate even intra-church
disputes if "neutral principles" could be found to form the basis of an inquiry that
did not implicate religious questions. 2 3 1 This considerably muddied the Watson
line of deference to church decision making.232 And in 1990 the Court held in
Employment Division v. Smith 2 33 that generally applicable, facially neutral laws
were fully applicable to religious institutions, despite burdens. Smith thereby
on the merits); Smith v. Angel Food Ministries, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1351 (M.D. Ga. 2009)
(finding Title VII exemption not jurisdictional); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n,
503 F.3d 217, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding Title VII exemption not jurisdictional); see also supra
note 187.
227
In Herx v. Diocese ofFort Wayne-South Bend, for instance, the diocese's
attorneys moved
for interlocutory review based on the collateral-order doctrine. Herx v. Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014). The court of appeals, rejecting this motion, stated,
"[Tihe Diocese has not established that the Title VII exemptions or the First Amendment more
generally provides an immunity from trial, as opposed to an ordinary defense to liability." Id. at
1090. The collateral-order doctrine would be applicable to stop a trial where a religious question
is going to be submitted to a jury, however, here, the district court is instructing the jury "not to
weigh or evaluate the Church's doctrine regarding in vitro fertilization." Id. at 1091.
228

1988).
229
230

231
232
233

See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 949-50, 953-55
(Cal.
See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595
(1979).
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
Id. at 602-04.
See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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lowered the standard of review under the Free Exercise Clause from the
Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny to rational basis. 234 Both Jones and Smith give
expression to the idea that religion is often not different from other kinds of
human activity, and should be treated accordingly. Tort law is now understood
to provide neutral principles for adjudication that are general and neutral law
under Smith. 23 5 Together, these cases signaled a narrowing of autonomy to those
situations of shared mission.
For the Catholic Church in the late 20th century, victims of clergy sex
abuse began to come forward in increasing numbers and sue dioceses and other
in
religious institutions.2 36 With a trickle of cases in the 1980s and an increase
23 7
Priests
story.
familiar
and
recurring
a
reveal
to
began
the 90s, the litigation
that abused minors were protected by their supervisors, despite the fact that the
abuse was known and/or had been reported. 2 3 8 Those superiors, often bishops,
either failed to investigate parents' claims of sex abuse of their children or, if
they investigated, placed the priests in ineffective counseling programs and/or
reassigned them to some other ministry or some other parish with continued
access to children. The parishes and schools to which the priests were reassigned
were not told about the prior abuse; families were told not to reveal the
information to anyone. Confidentiality agreements with victims were
common. 2 39 Files containing damning evidence were segregated and hidden.
Tragically, the desire to avoid scandal led to an enormous scandal by the turn of
the new century.
By the time the Boston Globe "broke" the story in 2002-when we
learned just how entrenched the silence had become-there was already a body

234
Id. Smith has had a major impact on free exercise adjudication. See, e.g., DeGirolami, supra
note 219.
235
See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
236

See Jo RENEE FORMICOLA, CLERICAL SEXUAL ABUSE: HOW THE CRISIS CHANGED U.S.

CATHOLIC CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS (2014); JAMES T. O'REILLY & MARGARET S. P. CHALMERS,
THE CLERGY SEX ABUSE CRISIS AND THE LEGAL RESPONSES (2014).
237

By the mid-1980s, only about 800 incidents had been reported, but by 2002, the number

climbed to almost 11,000. See KAREN J. TERRY ET AL., THE CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL
ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-2010 (2011) [hereinafter
TERRY ET AL., CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL ABUSE], http://www.usccb.org/issues-andaction/child-and-youth-protection/upload/The-Causes-and-Context-of-Sexual-Abuse-of-Minors-

by-Catholic-Priests-in-the-United-States- 1950-201 0.pdf.
238
The response of the Conference from the 1980s to the 2000s is detailed in SR. NUALA
KENNY, HEALING THE CHURCH: DIAGNOSING AND TREATING THE CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CRISIS

39-46 (2012).
239
See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65
EMORY L.J. 1657, 1688 (2016) ("By requiring individuals to sign confidentiality agreements in
order to settle [allegations of sexual abuse], the Church was able to hide the extent and systemic
nature of the abuse.").
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of case law on this issue, which has since continued to grow. 2 40 Victims suing
dioceses for clergy sex abuse have typically claimed negligent supervision. They
have also claimed a variety of other torts, including negligent retention, breach
of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment of a cause of action and
conspiracy to conceal, negligent hiring and ordination, recklessness, loss of
consortium (by family members), and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional harm. In addition to suits by individual victims, numerous grand juries
have been convened. 2 4 1 The grand jury reports have provided "staggering and
sobering" accounts of sexual abuse in numerous dioceses,242 and some criminal
liability for diocesan officials has resulted.243 Out of 195 dioceses in the United

240
See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: How LAWSUITS HELPED
THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE (2008); see also Matt Carroll et al., Church
allowed
abuse
by
priest for
years,
Bos.
GLOBE
(Jan.
6,
2002),

https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-abuse-priest-foryears/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html. Over 3000 lawsuits have been filed. See KENNY,
supra note 238, at 21.
241
Six dioceses in Pennsylvania are currently under grand jury investigation.
Peter Smith,
Advocates applaud new investigation of abuse by Pennsylvania priests, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE
(Sept.
20,
2016,
12:00
AM),
http://www.postgazette.com/news/state/201 6/09/20/Advocates-applaud-widening-probe-into-churchabuse/stories/201609200053.
The investigation is being conducted by the attorney general's office in
conjunction with a grand jury based in Pittsburgh. The state has subpoenaed
documents dating to 1947 from the dioceses of Pittsburgh, Greensburg,
Allentown, Erie, Harrisburg and Scranton, home to more than half of the
state's 3.3 million Catholics. That covers every Roman Catholic diocese in the
state besides Altoona-Johnstown, which had its records seized in 2015 during
the grand jury probe, and the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, already the subject
of grand jury investigations in 2005 and 2011.
Id.
242
Laurie Goodstein, As Pennsylvania Confronts Clergy Sex Abuse, Victims and Lawmakers
Act, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/us/pennsylvania-clergysex-abuse.html.
243
Bishop Robert Finn of the Kansas City diocese was found guilty of a criminal misdemeanor
for failing to report suspected child abuse, at a cost of $1.39 million for legal defense. Joshua J.
McElwee, Francis appoints new bishop for scandal-rocked US Diocese of Kansas City, NAT'L
CATH. REP. (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/francis-appoints-newbishop-scandal-rocked-us-diocese-kansas-city. Monsignor William Lynn of the Philadelphia
Archdiocese was found guilty of child endangerment, convicted for covering up clergy sex abuse.
See KENNY, supra note 238, at 45-46; see also Mitch Smith, Catholic Archdiocese in Minnesota
Charged Over
Sex
Abuse
by
Priest, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
5,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/US/catholic-archdiocese-in-minnesota-charged-over-sexabuse-by-priest.html. These charges were dropped only after the admission of wrongdoing by the
Archdiocese. Id.
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States, 15 have filed for bankruptcy, 2 " and estimates of the financial cost to the
Church nationwide exceed $3 billion in payouts.245 Although some of the money
came from insurance, insurers after 1987 began to refuse coverage for abuse and
24 6
for failing to screen, train, or supervise priests. The scandal has resulted in a
7
loss of membership and reduced donations.24 Academics have determined that
the decline in giving attributable to the scandals "is on an order of magnitude
larger than the direct costs of the scandal to Catholic churches (e.g., the
248
lawsuits)"-over two billion of lost contributions annually.
Some dioceses had begun to establish rules in the 1990s as sex abuse
cases began to percolate, but in 2002, the Bishops' Conference finally acted to
create the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, a new office
24 9
of Child and Youth Protection, updated in 2011, and a Review Board. A visit
to the Conference website shows its annual report on the progress of
implementing the Charter, 25 0 as well as the major independent reports prepared
for the Conference by John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City in
2004, with frequent updated reports. 25 1 These reports have determined that about
11,000 incidents of sexual abuse were reported between 1950 and 2002.252 An
Dan Morris-Young, Great Falls-Billings Diocese becomes 15th to file for bankruptcy,
NAT'L CATHOLIC REPORTER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountability/great244

falls-billings-diocese-becomes-i 5th-file-bankruptcy.
245
See David L. Gregory, Some Reflections on Labor and Employment Ramifications of
DiocesanBankruptcyFilings, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 97,101 (2008). This number is much closer

to four billion, according to Jack Ruhl & Diane Ruhl, NCR Research: Costs ofsex abuse crisis to
US

church

underestimated,

NAT'L

CATH.

REP.

(Nov.

2,

2015),

https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountability/ncr-research-costs-sex-abuse-crisis-us-churchunderestimated.
246
Sacha Pfeiffer, Insurer refuses to reimburse settlements over church sex abuse, Bos. GLOBE
(May 14, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/05/13/insurance-refusing-reimbursesee
hartford-archdiocese-for-sex-abuse-settlements/R8EY95Ud8ikxGtOWardjTIstory.html;
CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF

generally U.S.

CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 40-48 (2016) [hereinafter 2015 ANNUAL REPORT],
/
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/upload 2015-Annual-ReportRevised.pdf (showing statistics concerning payments made by diocesan insurance coverages);
O'REILLY & CHALMERS, supra note 236; Gregory, supra note 245 (discussing the effects of
bankruptcies declared by dioceses, even if those dioceses are covered by insurance).
247
See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
248
Vinnie Rotondaro, Researchersfind drop in giving in areas hit by sex abuse scandal, NAT'L
CATHOLIC REPORTER (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountability/researchersfind-drop-giving-areas-hit-sex-abuse-scandal (citation omitted).
249

See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 246, at v, 3-5.

250

See id.

251

See, e.g., TERRY ET AL., CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 237, at 7-13.

252

Id. (stating the vast majority of these incidents were claimed to have occurred by 1985). See

KENNY, supra note 238. For statistics regarding abuse in religions other than Catholic institutions,
see TERRY ET AL., CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 237, at 21.
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additional 3,800 incidents were reported by 2009.253 Some innovative
alternatives to litigation (and possible bankruptcy) have been established.254
Many institutions in addition to churches have harbored employees who
sexually abuse children: public schools and secular private schools (including
some of the most elite, like Choate and Horace Mann); 255 civic youth
organizations;256 and youth sports teams,257 to name a few. And all of them tried
to avoid liability, preserve assets, and protect their reputation. 25 8 But only
religious institutions, like Catholic dioceses and religious orders, argued that they
enjoyed a constitutional basis for non-liability. In three decades of tort litigation,
Catholic leaders have invoked the First Amendment as a defense to a civil court's
jurisdiction, discovery requests, and jury involvement.259 Of course, the

253

TERRY ET AL., CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 237, at 10 (providing

reports of sexual abuse reported to the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate after 2002).
254
For instance, the New York Archdiocese recently announced the establishment of a fund for
victims, the Independent Reconciliation and Compensation Program, to be run by Kenneth
Feinberg, who has served as mediator for the 9/11 victims' fund and for mass torts like Agent
Orange and Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Participants in this program would relinquish any tort
claim in civil courts. Josh Barbanel, FeinbergBrings Experience to Archdiocese's Compensation
Program, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2016, 8:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/feinberg-bringsexperience-to-archdioceses-compensation-program-1475801922.;
Kate King, New York
Archdiocese Panel to Compensate Sex-Abuse Victims, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2016, 8:46 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-archdiocese-panel-to-compensate-sex-abuse-victims1475769453. A similar program is being established in the Brooklyn Diocese. Sharon Otterman,
Brooklyn Diocese Seeks to Compensate Sex Abuse Victims, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/nyregion/brooklyn-diocese-seeks-to-compensate-sexabusevictims.htmlmtrref-www.google.com&gwh=FA392E29938080EE1218573C379DE9EA&gwtpay.
255
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harris, Sexual Abuse at Choate Went On for Decades, School
Acknowledges,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Apr.
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/nyregion/sexual-abuse-choate-connecticut-school.html;
Amos
Kamil,
Prep-School
Predators,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
6,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/magazine/the-horace-mann-schools-secret-history-ofsexual-abuse.html.
256
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Boy Scout Files Give Glimpse Into 20 Years of Sex Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/us/boy-scout-documents-revealdecades-of-sexual-abuse.html.
257
See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Report on Sexual Abuse in US.A. Gymnastics Urges 'Culture
Change', N.Y. TIMEs (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/sports/usagymnastics-child-sex-abuse.html.
258
See Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and
Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedoms, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1031, 1031-32 (2003)
[hereinafter Protection of Children];see also supra notes 255-57.
259
See Protection of Children, supra note 258, at 1051-55; see, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese
of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1220 (Miss. 2005) (reviewing denial of Diocese's
petitions seeking interlocutory appeals of orders (1) demanding all documents and interrogatory
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offending priests' behavior was never condoned, but as to the liability of the
institution, bishops and others have claimed immunity under the Establishment
Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the church autonomy doctrine, which is
rooted in both clauses. 2 6 0 They argued that Lemon 's prohibition 2 6 1 on excessive
entanglement would be violated with juries intruding into the relationship
between the bishop and priest, assessing theological doctrines, deciding whether
a bishop complied with church teachings and canon law, and setting standards
for a "reasonable bishop."2 62 They argued that courts should not be deciding what
information within the Church's possession is properly confidential.2 63 They also
argued that the Free Exercise Clause would be infringed, as the litigation would
be tantamount to state regulation of a church's ecclesiastical policies and
procedures, and that large punitive damages awards would seriously impair
religious mission.264 Finally, they argued that the Watson line of autonomy cases,
in which the state must defer to religious decisions on ecclesiastical matters,
precluded any civil court jurisdiction in these cases to ensure that churches are
able "to select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own
disputes, and run their own institutions." 26 5 In a few situations, they also made
the unfortunate argument that victims and their families had "waived" the
expectation to "secular standards of reasonable conduct," under a kind of
responses be produced to mother and three children alleging sexual abuse case and (2) denying
Diocese's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
260
See, e.g., Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1223. There is quite a bit of scholarship assessing these
arguments. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of
ConstitutionalProtections, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 271 (2002) (arguing the majority position of barring
tort actions against religious institutions by the First Amendment will be functionally eroded, if
not eliminated over time); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, ChurchAutonomy andReligious Group
Liability: Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789 (2004)
(arguing religious institutions should have no sweeping immunities from any body of law,
especially with respect to cases involving intentional failures to supervise); contra Victor E.
Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step
Aside, 80 CIN. L. REV. 431, 497 (2011) (arguing the church autonomy doctrine is an essential
element in the development of tort liability rules for religious institutions); see generally Marci A.
Hamilton, The Waterloofor the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse
and InstitutionalCover-Up, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 225, 231, 245 (2007) (arguing the Supreme Court
is right in believing ordered liberty is what the Constitution demands, and that an expansive sphere
of autonomy for religious entities is a mistake); Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a
Restatement of Child Sex Abuse, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 397, 434 (2014) [hereinafter Hamilton, The
Time Has Come] (arguing for the creation of a Restatement concerning child sexual abuse).
261
See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
262
Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1223-43; see also Kelly W. G. Clark, Kristen Spencer Roggendorf,
& Peter B. Janci, Of CompellingInterest: The Intersection ofReligiousFreedom and Civil Liability
in the PortlandPriest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 481, 518-22 (2006) [hereinafter Clark, Of
CompellingInterest].
263
Id. at 522-31.
264
Id. at 531-38.
265
Laycock, General Theory, supra note 166, at 1389.
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consent-based (or assumption of risk) theory of church membership.2 6 6 Church
leaders also decried extensions of statutes of limitations as catering to victims in
search of a "pot of gold." 2 67
The Bishops' Conference, as one of several religious amici in support of
the church defendants, pressed these claims as well in order to preserve the claim
to autonomy in managing religious institutions. 2 6 8 It argued that all day-to-day
decisions made to run a church are "matters of religious governance" outside the
province of civil courts. 269 The Conference contended that allowing tort actions
would violate the absolute right of churches to select and supervise their own
clergy
essentially plac[ing] the courts in the position of monitoring
through the tort liability system who churches select as their
ministers and how their ministry is exercised and overseen.
Allowing such claims thus runs the serious risk of forcing
churches to abandon what in many cases are centuries-old
(indeed, many would say divinely ordained) ecclesial structures
to be replaced by some secular model. Such a radical attempt by
courts to rewrite how churches govern themselves, select
ministers, and exercise their ministry must be avoided and
cannot constitutionally be required.2 70
Some courts agreed with dioceses' constitutional arguments and would
not allow actions to proceed. 271 The majority of courts, however, rejected

266

Clark, Of Compelling Interest, supra note 262, at 517-18.

Id. at 496.
Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Filed by the Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin.
of the United Methodist Church et al., Morrison v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson, 905 So.2d
1213 (2004) (Nos. 03-IA-00743, 03-IA-00744), 2004 WL 3398162, at *8-13 [hereinafter
Methodist Amici]. The Conference, along with other church organizations, argued that "[t]o impose
an employer-employee or supervisor-subordinate relationship upon churches can do violence to
their ecclesial structure and faith." Id. at *9. For the contrasting argument that litigation helps
institutions collect information and reflect on their behavior, see Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection
Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1055 (2015).
267
268

269

Methodist Amici, supra note 268, at *1.

Id. at *13.
See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998), aff'd on other
grounds, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1150-51
(E.D. Mich. 1995); Gray v. Ward, 950 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. 1997); Doe v. Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of St. Louis, 347 S.W.3d 588, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1260
(2012) (U.S. Supreme Court declining to address whether Religion Clauses protect religious
institutions from suits claiming negligence and negligent supervision and retention of employees
who sexually abuse children); Nicholson v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis, 311 S.W.3d
825, 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997); Mars v.
Diocese of Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885, 889 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2003);
270
271
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them. 2 7 2 For most courts, the general and neutral principles of tort law did not
touch upon religion at all: as a purely secular dispute between defendant and a
third party, tort litigation did not involve religious beliefs or internal disputes or
require interpretations of church law or doctrine.273 Indeed, most courts rejected
even the argument that tort litigation would interfere with the way a church
"selected, appointed, disciplined, and supervised its clergy." 27 4 One court noted
that "the 'excessive entanglement' prong of Lemon has been unnecessarily
expanded and extended by the minority of courts granting First Amendment
protection to religious organizations" from these tort claims.275 To agree with the
diocese's claim for immunity and, especially, to find that churches have an
absolute right to self-governance as the Conference of Bishops had argued
"would require us to conclude that ecclesiastical principles could reasonably
WL 388298, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1998); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780,
790-91 (Wis. 1995), reh'g denied, 540 N.W.2d 203 (Wis. 1995).
272
See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir.
1999); Doe v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (E.D. Wash. 2013); Jane
Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Or. 2010); Doe v.
Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Conn. 2003); Smith v.
O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp.
66 (D. Conn. 1995); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd in part, vacated in
part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Iowa law); Roman Catholic Bishop
of San Diego v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. App. Dep't Super
Ct. 1996); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015); Doe No.
2 v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 2013 WL 3871430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013); Givens
v. St. Adalbert Church, 2013 WL 442076 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013); Noll v. Hartford Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 2008 WL 4853361 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008); Doe v. Hartford Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 960 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370
(Fla. 2002); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002); Fortin v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Me. 2005); Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 77 (Ct.
App. Ind. 2011); Leary v. Geoghan, 2000 WL 1473579 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000); Mendez v.
Geoghan, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 417, 1999 WL 792202 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999); In Gagne v.
O'Donoghue, 1996 WL 1185145 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1996); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and
Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v.
Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 2005); Doe v. Diocese of Raleigh, 776 S.E.2d 29 (N.C. Ct. App.
2015); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997), leave to appeal dismissed, 690 N.E.2d 492 (1997); Jones by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d
927 (Sup. Ct. 1992); M.K. v. The Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D.
Ore. 2002); Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012);
C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1999); Turner v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vermont, 987 A.2d 960 (Vt. 2009).
273
Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). See
generally Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 168, at 1286-87 (noting that the negligent supervision
cases involve the question of exposing children to risk of harm, which is a concern properly in the
state's jurisdiction, and not about whether a particular priest is "fit for ministry," which is an
ecclesiastical question).
274
Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1221.
275
Id. at 1229 (emphasis added).
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impose or suggest different requirements for the protection of children from
sexual molestation, than the requirements generally imposed by society. This we
cannot do." 276
Church defendants have continued to press constitutional arguments on
other topics. They have tried to shield documents from the discovery process,
arguing for expansive privileges.27 7 They have tried to prevent jury involvement
and have continued to press First Amendment claims even after a jury trial.278
They are of course attempting to preserve church assets-and the many
ministries that do good works-as well as avoid compounded scandal. But courts
have allowed these abuse cases to proceed to a jury trial, and have allowed juries
to make detailed factual findings of how churches handled abuse complaints
because that is the way tort law works. If a church
has specific knowledge that children within its care are in danger
of sexual molestation, and if it has the authority, power and
ability to protect those children from that known danger of abuse

Id. at 1229-30.
In addition to the familiar, widely-accepted privileges involving relationships between
Psychiatrist-Patient, Priest-Penitent, and Attorney-Client, diocesan lawyers sought protection
under novel variations of a "First Amendment" privilege (a church autonomy privilege, a church
governance privilege, as well as free exercise privileges under the constitution and statutes) and a
privilege based on privacy rights under canon law. See id. at 122-21; see also Thopsey v.
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. NNHCV106009360S, 2012 WL 695624, at *89 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2012). Courts rejected these innovations, noting that they are bound
to the neutral principles approach which prohibits interference with Catholic practices. Id. at *9.
Courts focused their attention on those documents found through discovery that showed patterns
of priest abuse of minors, diocesan reassignment, and more abuse. Id. at *3-9.
278
In Wisniewski v. Diocese ofBelleville, a jury awarded a victim of a serial abuser $2.4 million
in compensatory damages and $2.6 million in punitive damages. 943 N.E.2d 43, 48 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011). The trial revealed a harrowing and repetitious history of sexual abuse and violence against
minors. Id. at 49-64. The victim claimed fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, and the jury
was instructed to find for the victim if it determined that the defendant diocese had failed to disclose
all material facts and that a special relationship existed between the victim and the diocese. Id. at
73-75. The Diocese, denying such a relationship, argued that this was a matter of law for the court
and not the jury, and that the inquiry was barred by the First Amendment. Id. at 75-77. The
appellate court held that this was a factual issue properly submitted to the jury and entirely secular
in nature that:
did not require the court or the jury to engage in interpretation of religious
doctrine ... To invoke the protection of the first amendment, the Diocese must
assert that the conduct at issue was 'rooted in religious belief.' The Diocese
does not and cannot contend that its silence about the abuse committed by [the
priest] was a part of Catholic religious beliefs and practices. On the contrary,
the evidence at the trial established that the Diocese considered Wisniewski's
abuse as 'dirty laundry' that it did not want to hang out in public.
Id. at 77.
276
277
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and molestation, it is for a jury to determine whether it took
reasonable steps to protect the children.279
Dioceses have also defended against "windows" legislation, which
abuse victims to sue after the statute of limitation has expired.280 In
sex
allows
litigation, dioceses focus their defense on due process concerns, on retroactivity,
and on free exercise violations when churches are targeted-without much
success. 2 8 1 In the legislative arena, state Catholic conferences have lobbied
actively to oppose such windows amendments, spending millions of dollars in
the process.
In light of lawsuits like these and the threat of thousands more, 15
dioceses have turned to bankruptcy protection.28 3 Many of the filings occurred
right before trials commenced. 284 Even though the dioceses voluntarily submit to
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and federal bankruptcy law, they have

279

Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1222.

280

Hamilton, The Time Has Come, supra note 260, at 401-03.

281
See, e.g., Melanie H. v. Sisters of Precious Blood, Civil No. 04-1596-WQH-(WMc) at 7-8
(S.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that windows legislation does not target religious exercise because child
abuse is not a religious belief or practice); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119
A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015) (upholding statutes allowing revival of otherwise time-barred sexual abuse
claims under rational basis review); see also Hamilton, The Time Has Come, supra note 260, at
401-03.
282
See, e.g., Reuters, The CatholicChurch isfighting to block bills that would extend the statute
of limitations for reporting sex abuse, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 10, 2015, 2:53 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-as-pope-visit-nears-us-sex-victims-say-church-remainsobstacle-to-justice-2015-9 (noting that six states have extended the statute of limitation period for
child sex abuse, while others refuse because of concerns that extensions would force schools to
close and force cuts to other programs).
283
Morris-Young, supra note 244 (noting 15 dioceses and 2 religious communities which have
filed for bankruptcy related to the fallout of sexual abuse by clergy). Those dioceses are
Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon (filed 2004); Diocese of Tucson, Arizona (filed 2004); Diocese
of Spokane, Washington (filed 2004); Diocese of Davenport, Iowa (filed 2006); Diocese of San
Diego, California (filed 2007); Diocese of Fairbanks, Alaska (filed 2008); Diocese of Wilmington,
Delaware (filed 2009); Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Wisconsin (filed 2011); Diocese of Gallup,
New Mexico (filed 2013); Diocese of Stockton, California (filed 2014); Diocese of Helena,
Montana (filed 2014); Diocese of Duluth, Minnesota (filed 2015); Archdiocese of St. Paul and
Minneapolis (filed 2015); Diocese of New Ulm, Minnesota (filed 2017); Diocese of Great FallsBillings, Montana (filed 2017). Bankruptcy Protection in the Abuse Crisis,

BISHOPAccouNTABLIY.ORG,

http://www.bishop-accountability.org/bankruptcy.htm#NewUlm

(last visited Oct. 5, 2017); see also Amy Julia Harris, Catholic diocese declare bankruptcy on eve
of sexual abuse trials, REvEAL (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/catholicdioceses-declare-bankruptcy-on-eve-of-sexual-abuse-trials/. For the issues raised in diocesan
bankruptcies, see generally Kathleen M. Boozang, Symposium: Bankruptcy in the Religious NonProfitContext, 29 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 341 (2005).
284
Amy Julia Harris, supra note 283 (stating that the civil trials on abuse are suspended during
pendency of bankruptcy and the abuse claims are all settled during bankruptcy).
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continued to make free exercise, establishment, and autonomy claims. 2 85 Bishops
have argued that the First Amendment's non-entanglement requirements and
statutory free exercise protection under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),28 6 which is applicable to the federal bankruptcy code, compel courts to
defer to canon law to define the debtor's property-in order to prevent the tort
creditors, in effect, from reaching parish and school assets.287 The bankruptcy
courts have been unwilling to adopt canon law definitions, as these courts employ
neutral principles of state property law, but federal district courts, in yet another
instance of compromise, have been more willing to allow the bankruptcy courts
to consider canon law and various trust theories when determining facts and
intent. 288 Professor David Gregory notes that one of the consequences of
285
For an overview, see Colin M. Downes, Note, Appointing Chapter 11 Trustees in
Reorganizations of Religious Institutions, 101 VA. L. REv. 2225, 2250 (2015) (stating that

government benefits, like Chapter 11 reorganization, may not be conditioned on waiving free
exercise rights); Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan DebtorDilemma, 79 S.
CAL. L. REv. 363 (2006).
286
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (1)-(4) (2012).
287
The argument runs as follows: dioceses are incorporated as corporations sole, where
available, which makes the Bishop the owner of all property under state law. But under canon law,
the diocese, parishes, and schools are separate juridical entities, and so the diocese "owns" parish
property as a trustee would, on behalf of the equitable owner-the parish. See Patricia Williams,
PartII. What is the Property of the Estate: The Trust Theories, The Church in Chapter 11: The
Lessons of the Catholic Diocese Cases, Am. BANKR. INST., 2008 Meeting 080403 ABI-CLE 589.
Property for which a debtor owns mere legal title is not considered property of the debtor under
the bankruptcy code. For a bankruptcy court to include parishes and schools in the debtor's estate
would mean that victims would be able to reach far more property under state law than under canon
law, and it would also threaten to deplete the assets of parishes, which were not involved in the
diocesan decisions concerning abusive priests. See generally Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Keeping
the Faith: The Rights of Parishionersin Church Reorganizations, 82 WASH. L. REv. 75 (2007);
Jennifer L. Ryan, The Delicate Balance Between Religious Freedoms and Legal Accountability in
an Increasingly Litigious Society, 24 J. OF Civ. RIGHTS & EcoN. DEV. 243, 263-65 (2009),
http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context-jcred (describing in
detail the potential free exercise burdens befalling parishes whose assets are depleted); The tort
claimants have responded that state courts have recognized total ownership and control by dioceses
in other contexts, to the benefit of the dioceses, and that the parishes have no separate existence
under civil law.
288
See, e.g., Nicholas P. Cafardi, The Availability of Parish Assets for Diocesan Debts: A
CanonicalAnalysis, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 361 (2005); Melanie DiPietro, S.C., The Relevance
of Canon Law in a Bankruptcy Proceeding,29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 399 (2005); W. Cole Durham
and Robert Smith, Application ofthe FirstAmendment andthe Religious Freedom Restoration Act
to determine the property of the bankruptcy estate, 2 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW
§ 13:21 (Mar. 2017 update) (courts not required to recognize canon law, but may look to canon
law for fact determinations about ownership); and Williams, supra note 287. Not all constitutional
claims have been rejected in the bankruptcy context. Sex abuse victims tried to bring a $55 million
cemetery trust into the debtor's estate, but the federal district court denied the move and reversed
the bankruptcy court. In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Debtor v. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors, 496 B.R. 905, 910 (E.D. Wis. 2013). The court held that under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(lM4), appropriating the trust monies substantially
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bankruptcies may be that lay faculty at Catholic schools begin to unionize
successfully, given institutional instability. 289 Despite NLRB v. CatholicBishop
of ChicagO 290 which permitted the disregard of such efforts, courts now are
"decidedly more skeptical of the institutional employer Church's defenses. The
Church has become so interwoven in the legal system . . . [with bankruptcy
filings] that some courts may correctly perceive that that Church has acquiesced
in allowing itself to be governed by more than just canon law."29 1
The jurisprudential compromise that recognizes autonomy-based
exemptions in employment jurisprudence but resists them in tort litigation is not
at all surprising. Initially, Catholic institutions defending sex abuse cases claimed
that they could not be sued because they had the absolute right to appoint and
assign clergy. But this expansive notion of autonomy shares none of the
characteristics of the autonomy-based defenses in the employment area.
Autonomy in employment is based on the presumption that it allows churches to
gather persons to promote a shared religious mission. It is also based on the
presumption of implied or express consent among all those persons-church
leaders, employees, and the faithful-to advance that shared mission within the
institution's governance structure.29 2 Thus, autonomy in employment is
fundamentally a mechanism for promoting the free exercise of religion by the
institution, which "furthers individual religious freedom as well" 29 3 and
promotes the common good and religious pluralism. No such salutary goals are
promoted by the application of autonomy principles to situations where decisions
of ecclesiastical authorities ignored the devastating human cost of the illegal
actions of their employees.294

burdened the diocese's religious exercise and was not the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest. Id. The fund had been created in 2007 to shelter cemetery assets

from sex abuse awards. Id.
289

Gregory, supra note 245.

290

440 U.S. 490 (1979).

291

Gregory, supra note 245, at 126.
292
See supra notes 172 and 186 and accompanying text; see also Methodist Amici, supra note
268 at * 12 (arguing that "[iut may be acceptable for courts to find that a business entity should have
structured its business to provide more supervision or different supervision over its employees. It
is another thing entirely for courts to hold that a group of people who have voluntarily associated
with each other to exercise their common faith must adopt a supervisory model selected by a jury

or be found liable for failing to do so").
293

Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.

327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
294
Some scholars disagree with the distinction, arguing instead that the employee and the abuse
victim are similarly situated. See, e.g., Griffin, Hosanna, supra note 183.
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IV. THE POLITICAL-LEGAL COMPROMISE ON FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION
JURISPRUDENCE: CATHOLIC NONPROFITS
AND THE "CULTURE WARS," 1970s TO PRESENT

The previous Parts of this Article indicate that boundaries to religious
freedom are being worked out all the time, with jurisprudential lines shifting and
forming: school aid through private, independent choice is acceptable (even
when most of the money flows to Catholic schools); protection of operational
autonomy for shared mission is acceptable (even in the face of negative impacts
on particular employees). At the same time, Catholic institutions do not obtain
the maximalist religious freedom they have demanded: juridical and funding
equity in education; autonomy from judicial scrutiny for all discretionary
employment decisions and for mass tort litigation; and the full recognition of
canon law in the bankruptcy context. Clearly, the political and judicial processes
produce compromises on these topics.
The political-legal compromise that will result on "culture war" issues
remains to be seen. While Catholic institutions with "public" ministries in health
care, higher education, and social services generally comply with a host of
governmental regulations on numerous topics, they seek to be free of moral
compromise on culture war issues. Amid enormous social change of the last 40
years, Catholic hospitals, colleges, and service agencies have sought conscience
protections and exemptions to ensure they would not be required to participate
in any way that violates church teaching on matters of abortion, contraception,
and same-sex relations, even when accepting and administering public monies.
In addition to numerous legislative protections, several court decisions have
interpreted free exercise very generously, which has led church attorneys to
assume the Church will continue to prevail in its maximalist claims.2 95 Despite
legislative and judicial solicitude, however, challenges have begun to surface.
New attention to "third-party harms" makes exemptions vulnerable, both
politically and legally. Catholic institutions will argue in legislatures and in
courts for broad exemptions to protect conscience and teaching; secular groups
will argue for narrow exemptions, if not strict compliance with law. Is the current
conscience exemption regime already the appropriate political-legal
compromise? Or will a different balance be struck among multiple stake holders,
including employees, students, patients, agency clients, grant beneficiaries and
the Church? In short, how will religious freedom come to be defined for these
public ministries?
This Part offers no answer but rather suggests some frameworks for
analysis. But first, it reviews the role of Catholic institutions in the culture wars
of the last 40 years, beginning with a summary of their lobbying activity and then
moving to the legislative and judicial protections and exemptions granted and
295
See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
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continued litigation. The discussion of exemptions looks at protections that allow
Catholic institutions to avoid participation in acts that contravene church
teaching. Finally, the discussion assesses various frameworks for compromise,
like the notion of "refuse but refer" that has been developed in the pharmacist
context and the "accommodation" for religious nonprofits in the ACA
contraception mandate, which ensures coverage to employees but places
responsibility for delivering coverage on insurers, rather than on objecting
religious employers.
A.

Lobbying

Complementing the Church's inward focus to preserve its identity and
autonomy is the Church's outward focus to address the wider American society.
The Declaration provides for the right of religious bodies to engage in "public
teaching and witness to their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written
word." 2 96 It also recognizes the freedom of churches to participate in the civil
conversation to "show the special value of their doctrine in what concerns the
2 97
organization of society and the inspiration of the whole of human activity."
Thus, in addition to the freedom to share the faith with others, churches also bear
freedom to try to persuade citizens about a vision of the good life in temporal
terms.298 Through the Church's participation in political discourse and legal
advocacy to restrict abortion and same-sex marriage, it has understood itself to
be speaking prophetically, to be "teaching" and "witnessing" to a secularized
culture about the proper aims of sexuality and the nature and meaning of human
life. In this connection, it has actively focused its opposition to contraception,
sterilization, assisted reproduction, embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia,
physician-assisted suicide and related topics. But its participation has gone well
beyond these edge-of-life topics. Reflecting the Church's social teachings of
more than a century, Catholic institutions have long spoken out on numerous
issues: immigration and refugees; economic issues (poverty, homelessness,
welfare reform); nuclear war, just war, and armaments; racism and
discrimination; violence and gun control; the dignity of work, workers' rights,
296

Declaration,supra note 15, § 4.

297

Id.
Murray contends that religious freedom:
is to create and maintain a constitutional situation, and to that extent to favor
and foster a social climate, within which the citizen and religious community
may pursue the higher ends of human existence without let or hindrance by
other citizens, by social groups, or by government itself. These ends, and the
actual pursuit of them, are of the meta-juridical order. They are related to the
iner dynamism of the human spirit as such, which is remote from direction or
control by any forces of the juridical order.
John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Declarationon Religious Freedom: A Moment in Its Legislative
History, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN END AND A BEGINNING 15, 29 (John Courtney Murray, S.J., ed.
1966).
298
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and a just living wage; the death penalty, punishment and torture; the
environment and climate change; and international development.29 9 In the last
few decades, however, the witness on these topics has been overshadowed by
what Pope Francis has criticized as the Church's fixation on "abortion, birth
control and sexual orientation." 3 00
The Church's advocacy on so many legal-moral issues reflects its
conviction that all people and all non-governmental actors, as well as
governments, are obligated to promote the common good and to work tirelessly
toward justice and peace in the political, economic, and social order. The broad
advocacy also reflects the Declaration's conviction that even though the state is
properly secular, religious voices in civil society must be free to share their moral
vision.30 1 Indeed, the maximal religious freedom demanded in the Church's
Religion Clause jurisprudence is intended to have impacts on the culture,
certainly by accommodating religious pluralism and religion in general to ensure
that religion is not privatized to the inside of one's mind, one's home, and one's
house of worship.30 2 Beyond this, Catholic advocacy entails envisioning a
society that abides by the "moral norms" of an objective moral order; this
aspiration is made concrete when like-minded citizens, regardless of faith, share
the political and legal goals to create such a society.303 But the vision is neither
romantic nor theocratic: John Courtney Murray cautioned against too great a
dependence on law for instantiating a moral vision and counseled prudence,
299
See MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS
(Kenneth R. Himes et al. eds., 2005); Pope Francis, LAUDATO SI: ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON
HOME, U.S. CoNF. CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/about/leadership/holy-see/francis/popefrancis-encyclical-laudato-si-on-environment.cfn (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
3
See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Pope Says ChurchIs 'Obsessed' With Gays, Abortion and Birth
Control, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/world/europe/popebluntly-faults-churchs-focus-on-gays-and-abortion.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0
(criticizing
church for prioritizing moral doctrines over serving the poor and marginalized).
Francis told the interviewer, a fellow Jesuit: It is not necessary to talk about
these issues all the time. The dogmatic and moral teachings of the church are
not all equivalent. The church's pastoral ministry cannot be obsessed with the
transmission of a disjointed multitude of doctrines to be imposed insistently.
We have to find a new balance, the pope continued, otherwise even the moral
edifice of the church is likely to fall like a house of cards, losing the freshness
and fragrance of the Gospel.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). There has already been some modulation of
positions among American bishops. See, e.g., Text ofHomily DuringMass of Installation ofHis
Eminence, Joseph William Cardinal Tobin, C.Ss.R., ARCHDIOCESE OF NEWARK (Jan. 6, 2017),
http://www.rcan.org/text-homily-during-mass-installation-his-eminence-joseph-william-cardinaltobin-cssr (discussing concerns with issues other than "hot button" issues).
301
Declaration,supra note 15, §§ 4, 6.
302
As to the Conference's support for "religion in general," see Sullivan, supra note 92.
303
This is referred to as the "natural law" in the Catholic tradition. See MURRAY, WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS, supra note 32, at 296-97.
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especially when consensus on moral views is lacking; he emphasized instead the
importance of civil conversation (and respectful disagreement) among citizens
of various religious faiths and secular worldviews.* Indeed, Murray counseled
a clear "differentiation" between law and morality, noting that "the greater the
social evil, the less effective against it is the instrument of coercive law,"
particularly with respect to sexual morality.305 Further, the Declaration
recognizes an important constraint, that "equality of citizens before the law,
which itself is an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly
or covertly, for religious reasons." 306
The tectonic moral-legal shifts experienced today began with the erosion
of state laws prohibiting elective abortions and contraception throughout the
1960s. Although church teaching prohibited both, the question of whether the
law should prohibit them both was a separate matter. When Massachusetts was
considering decriminalizing contraception, some bishops asked Murray for
advice.30 7 He opined that contraception was a matter of private morality and,
30 8
therefore, was not an appropriate matter for public regulation. After Griswold
v. Connecticut30 9 invalidated a prohibition on the use of contraceptives in 1965
and the Supreme Court's expansive right to privacy blocked other anticontraceptive legislation,3 10 Catholic leaders turned their attention to the
contraception prohibition only as it applied to the faithful, with Pope Paul VI's
1968 statement against contraception in Humanae Vitae. This ran counter to the
conclusions of the Vatican's own appointed commission that had studied the
issue; many Catholics rejected this teaching, and most American Catholics
continue to ignore it to this day.311

304

Carmella, John Courtney Murray, supra note 16, at 78-80 (providing insights on the

limitations of human law and the futility of trying to make society Christian through law). Of
course, Murray never dreamed of a society in which abortion, same-sex marriage, and transgender
rights would be recognized, but he did counsel prudence (i.e., no regulation) on the contraception
issue, which can provide insights for new situations. Indeed, Professor Griffin has argued that
Murray refraned the Catholic natural law tradition in ways similar to the political liberalism of
John Rawls. See Leslie C. Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S.CAL.
INTERDISc. L.J. 297, 352-53 (1997) (stating that Murray and Rawls both embrace the autonomy of
law and politics from certain religious arguments).
305

MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, supra note 32, at 167.

306

Declaration,supra note 15, § 6.
See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception

307

Legislation, in BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR 81 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1994).

Id.; see also Carmella,John Courtney Murray, supra note 16, at 78.
309
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
310
Id. at 479, 485-86.
311
Leslie Griffin, What Might Have Been: Contraception and Religious Liberty, 1 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 632, 638-39 (2003) [hereinafter Griffin, What MightHave Been] (noting that Church
teaching on birth control could have changed, based upon recommendations of a post-Vatican II
commission).
308
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But the law regarding elective abortions was different. As states began
to liberalize abortion laws throughout the 1960s, with some allowing boards to
review women's petitions for abortions in cases of threats to health, rape and
birth defects, and others allowing abortions in the early stages of pregnancy,
Catholic opposition to any liberalization was mobilized in each state. 312 After the
Supreme Court issued its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,313 the Conference and
state conferences were convinced that political and legal action was necessary to
overturn it. 3 14 They advocated for a "Human Life Amendment" to the
Constitution, and over the last four decades, together with many Catholic and
other pro-life organizations, have spoken out in favor of any federal or state law
that would restrict abortions and against those that would promote it.315 Waiting
periods, counseling, and limits based on fetal age have been successfully
achieved in many states.316 One of the most significant gains was the Hyde
Amendment, in effect since 1977, which bans federal Medicaid coverage of
abortion (with rape, incest and life of mother exceptions).3 17 During the
Affordable Care Act debates, the Conference lobbied strongly to prevent any
funding for abortion. The President's Executive Order in 2010 provided this,
although the bishops had sought an amendment to the ACA itself.
The Conference has filed amicus briefs, alone or with other religious
groups, in every major abortion case at the Supreme Court in favor of state and
federal restrictions, with the ultimate goal of overturning Roe. The briefs
consistently argue the full humanity of the fetus; reject the use of women's
privacy and autonomy rights as appropriate justifications; support the need to
consider not just the individual and the state, but also the unborn child, the father,
other members of the family, and society; and urge recognition of adverse

B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE
ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING 282 (2012).
312

LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Jesse Ryan Loffler, Catholicpac: Why the United States Catholic Conference
of Bishops
Should (Probably)Lose its 501 (c) (3) Tax Exempt Status, 14 RUTGERS J. L & REL. 69, 129 (2012).
315
See id. at 125-32.
316
Counseling and
Waiting
Periods for Abortion,
GUTTMACHER
INST.,
313

314

https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion

(last

updated Oct. 1, 2017); State Policies on Later Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions (last updated Oct.
1, 2017); see also Loffler, supra note 314, at 116-18 (discussing restrictions on lobbying and
electioneering for tax-exempt organizations).
317
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment
against
constitutional and statutory challenges). During the 2016 presidential election, repeal of the Hyde
Amendment, as noted in the 2016 Democratic National Platform, was discussed seriously, with the
goal to permit Medicaid-funded abortions. Emma Green, Democrats Are Pushing to Use Tax
Dollars
to
Pay
for
Abortions,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/hyde-repeal/502568/.
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318
impacts of abortion, both psychological and societal. The political and legal
activity has earned the Conference (and its member bishops) and the National
Right to Life Committee the designation of the two biggest opponents to NARAL
Pro-Choice America.3 19
Indeed, for many, the Church's position on abortion has become
3 20
synonymous with what it means to be a Catholic. This has been the case since
the late 1960s, but especially so during John Paul II's pontificate, with his
emphasis on a "culture of life" as opposed to a "culture of death" rhetoric the
Church used for decades to describe the society created by proponents of
abortion. 3 21 Some bishops have warned pro-choice politicians who were Catholic
that they should not take communion, and some have flat-out denied them.322
During elections, the voter education efforts have often made abortion the
absolute litmus test for fitness for office, although this has waxed and waned
over time. 32 3 Indeed, the activism was so intense during the 1980s that pro-choice

As of 2014, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops had filed eight amicus briefs on
318
abortion restrictions during the Rehnquist and Roberts courts. See Walsh, supra note 29, at 42329; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007) (ban on partial birth abortion upheld
as facially constitutional); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330-31
(2006) (if parental notification would be unconstitutional in emergencies, remand to determine if
relief available that is narrower than invalidating entire statute); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
914-16 (2000) (statute unconstitutional under Casey andRoe because it lacks exception for health
of mother and burdens right to choose abortion); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992) (state abortion law requiring informed consent, waiting period,
parental notification, reporting/recordkeeping requirements held constitutional, but not spousal
notification); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991) (constitutional for legislature to restrict
federal money from being used to counsel Medicaid recipients on abortion); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 457-58 (1990) (parental notification law constitutional); Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 502 (1990) (parental consent statute with judicial bypass
provisions held constitutional); Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (state
ban on using public employees and facilities to perform abortions is constitutional, as no one has
an affirmative right to government aid). But see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2745-46
(2014) (buffer zones around abortion clinics are unconstitutional); Brief for the National Hispanic
Christian Leadership Conference, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, McCullen v.
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 5274826, at *8.
319
Loffler, supra note 314, at 129-30.
Note the scandal created by the lawyers representing a Catholic hospital in a wrongful death
320
suit brought by husband whose wife and twins in utero died; they defended on the basis that
Colorado law does not consider a fetus a person. Electra Draper, Bishops will review Catholic
11:38 AM),
2013,
hospital's malpractice defense, DENVER PosT (Jan. 24,
http://www.denverpost.com/2013/01/24/bishops-will-review-catholic-hospitals-malpracticedefense/.
321
See, e.g., CATHLEEN KAvENY, LAW'S VIRTUES: FOSTERING AUTONOMY AND SOLIDARITY IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 275 (2012) [hereinafter KAVENY, LAW'S VIRTUES] (focusing solely on legal

prohibition is to misunderstand John Paul II, who "clearly recognizes that law and social policy as
a whole must be pro-life for both moral and practical reasons").
322
See Loffler, supra note 314, at 69-70.
323

See id. at 69-7 1.
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groups sued the Conference (unsuccessfully) for violating its tax-exempt
status. 324

Catholic leaders have also been heavily involved in lobbying and amicus
participation to support traditional marriage and oppose domestic partnerships
and same-sex marriage. 325 They have argued consistently that the justification
for traditional marriage is the government's interests in procreation, in having
children raised by a mother and father, and in preventing the societal ills that will
increase when traditional marriage is weakened. Church leaders supported the
passage of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, which was
invalidated in United States v. Windsor.32 6
The legal recognition of same-sex marriage began to occur at the state
level after 2000. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was the first to
recognize same-sex marriage in 2003; by 2015, a total of 18 states had legalized
same-sex marriage, some through state legislation, others through state high
court decisions.327 State Catholic conferences were active in opposing this
recognition in New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Washington, Maryland,
and the District of Columbia, where they supported repeal of legislation and state
constitutional amendments where same-sex marriage had been adopted; they
supported efforts (that were successful) for constitutional amendments for
traditional marriage in about 30 states. 32 8 Federal district courts held those
restrictive efforts unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.329 Indeed,
the Catholic-Mormon coalition supporting Proposition 8 in California was met
with tremendous public hostility, culminating in a decision of the Ninth Circuit
324
The suit claiming that the IRS knew of the Church's violation of political restrictions
but
failed to deny tax exempt status was not successful. In re United States Cath. Conf. v. Baker, 885
F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff standing).
325
See, e.g., Robert Nugent, The U.S. Catholic Bishops and Gay Civil Rights: Four
Case
Studies, 38 CATH. LAW. 1, 1-4 (1998); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(upholding sodomy law), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (striking
sodomy law); Brief of U.S. Catholic Conference and N.J. Catholic Conference as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), 2000
WL 228563, at *4.
326
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013); see also Brief for the
U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 1780814 (Conference supported DOMA,
arguing it is subject to rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause; no fundamental
right to same-sex marriage); Loffler, supra note 314, at 123 (describing support for the Federal
Marriage Amendment Act).
327
Note that exemptions for religious practice were contained in these laws, to ensure
that no
church could be compelled to perform a same-sex marriage. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2,
at 850.
328
Loffler, supra note 314, at 121-25.
329
Jessica Miller, 10th Circuit Court: Utah's same-sex marriageban is unconstitutional, SALT
LAKE
TRIB.
(June
26,
2014,
2:09
PM),
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=58114139&itype=CMSID.
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that found that a law based on religious and moral arguments against same-sex
marriage had no rational basis. 3 30 By 2015, the Supreme Court found 5-4, in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 33 1 that "the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person" under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
332
and that "same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry." The
333
Conference had filed an amicus brief against such an outcome.
Thus, with abortion and same-sex marriage legalized, obtaining broad
exemptions becomes the Church's highest priority, and crafting the narrowest
possible exemption, if any, becomes the goal of the Church's opponents. The
Church's moral-political advocacy on abortion (and other reproductive matters)
and same-sex marriage, though consistent with its practice of speaking out on
numerous issues of the day, has been unique in that the discourse is easily framed
as a battle between the Church on one side and women and the LGBT community
on the other. Because success for the Catholic agenda means thwarting rights
that others claim to be fundamental, the conflict has been inflamed, and
exemptions for Catholic institutions-to which we now turn-have become
highly politicized. Professor Laycock, an ardent supporter of religious liberty,
334
He has
has noted that society is simply exhausted by the culture wars.
teachings
their
impose
to
trying
stop
should
churches
sorts:
of
truce
a
proposed
on others, and reproductive rights/justice and gay rights groups should back away
33 5
from efforts to require churches to engage in conduct they find immoral.
B. Legislative and JudicialExemptions from Participationin Problematic
Activities
In addition to its legislative advocacy on moral-legal issues, the Church
seeks to serve the world through its many outward-facing nonprofit institutions
in health care, higher education, and social services. These entities contrast with
the dioceses, parishes, and schools described in Part III, which pursue "settled"

330
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (proponents of Proposition 8 had no
standing to appeal district court order declaring it unconstitutional); see also Brief for the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 355754; Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48,
62 (Cal. 2009); Application and Proposed Brief as Amici Curiae of the Cal. Catholic Conference
et al., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (Nos. S168047, S168066, S168078), 2009 WL
1226937 (arguing that the people, not courts, should determine the meaning of marriage).
331
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
332
Id. at 2604-05.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in Support of
333
Respondents and Supporting Affirmance, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1519042.
334
Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 871.

335

Id. at 878-79.
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missions that are shared by members and employees.336 Echoing the distinctions
drawn in Bradfield v. Roberts337 in the 19th century,338 nonprofits that are
extensively engaged in temporal affairs pursue instead their own "articulated"
missions: they "engage with multiple constituencies . .. [and sometimes]
negotiate their values with outside groups and external forces" (like markets,
neighbors, laws, and public policy) in addition to those inside. 3 39 They owe duties
to employees, beneficiaries, clients, and other stakeholders. 3 40 They operate
alongside (and are extensively regulated along with) other private and public
hospitals, charitable agencies, and colleges. 34 1 They are competitive with other
religious, private non-religious, and public entities and are often among the best
in their field. 342 They typically employ non-Catholics and a morals clause, if
used, may be quite narrow; they serve the public. Though their missions are all
distinctively rooted in Catholicism, their corporate purposes are specifically
tailored to their temporal services (i.e., education, health, welfare).34 3 And
finally, they receive substantial sums of federal and state dollars to use and
administer programs for those specific temporal purposes. 34 Although these
nonprofits cannot make the same claim as churches and parochial schools to
exclusivity or uniqueness of religious commitment, they are by no means secular:

336
Some parochial schools are more like these "public" nonprofits, in that they are large and
serve largely non-Catholic populations; the issues being raised in supra Section IV.B could easily
apply to such schools in certain circumstances. Most of the case law, however, locates parochial
school issues within the employment autonomy concerns discussed in Section III.A.
337
175 U.S. 291, 292 (1899).
338
See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
339
David M. Craig, Mission Integrity Matters: Balancing Catholic Health Care Values and

Public Mandates, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 134 (Holly
Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES].
340
Outside the parish and school context-where mission is not settled but is instead
"articulated" through negotiation with many constituencies-there are fewer employee suits, but
the ministerial exception and Title VII exemption can still apply to employees like a hospital
chaplain or a theology professor. See supra notes 216, 218, 220. Outside situations like these,
employees of Catholic hospitals, universities, and social services typically do not have to be
Catholic, and their compliance with Catholic teaching is usually limited to specific matters of
Catholic doctrine (e.g., doctors in Catholic hospitals cannot perform abortions). The concept of
consent is more attenuated as well. See Carmella, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 168, at 417; see
also supra notes 172 and 186 and accompanying text.
341
See supra notes 6-11.
342
See infra notes 373 and 421; see also John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Value ofAmerican Nonprofits,

AMERICA:

JESUIT

REv.

(Feb.

7,

2011),

https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/763/columns/value-nonprofits.
343
See, e.g., Melanie DiPietro, S.C., A Corporation'sExercise of Religion: A Practitioner's
Experience, in HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 339, at 90, 93.
3"
See infra Section IV.B.4.
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they "pursue their missions through inherently religious activity."3 45 For the
Church, they promote the common good of civil society and the dignity of the
persons they serve.
Entities with articulated missions are enormously complex to operate
because Catholic teaching subjects their actions to moral analysis in order to
avoid illicit cooperation with evil. Determinations regarding cooperation are
neither simple nor obvious, and often must be made on a case-by-case basis; even
with guidelines, 34 6 inexperienced or unprepared decision makers might be
overly-rigid (or lax) or simply conclusory in their interpretations. As applied to
a whole host of issues in the social service and health care realm, this moral
analysis must be applied to unprecedented questions: in Catholic-run group
homes and nursing homes, is safe-sex counseling ever appropriate for
transgender and gay persons? In Catholic hospitals, how does the general
prohibition against abortion get worked out in specific situations of miscarriage,
ectopic pregnancy, D&C procedures, medical treatment of one of multiple
fetuses (with risks to the others), and medically necessary abortions? In Catholic
emergency rooms, can emergency contraception be administered to a rape
victim? In a Catholic university, can married housing or marital counseling ever
be given to a married same-sex couple? The answers to moral questions like these
may vary, depending upon accepted scientific and psychological understanding,
on the available bioethics or theological expertise, and on whether the hierarchy
has responded to past practices or has issued applicable guidelines. External
factors, like political pressures or litigation posturing, may also affect decisions
about moral complicity.3 47
It should come as no surprise, then, that Church leaders seek-and have
often won-exemptions from laws that involve matters like abortion,
contraception, and sexual orientation, to give their nonprofits wide latitude to
determine what is and is not consistent with Church teaching. In this way, the
legal system protects Catholic entities to "pursue their missions through
inherently religious activity," 34 8 while at the same time regulating them for, in
the words of the Declaration, "public order." 34 9 There are several sources of
protection. First, there may be regulatory and legislative exemptions that provide
space for the entity to operate in accordance with church teaching, as Smith
contemplates. Second, in the absence of such an exemption, a court might
mandate one. Courts will not mandate exemptions under the Free Exercise
Clause because neutral, general laws are constitutional under Smith, regardless
345
Kalscheur, supra note 165, at 102. Because nonprofits act in ways that are inherently but
not exclusively religious, they are subject to civil regulation for public order. Id. at 96-97. See also
DiPietro, supra note 343.
346
For Catholic health care, the Ethical and Religious Directives govern. See infra note 357.

347
348
349

See Kaveny, Law, Religion, and Conscience, supra note 31, at 1-2.
Kalscheur, supra note 165, at 102.
Id. at 95-97.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/4

64

Carmella: Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Politica

2017]

CatholicInstitutions in Court

65

of burdens to religious practice.3 50 But courts are able to mandate exemptions
under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)-enacted in
reaction to Smith-and under laws in about half the states that have strict scrutiny
regimes. 351 Under RFRA and in strict scrutiny states, an exemption will issue if
a substantial burden to religious exercise is found and government fails to
demonstrate a narrowly tailored, compelling justification to deny the
exemption. 352 In the absence of an explicit textual exemption or a strict scrutiny
regime that could mandate one, however, Smith governs and renders Catholic
nonprofits subject to all general and neutral laws that apply to comparable
institutions.
The Church's own teaching on religious freedom, contained in the
Declaration, does not describe a precise methodology for setting the contours of
freedom and order. Murray had struggled with this question and offered a
methodology, somewhat similar to the Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny, requiring
of government:
that the violation of the public order be really serious; that legal
or police intervention be really necessary; that regard be had for
the privileged character of religious freedom, which is not
simply to be equated with other civil rights; that the rule of
jurisprudence of the free society be strictly observed, [namely],
as much freedom as possible, as much coercion as necessary.3 53
Murray's four-prong analysis obviously favors the religious claimant but also
recognizes the government's duty to intervene to protect the public and to create
the conditions necessary for the flourishing of the human person.35 4
This is the case unless an autonomy claim, like the type seen in Section Il.A, is successful.
See supra note 219.
351
RFRA is found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (1)-(4) (2012). For state statute and constitutional
information regarding the use of strict scrutiny in free exercise cases, see Eugene Volokh, ]A. What
Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:34 AM),
www.volokh.com/2013/12/02/1 a-religious-freedom-restoration-act/.
352
RFRA is given broad interpretation under Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015), Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), and Gonzales v. 0 Centro EspiritaBeneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). Note that the Establishment Clause serves as an outer
boundary to an exemption, placing restrictions in order to avoid privileging as opposed to
protecting free exercise. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). This Establishment Clause argument is under-theorized in Catholic
thought. See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J. L.
GENDER 103 (2015).
3
See MURRAY, The Problem ofReligious Freedom, supra note 165 and accompanying text.
354
See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, § 75. ("The complex circumstances of our day make it
necessary for public authority to intervene more often in social, economic and cultural matters in
order to bring about favorable conditions which will give more effective help to citizens and groups
in their free pursuit of man's total well-being.").
&

350
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Given the changing sexual norms, gender roles, and family structure of
the last half century, as well as emerging avenues of cultural and scientific
inquiry, Catholic hospitals, social service providers, and colleges and universities
have found themselves in a regulatory environment that is sometimes at odds
with, even hostile to, church teaching. They have sought-and continue to
seek-exemptions from laws that implicate them in abortion, contraception,
same-sex marriage and other practices considered immoral.355 With the loss of
traditional morality on these issues and the recent refusals to accommodate
religious scruples in every imaginable situation, the Church has sounded the
alarm: Catholic institutions are being conscripted into the service of advancing
secularism; religious liberty is under attack.356 Obviously, government coercion
of any religious group to violate its faith should raise concerns about free exercise
rights and energize efforts to correct it. But since these nonprofits have
articulated missions, the religious freedom issue is not the exclusive
consideration; government heavily regulates providers of temporal services and
takes into account the interests and rights of the multiple communities affected
and the many stakeholders involved. 35 7 Even Murray's four-prong analysis for

355
Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated Religious Activity: A Case for Accommodating
Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1341 (2016) [hereinafter Berg, Partly
Acculturated]. The list includes sterilization, assisted reproductive technology, same-sex relations
and marital/family rights, transgender transition health care, stem cell research, and physician

assisted suicide.
356
See MOST CHERISHED LIBERTY, supra note 40 and accompanying text. Note that Smith
restricts religious freedom to the mind, the home, and the house of worship, but was not the product

of a secularist, anti-religious Court. It was penned by Justice Scalia and supported by the Court's
conservatives, who thought that religious exemptions should be sought through the political

process, not the courts. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Indeed, the reliance on the
political process and not courts is at the heart of the conservative critique of Roe v. Wade, in that

abortion should have been left to the political process, not to activist judges. 410 U.S. 113, 174
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For discussion, see CATHLEEN KAVENY, A CULTURE OF
ENGAGEMENT: LAW, RELIGION AND MORALITY 95-99 (2016). But now, when Church institutions
find themselves unable to win legislative or regulatory exemptions, they depend heavily on courts

to protect free exercise. And though the bishops did not support RFRA's passage-again, because
they were concerned that it would be used to expand abortion-Church litigants have relied on this
statute heavily to press for a broad interpretation of free exercise rights and to vindicate their claims

in court. See, e.g., Brief of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 544 U.S.
973 (2005) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2211654; Brief of United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops as Amicus Curiae, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13354, 13-356), 2014 WL 316721; Brief of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as
Amici Curiae, et al., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453), 2016 WL
106617; see also Brief of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion as Amicus Curiae, Cutter

v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (No. 03-8766), 2004 WL 2961151 (supporting RFRA's sister
statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, RLUIPA).
3
The Church's claims are stark, with no recognition of the competing claims for a "justpublic
order" or "equality of citizens before the law." CATHLEEN KAVENY, A CULTURE OF ENGAGEMENT:
LAW, RELIGION AND MORALITY 78 (2016). Yet, "[fjor years, Catholic moralists and lawyers have

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/4

66

Carmella: Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Politica

2017]

Catholic Institutions in Court

67

determining appropriate constraints on free exercise does not yield a clear answer
in complex situations that involve third-party impacts. In the end, some
jurisprudential compromise is likely on these matters.
1.

Abortion, Sterilization, Contraception

The analytical framework for making moral decisions in Catholic health
care is found in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services (the ERDs). 3 5 8 Catholic-owned health care systems, the largest
providers in the nonprofit sector, operate about 16% of hospitals throughout the
country, with concentrations of one-third or one-half of the hospitals in some
markets.359 More than half a million people are employed full-time by Catholic
hospitals, and another quarter of a million part-time.360 Healthcare professionals
and entities affiliated with these healthcare systems through employment or other
contractual arrangements, including hospital-owned physician practices and
outpatient surgical centers, are required to follow the ERDs. 3 6 1 The bishop of the
diocese in which the facility sits has final interpretive authority over compliance
with the ERDs. ERDs also control in the case of mergers and acquisitions
between Catholic and secular hospitals; and even where secular systems acquire
Catholic hospitals, ERDs govern the secular hospitals post-acquisition because
"Catholic sellers typically are unwilling to negotiate a sale without some
commitment to restrictions from buyers."362 In seeking to continue its moral
influence over the delivery of health care even when no longer a direct provider,
the Church makes the ERD requirements perpetual, in contracts and even as deed
restrictions that encumber title to real property.363 ERDs prohibit nearly all

railed against the assertion of rights claims without any consideration of relational responsibility."
Id.
38

U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUs DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH

CARE SERVICES (5th ed. 2009)

[hereinafter DIRECTIVES], http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-

action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-HealthCare-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf.
359
Elizabeth Sepper, ContractingReligion, in HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 339,
at 113-14.
36
Wurdock, supranote 57, at 187; see also USCCB Statistics, supra note 6 and accompanying
text for slight variations in numbers.
361
DIRECTIVES, supra note 358, at 12. For a discussion of the many ways people and entities
become subject to ERDs through leases, purchase agreements, and the like, see Sepper, supra note
359, at 114-19. "Contract serves as the mechanism by which compliance with religious restrictions

is secured." Id. at 115.
362
363

Sepper, supra note 359, at 118.
Sepper raises an important point:
The use of contract in health care, however, raises the specter of complicity
without end. In tying sales to compliance with ERDs, Catholic health care
systems claim an objection to acts remote in time and distance, in institutions
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abortions, contraceptive sterilizations, and contraception, among other things,
and restrict the information that providers can give relating to alternatives.364
Thus, in addition to the anti-abortion stance of the Church on the legality and
availability of abortion in society, the Church has tried to be scrupulous about
ensuring that its own institutions do not participate in reproductive-related acts
it considers immoral.
Catholic hospitals are permitted to follow the ERDs with respect to
reproductive matters because of federal and state laws referred to as "conscience
clauses." Spurred by both a court order to compel a Catholic hospital to perform
a sterilization36 5 and the decision in Roe v. Wade,366 Congress in 1974 passed the
first conscience clause to protect individuals and institutions that refused to
provide sterilizations and abortions. 3 6 7 Forty-four states have since enacted
conscience clauses that also protect the refusal to provide abortions (and
sterilization, in some states); these typically provide that the refusing hospital
368
will not suffer any penalty, discrimination or liability on account of the refusal.
In contrast to the extensive web of conscience protections at the federal and state
level for abortion and sterilization refusals, there is far less explicit conscience

to which they have no ties or financial interest, and by individuals over whom
they have no oversight.
Id. at 122. Note, however, that unwind provisions will apply to end the control in certain
circumstances.
Id. at 114. Other prohibitions include safe-sex counseling, stem cell treatments, assisted
36
reproduction, and physician-assisted suicide. In Colorado, Catholic hospitals refuse to offer
assisted suicide, which was legalized by ballot initiative in 2016. See Judith Graham, Colorado's
aid-in-dying law in disarray as big Catholic health systems opt out, STAT (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/19/aid-in-dying-catholic-hospitals-colorado/.
365
Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973) (dissolving preliminary
injunction), aff'd, 523 F.2d 75, 76 (9th Cir. 1975) (federal funds do not render the hospital's actions
state action under color of law).
366
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
367
No hospital could be required to "make its facilities available for the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of such procedure or abortion in such
facilities is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions." 42 U.S.C.
§ 300a-7(b)(2); see also Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974)
(district court lacked power to compel sterilization procedure).
368
Angela C. Carmella, For-Profitv. Non-Profit: Does CorporateForm Matter? The Question
of For-ProfitEligibility for Religious Exemptions Under Conscience Statutes and the First
Amendment, in SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS: IS A FOR-PROFIT STRUCTURE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE MINISTRY (Kathleen M. Boozang ed. 2012), at 77-80 [hereinafter

Carmella, Conscience Statutes]. Other provisions include 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a) and § 238n(c)(2)
(protecting hospital residency training programs in obstetrics and gynecology from abortion
requirements); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 811, Stat. 3034
(2009) (federal monies may be given only to those federal and state agencies that respect
conscience protections); Exec. Order No. 13535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15599 (Mar. 24, 2010) (ACA
prohibits discrimination against hospitals and providers that refuse "to provide, pay for, provide
coverage of, or refer for abortions").
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protection relating to contraception.3 6 9 Catholic institutions have not been
required by law generally to provide contraceptives, 370 although the provision of
emergency contraception has been resisted in certain contexts. 7
More than half a million babies are born in Catholic hospitals each
year.372 Catholic hospitals get consistently high marks on maternal and child
health care; many are licensed to provide high-risk obstetrics care. But with
Catholic-secular hospital mergers and management agreements, and increased

369
Individual pharmacists may be protected under state conscience laws; federal law offers no
protection, and only some states (either specifically or under a general conscience provision) allow
hospitals to refuse to provide contraception on moral grounds. See Carmella, Conscience Statutes,
supra note 368, at 80.
370
The State of Washington adopted an explicitly "anti-conscience" clause, requiring
pharmacies to stock and dispense emergency contraception and prohibiting the refusal "to deliver
a drug or device to a patient because its owner objects to delivery on religious, moral or other
personal grounds." Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). Referrals are
not permitted for religious objectors but are for other situations. This rule was unsuccessfully
challenged in Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct.
2433 (2016) (mem.). In dissent, Justice Alito argued that this looked like classic targeting of
religious conduct in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 2440. (Alito, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). The Conference and the state Catholic Conference argued as amici in support
of the pharmacy's petition, Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops & Wash.
State Catholic Conference Supporting Petitioners, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433
(2016) (No. 15-862), 2016 WL 492302, although enforcement had not been attempted against
Catholic hospitals.
371
See, e.g., Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (Cal. App.
Ct. 1989); Heather Rae Skeeles, Patient Autonomy Versus Religious Freedom: Should State
LegislaturesRequire Catholic Hospitals to Provide Emergency Contraceptionto Rape Victims?,

60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1007, 1012 (2003). Some of the current opposition to emergency

contraception (and to some other types of contraceptive devices) is more accurately described as
opposition to abortion. Because the Church defines pregnancy as beginning at conception (and not
at implantation, as defined in federal law), any contraceptive that acts to frustrate implantation is
considered an abortifacient. Skeeles, supra note 371, at 1014-15. When Catholic institutions refer
to "abortion-inducing" drugs, they are not only referring to drugs like RU-486 which induce a
chemical abortion of a fetus. Id. They are referring to anything that can interfere with implantation,
including emergency contraception given within hours of a rape or any unprotected intercourse, on
the theory that a fertilized ovum could be present and that the drug could prevent its implantation.
Id. The Conference and individual bishops have been actively involved in trying to block
emergency contraception legislation. Griffin, What Might Have Been, supra note 311, at 641.
372
Mark Zimmerman, Critics blast report on Catholic hospitals as 'distorted, inaccurate',
CRUX (May 14, 2016), http://cruxnow.com/church/2016/05/14/critics-blast-report-on-catholichospitals-as-distorted-inaccurate/. CHA statistics note that there are over 600 Catholic hospitals
and 1,400 long term care and other health care facilities in the nation. Id.
373
CHA News Release, Catholic Health Association Responds to New York Times Editorial,
(Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.chausa.org/newsroom/newsCATH. HEALTH Ass'N U.S.
releases/2013/12/09/catholic-health-association-responds-to-new-york-times-editorial;
Zimmerman, supra note 372.
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acquisition of physician practices by Catholic hospitals,3 74 critics assert that
ERD-driven health care results in the denial of access to care that is medically
appropriate and legally permitted, which may in turn result in a compromised
standard of care.3 75 In addition to complaints that women find themselves unable
to obtain tubal ligations after C-sections, a recent allegation is that Catholic
hospitals seek to preserve pregnancies in inappropriate situations, contrary to
women's health.376 In 2013, the ACLU filed a negligence suit on behalf of
Tamesha Means against the U.S. Conference of Bishops and a Catholic health
care system, arguing that the hospital and its doctors followed the ERDs to the
detriment of her health and in violation of the standard of care, which she argued
The suit was dismissed against both
required the termination of the pregnancy.
374
Keith Loria, Hospital Ownership ofPhysician Practiceson the Rise, MED. ECON. (Sept. 24,
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/hospital2016),
ownership-physician-practices-rise (noting an 86% increase in physician practices owned by

hospitals since 2012, resulting in nearly 50% of doctors employed by hospitals). Catholic hospitals
are part of this larger trend.
375

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS 274 (4th ed. 2017).

On refusals of sterilization: California does not permit hospitals to refuse sterilizations; the
ERDs prohibit them. In 2015, the ACLU sued a Catholic hospital that refused a tubal ligation; the
376

case settled and the hospital performed the sterilization. Id.; see also Bob Egelko, Legal Case Tests
CHRON.
(Aug.
25,
2015),
to
Deny
Procedures, S.F.
Religious
Right
http://www.sfchronicle.com/health/article/Lawsuit-tests-religious-hospitals-right-to-

6461051 .php. On preserving pregnancies, see Wurdock, supra note 57, at 193 (advocacy groups
argue lapses in care due to ERD compliance, including unnecessary medical tests, transferring
patients, administrator interference with doctor treatment decisions and with doctor
communication regarding treatment options); see also Lori Freedman, et al., When There's a
Heartbeat:MiscarriageManagement at Catholic-OwnedHospitals,98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1774-

78 (Oct. 2008) (noting variations in the application of ERDs among hospitals); Nina Martin, At a
CatholicHospital, a Dispute over What a Doctor Can Do-and Say, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2013,
https://www.propublica.org/article/at-a-catholic-hospital-a-dispute-over-what-aPM),
3:58
doctor-can-do-and-say#correx. These criticisms follow the reasoning employed by scholars since
Hobby Lobby, who have focused attention on the notion that exemptions cause "third-party harms."
See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleasfor ReligiousExemptions

in Hobby Lobby's Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 1897 (2015); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Seigel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L. J.

2516 (2015); see also DeGirolami,supra note 219, at 131-37 (criticizing the third-party harms
argument).
377
Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 2016). Means
alleged the following facts: her water broke at 18 weeks, she went to Mercy Health Partners, she

was told no treatment was possible, she lost the baby, and she suffered complications caused by
prolonging the pregnancy.

In her view, Mercy Health should have: (1) informed Means of the option to
terminate her pregnancy before discharging her; (2) informed her of the health

risks of continuing her pregnancy; (3) informed her that her baby would likely
not survive; and (4) "provide[d] appropriate medical care to" Means. Id. at

653. Means alleges that Mercy Health did not do these things because it was
following the Directives.
Id. at 653.
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defendants. 78 Another recent challenge involving a Catholic hospital's standard
of care, unsuccessful on procedural grounds, alleged a violation of the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) for failing to
terminate a pregnancy as "stabilizing treatment" that is part of full emergency
care for mothers suffering various pre-term conditions.3 7 9 (Note that, for nearly
a decade, the state of California has not provided conscience protection for health
care facilities in situations of medical emergency and spontaneous abortion.3 80 ).
A 2016 report of the ACLU and Merger Watch accuses Catholic health
care of posing grave dangers to women's health.38 1 The Catholic Health
Association (CHA), in response to what it called "unsubstantiated and
irresponsible" allegations, has asserted that "[t]here is nothing in the Ethical and
Religious Directives that prevents the provision of quality clinical care for
mothers and infants in obstetrical emergencies." 3 82 Indeed, even under the ERDs,
many types of appropriate treatment can result in the termination of a
pregnancy.383 Further, there is much interpretive latitude under the ERDs, and
hospital ethics review boards address situations of difficult pregnancies and
compliance with ERDs to ensure a high quality of care. Nevertheless, concern
remains over the role that contested moral restrictions might play in medical

37
Id. at 654. As to the Bishops' Conference, the court noted that "USCCB has simply set forth
the ethical standards necessary for an institution to call itself 'Catholic."' Id. at 650. It did not
impose these on the hospital. Id.
379
ACLU, et al. v. Trinity Health Corp. et al, 178 F. Supp. 3d 614, 618 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
Plaintiff claimed that, in addition, several past members who were denied abortions suffered
serious health effects and that several pregnant members could be similarly harmed. Id. at 617, 621
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss on standing and ripeness grounds).
380
See California v. United States, No. C 05-00328 JSW, 2008 WL 744840, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (requiring "health care facilities that provide emergency services to provide medically
necessary emergency abortions"; state sought declaratory judgment that it would not forfeit federal
funds under Weldon Amendment; suit dismissed on ripeness grounds).
381
See Report of ACLU and MergerWatch, Health Care Denied: Patients and Physicians
Speak Out About Catholic Hospitals and the Threat to Women's Health and Lives, ACLU (May
2016), https://www.aclu.org/issues/reproductive-freedoni/religion-and-reproductive-rights/healthcare-denied.
382
For CHA's response, see CHA News Release, Sister Carol Keehan, Catholic Health
Association Responds to ACLU/Merger Report, CATHOLIC HEALTH Ass'N U.S.,
https://www.chausa.org/newsroom/news-releases/2016/05/09/catholic-health-associationresponds-to-aclu-merger-watch-report (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (focusing on "unsubstantiated
and irresponsible" allegations); see also Rebecca Plevin, Some CatholicHospitalsLimit Treatment
for
Pregnancy
Complications,
IMPATIENT
(Jan.
13,
2016),
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/health/2016/01/13/18103/some-catholic-hospitals-limit-treatment-forpregna/ (noting that there have been no findings of situations in California in which care in Catholic
hospitals violates accepted standards of medical practice).
383
See DIRECTIVES, supra note 358, § 47 at 26 (medical treatment for the purpose of curing a
condition of a pregnant woman is allowed when it cannot be postponed until viability, even if it
results in the death of the unborn child).
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decision making.384 What happens when the moral analysis regarding
"cooperation with evil" is indeterminate, with a range of permissible options?
What happens when the analysis is being done without context, or experience, or
preparation-or when it is done in a highly charged political environment? And
what happens if the hospital finds itself in disagreement with the bishop over
ERD interpretation? On this last question, the situation in Phoenix is a case in
point. In 2010, a mother of four, pregnant with her fifth child in the eleventh
week of pregnancy, had come to St. Joseph's Hospital with a life-threatening
condition induced by the pregnancy. Left untreated, both mother and baby would
die. In consultation with family, doctors, and the hospital's ethics committee, Sr.
Mary McBride, the head of the hospital, decided to terminate the pregnancy to
save the mother's life. The local bishop revoked the hospital's right to call itself
"Catholic" because it had "actively engaged in an abortive procedure that is
immoral."38 5 The hospital stood by its decision because "[m]orally, ethically, and
legally we simply cannot stand by and let someone die whose life we might be
able to save."3 86 It seems obvious that a hospital would forego its religious
affiliation in a situation like this, in order to meet its obligations to its patients.
Likewise, treating physicians would also refuse to follow such a rigid, legalistic
reading of the ERDs that strays wildly from the standard of care in allowing the
mother's death. Professor Kaveny argues that the moral analysis in this particular
case was flawed and that clarification of the ERDs is necessary in these types of
cases.

387

For instance, some ethicists have argued that the ERDs, properly interpreted, did not dictate
the hospital's conduct in Means. Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643,
647 (6th Cir. 2016). Cathleen Kaveny, The ACLU Takes on the Bishops: Tragedy Leads to a
Misguided Lawsuit, in A CULTURE OF ENGAGEMENT: LAW, RELIGION AND MORALITY 229, 230
(2016) [hereinafter Kaveny, ACLU].
385
Letter from Thomas J. Olmsted, Bishop of Phx., to Lloyd H. Dean, President, Catholic
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp2010),
22,
(Nov.
West
Healthcare
srv/health/documents/abortion/bishopletter.pdf The revocation of the Catholic designation meant
that the Blessed Sacrament was removed from the chapel, and Mass is no longer celebrated there.
St. Joseph's is now considered a non-Catholic hospital but still operated "in the Catholic tradition."
See Sepper, supra note 359, at 122. The situation is discussed in Kaveny, ACLU, supra note 384,
at 230-31.
386
St. Joseph's Hosp. and Med. Ctr., St. Joseph'sResolved in Saving Mother's Life, Confident
2010),
21,
(Dec.
Announcement
Bishop's
Following
https://www.dignityhealth.org/cm/Media/documents/St-Josephs-Resolved-in-Saving-MothersLife-12-21-10.pdf; see also Wurdock, supra note 57, at 188-91. CHA also supported the hospital's
position. Catholic Health Association Statement Regarding St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical
384

Center

in

Phoenix,

CATH.

HEALTH

Assoc.

U.S.

(Dec.

22,

2010),

https://www.chausa.org/newsroom/news-releases/2010/12/22/catholic-health-associationstatement-regarding-st.-j oseph's-hospital-and-medical-center-in-phoenix.
387
Professor Kaveny insists that this outcome was not required by the ERDs or doctrine:
Properly understood, Catholic moral teaching requires Catholic hospitals to try
to save both mother and unborn child, and if that is not possible, doctors must
save the patient that can be saved. In early pregnancy, that's the mother. The
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In any event-and regardless of the success or failure of the ACLU court
challenges-this attention to Catholic maternal care has put the spotlight on
conscience clauses. 88 Historically, conscience clauses have been viewed as
striking the proper balance between the heavily regulated health care setting and
narrow exemptions to protect religious freedom. Recall Murray's view that
government coercion against religious freedom must occur only when the
violation of public order is "really serious" and the intervention is "really
necessary."3 89 The ACLU litigation, at bottom, argues that such interventionwith the ultimate (tacit) goal of repealing or narrowing conscience protectionis warranted because important issues of access to and quality of care are at stake.
Any scrutiny of conscience protection will raise some new questions: Is it the
case that conscience clauses allow deviations from the standard of care, as the
Sixth Circuit cavalierly noted in Means?390 Is there a deviation from the standard
of care, or is there a range of medical decisions that comport with that standard?
Are the training and credentials of the ERD interpreter relevant to the availability
of conscience protection? Is there a way to provide women with adequate notice
and alternatives if they seek procedures that are not available (like the post-Csection tubal ligation)? The scrutiny-whether legislative or judicial-will be
particularly acute in areas where a Catholic medical monopoly exists. 3 91

time has come for the Bishops' Conference to revise the directives to make
that crystal clear.
Kaveny, ACLU, supra note 384, at 231; see also Steven J. Squires, In Defense of the Principle of
Cooperation: Potential Benefits

Offset the

Limitations, CATH.

HEALTH

ASS'N

U.S.,

https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/hceusa/in-defense-of-the-principle-of-cooperationpotential-benefits-offset-the-limitations.pdfsfvrsn=0 (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (describing the
complexity of cooperation analysis).
388
For an overview, see generally Stephanie Slade, Why is the A.C.L. U Targeting Catholic
Hospitals?, AMERICA: JESUIT REv. (June 12, 2017), https://www.americamagazine.org/politicssociety/2017/05/3 1/why-aclu-targeting-catholic-hospitals.
389
Murray, The Problem ofReligious Freedom, supra note 165, at 153.
390
While neither the ACLU nor the Means court addressed the conscience clause, the court
said:
Means asks us to recognize a duty under Michigan law on the part of a religious
organization to a specific patient to adopt ethical directives that do not
contradict the medical standard of care. Whether such a duty exists is far from
certain, especially if the standard of care violates the organization's religious
beliefs.
Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643, 652 (6th Cir. 2016). Michigan has
a state conscience clause allowing refusals to perform abortions and immunity from civil or
criminal liability. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2017). As Doug Laycock points
out, such a claim could only proceed by "asking the court either to invalidate [the conscience
clause] as applied, hold it preempted by the federal duty to provide emergency care, or do major
interpretive surgery on it." Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 847.
391
See Douglas Laycock, Religious Libertyfor PoliticallyActive Minority Groups:A Response
to NeJaime and Seigel, 125 YALE L.J.F. 369, 380-81 (2016).
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2. Transgender Issues
While Catholic hospitals treat all patients, including transgender
392
individuals, they do not offer gender transition surgeries or treatments. The
recent attention given this issue at the federal level-regarding public bathrooms
and school bathrooms and locker rooms-has not escaped the concern of Church
leadership. Over 100 American bishops met in early 2017 to discuss "how
recently won rights for transgender individuals could affect Catholic entities,
393
including hospitals, schools and parishes, on both ethical and legal grounds."
The legal and medical treatment of transgender individuals, especially children,
is a very recent topic for law and public policy; the debate continues over the
anthropological, medical, and psychological dimensions of gender transition and
related topics. The discussion was not primarily about legal strategy; the bishops
appreciated the complexity of the issues, focusing on pastoral considerations and
3 94
on sensitivity and prudence in this context.

392

See Alexandra Desanctis, ACLU Sues Catholic Hospital over Sex-Reassignment Surgery,

NAT'L REv. (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/447203/aclu-sues-califomiacatholic-hospital-discrimination ("The Church's long-standing doctrine on gender and sexuality
maintains that sex-change operations are contradictory to the intrinsic truth of human nature and
therefore immoral."). Of course, precisely what constitutes gender transition treatments is not
always clear. Further complicating the question is a situation in which a transgender patient being
treated for a condition asks for continued hormone therapy. Matters such as these present
themselves in the health care context. Employment matters are different. An order of sisters
running a school in San Francisco allowed a transgender teacher to keep his job. The archbishop
neither "condemned" nor "fully endorsed" this decision, but did emphasize the need for "prudential
judgment" on an individual basis in these kinds of situations. Associated Press, Catholic School in
San Francisco Lets Transgender Teacher Keep Job, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2016),
20
160513-snap-story.html.
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-transgenderteacherMichael J. O'Loughlin, CatholicBishops Meet to Discuss Issues Related to Health Carefor
393
9,
2017),
(Feb.
REv.
JESUIT
AMERICA:
People,
Transgender
2
https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/ 017/02/09/catholic-bishops-meet-discussissues-related-health-care-transgender.
See id. Pope Francis is critical of "gender ideology" and has noted that "biological sex and
394
the socio-cultural role of sex (gender) can be distinguished but not separated." FRANCIS, AMORIS
LAETITIA

45

(2016),

https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost-exhortations/documents/papafrancescoesortazione-ap.20160319_amoris-laetitia-en.pdf. This gender ideology
denies the difference and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and
envisages a society without sexual differences, thereby eliminating the
anthropological basis of the family. This ideology leads to educational
programmes and legislative enactments that promote a personal identity and
emotional intimacy radically separated from the biological difference between
male and female. Consequently, human identity becomes the choice of the
individual, one which can also change over time.
Id. at 44-45. For discussion of some of the theological and philosophical issues, see David Cloutier
& Luke Timothy Johnson, The Church and Transgender Identity: Some Cautions, Some
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The Declaration emphasizes the distinction between the "common good"
of the larger society, which is the task of every person and every institution in
society, and the enforcement of "public order," which is the slice of the common
good that is entrusted to government.395 But it will be nearly impossible to remain
focused on the transgender discussion without legal issues-issues of public
order in the safeguarding of individual rights-taking center stage.
Discrimination lawsuits at the state level are being filed for refusals to provide
this surgery to transgender individuals.3 96 Further, recent federal HHS
regulations under the ACA put Catholic health care institutions in a difficult
position. The ACA states that no one can be denied health care because of race,
sex, or other discriminatory category. Declaring discrimination on the basis of
"sex" to include gender identity, sex stereotypes and termination of pregnancy,
HHS promulgated rules in May, 2016 ("the Rule"), regarding assistance with
gender transitions, which includes medical procedures.3 97 The Rule was to apply
to any non-governmental health care entity receiving funding from HHS-which
includes all Catholic hospitals because they participate in Medicaid and
Medicare. Any refusal to provide these services (if provided to other patients)
would be considered sex discrimination; heavy fines would be assessed for
noncompliance. The Rule barely acknowledged the existing conscience
protections and made no effort to explicitly coordinate with those laws or to offer
even narrow exemptions for hospitals and medical personnel that might oppose
providing these controversial services in some or all cases.
Because the Rule was set to take effect in 2017, Catholic health care
institutions sued and obtained a nationwide preliminary injunction against the
Rule's enforcement. 39 8 The Franciscan Alliance, a major Catholic hospital
system,399 sued HHS, asserting that sexual identity is an objective fact rooted in
nature as male or female persons and not something that can or should be
Possibilities, COMMONWEAL (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/churchtransgender-identity.
3
396

Declaration,supra note 15, para. 7.
See, e.g., Elissa Miolene, TransgenderPatientsSay Georgetown HospitalIs Denying
Them
Care, WASHINGTONIAN (July 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonian.com/2015/07/09/transgenderpopulation-still-struggling-with-access-to-health-care/; Sandhya Somashekhar, TransgenderMan

Sues Catholic Hospital for Refusing Surgery, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/01/06/transgender-man-suescatholic-hospital-for-refusing-surgery/.
397
45 C.F.R. §§ 92.4, 92.207 (2016).
398
Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (holding that
because "the Rule's harm is felt by healthcare providers and states across the country," a
nationwide injunction was appropriate regarding the rule commanding, "the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of 'gender identity' and 'termination of pregnancy."').
399
Franciscan provides $900 million in Medicare/aid services annually, and gets $300,000 in
HHS grants annually; it treats 4 million outpatients and 80,000 inpatients each year; and has 2,900
beds. Id. at 674. Other plaintiffs included the Christian Medical and Dental Association, as well as
eight states. Id.
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altered.4 00 It argued that the Rule would require its hospitals to offer medical
401
services that violate its best medical judgment and its religious beliefs. The
district court, in issuing the injunction, held inter alia that Franciscan Alliance
had shown a substantial likelihood of success on a RFRA claim: a burden on free
exercise could be established, and even if the government's interest were
4 02
compelling, the Rule was not the least restrictive means of achieving it. Note,
however, that state provisions comparable to the Rule (with modifications) may
be adopted. This could easily draw government and Church entities into
unrelenting political-legal hostilities.
3. Endorsement of Same-Sex Marriage
The issues raised up to now--on direct participation in abortion,
sterilization, contraception, and transgender surgery-have focused primarily on
health care facilities. But the Catholic institutions most affected by the Church's
claim to exclusive support of traditional marriage and other issues concerning
403
the LGBT community are Catholic social service agencies. Agencies that offer
adoption services but refuse to place foster and adoptive children with same-sex
couples have been particularly affected. Because the state legislatures would not
provide a statutory exemption from anti-discrimination laws, several Catholic
Charities agencies in Massachusetts, Illinois, District of Columbia, and other
locations have surrendered their licenses and are no longer involved in adoption
services.404 This is a significant loss of experience in the adoption field, but it

400

Franciscan holds religious beliefs that sexual identity is an objective fact
rooted in nature as male or female persons. Like the Catholic Church it serves,
Franciscan believes that a person's sex is ascertained biologically, and not by
one's beliefs, desires, or feelings. Franciscan believes that part of the image of
God is an organic part of every man and woman, and that women and men
reflect God's image in unique, and uniquely dignified, ways."

Id.
Id. at 671-72. Franciscan and the faith-based physician organization "sincerely believe that
participating in, referring for, or providing insurance coverage of gender transitions, sterilizations,
or abortions would constitute 'impermissible material cooperation with evil."' Id. at 675.
402
Id. at 691-93; see also Complaint at para 147, 179, 206,299, 315, Religious Sisters of Mercy
v. Burwell, No. 3:16-cv-00386, 2017 BL 19444 (D. N.D., Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Complaint,
Religious Sisters of Mercy].
403
Social service agencies that serve the homeless and care for children also must address
LGBT issues. See, e.g., NEST: Collaborativeto Prevent LGBTQ Youth Homelessness, MONTROSE
CTR., www.montrosecenter.org/hub/services/hatch-youth-services/nest-home/ (last visited Oct.
10, 2017) (listing Catholic Charities among the participating agencies).
404
Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/us/for-bishops-a-battle-over-whoserights-prevail.html; see also Alana Semuels, Should Adoption Agencies Be Allowed to
2015),
23,
(Sept.
ATLANTIC
Parents?
Gay
Against
Discriminate
401
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also suggests that religious teachings at variance with societal norms will not
enjoy automatic respect and accommodation.40 5 Indeed, many proponents of
same-sex marriage and gay rights argue more generally that religious freedom is
already protected because churches cannot be required to perform same-sex
weddings; beyond that, they say exemptions for ministries that serve the public
are not appropriate. That, of course, begs the question of the proper contours of
religious freedom. The Church claims a maximalist freedom, with exemption of
all its institutions from any endorsement of or cooperation with same-sex
marriage.
The Bishops' Conference's amicus brief in Obergefell voiced concerns
over the potential stigma of bigotry and the possibility of having to affirm same
sex marriage "as a condition of. . . receiving government contracts, participating
in public programs, or being eligible for tax exemption." 4 06 The Court's decision
was a resounding defeat for all who had tried to preserve the traditional definition
of marriage but was unclear about these possibilities. The Court noted only that

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-problem-with-religious-freedomlaws/406423/.
405
Four states accommodate this religious claim. Hannah Weikel, South Dakota Governor
Signs
Religious Adoption
Protections, RAPID CITY
J.
(Mar.
10,
2017),
http://rapidcityjournal.com/news/latest/south-dakota-govemor-signs-religious-adoptionprotections/article f42bfafc-41cf-5e38-a9b5-b1clc6796136.html (noting that South Dakota is
joining Michigan, North Dakota, and Virginia, which have exemptions for religious adoption
agencies from any requirements to place children with same-sex couples).
406
The Catholic Church's teaching on marriage is deeply embedded in its
understanding of God and the human person. If this Court were to declare
Church teaching to be mere bigotry, then the conflict between constitutional
rights to act on such religious beliefs- i.e., the rights to free exercise, speech,
and association- versus a newly created constitutional right of two people of
the same sex to civil marriage will never cease. . . . Religiously-affiliated
nonprofit organizations have had to cease providing adoption and foster care
services for vulnerable children because of the redefinition of marriage.
Further, if the Court construes the Constitution to require government
affirmation of same-sex relationships as marriage, it would seem a short step
to requiring such affirmation of private actors as a condition of their receiving
government contracts, participating in public programs, or being eligible for
tax exemption. In short order, those who disagree with the government's moral
assessment of such relationships will find themselves increasingly
marginalized and denied equal participation in American public life and
benefits. This intense pressure would not lead to their capitulation, but instead
to wide-ranging, long-enduring-and entirely needless-legal conflict
between Church and State.
Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL
1519042, *23-27; see also Application and Proposed Brief Amici Curiae for Cal. Catholic
Conference, et al. Supporting Interveners, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (Nos.
S168047, S168066, S168078), 2009 WL 1226937, *7-10.
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407 and
churches have autonomy to teach their traditional marriage principles
4 08
offered no suggestion on how to proceed in the cases of inevitable conflict.
Indeed, the Solicitor General acknowledged during oral argument "that tax
exemptions of some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed
same-sex marriage." 40 9
To ensure far-reaching protection, the Conference supports federal
legislation like the First Amendment Defense Act (FADA), which was
introduced in 2015 .410 It provides that no person (including for-profit and
nonprofit entities) will suffer penalties for acting in accordance with the
411
traditional view of marriage based on religious beliefs or moral convictions.
Specifically, this would protect Catholic entities from the denial of federal
benefits, funding, or licensing, and from negative tax treatment (like the
revocation of tax-exempt status). Presumably this law would allow Church
agencies to refuse same-sex couples not only adoption services, but also marital

407

Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by
divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so
central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue
the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who
oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe
allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter
of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with
their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does
not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms
as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
408
Had the majority allowed the definition of marriage to be left to the political
process-as the Constitution requires-the People could have considered the
religious liberty implications of deviating from the traditional definition as part
of their deliberative process. Instead, the majority's decision short-circuits that
process, with potentially ruinous consequences for religious liberty.
Id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As the Bishops' Conference noted in its amicus in Strauss v.
Horton, the concerns include the specter of anti-discrimination lawsuits forcing religious
institutions to change their practices; housing discrimination accusations at religious colleges;
expanded definitions of public accommodations; being labeled bigots. "The benefits that religious
groups stand to lose fall into four categories: (1) government grants and contracts; (2) access to
government facilities and fora; (3) government licenses and accreditation; and (4) tax-exempt
status." Application and Proposed Brief Amici Curiae for Cal. Catholic Conference, et al.
Supporting Interveners, Strauss, 207 P.3d 48 (Nos. S168047, S168066, S168078), at *21.
409
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
410
The Bishop's Conference makes its support public on its website. See USCCB Chairmen
Urge Supportfor the 'FirstAmendment Defense Act', U.S. CONE. CATH. BISHOPS (Jul. 12, 2016),
http://www.usccb.org/news/2016/16-089.cfm. For the text of the bill, see H.R. 2802, 114th Cong.
(2015).
411
H.R. 2802.
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and family counseling, housing assistance, and other services if those were
determined, by moral analysis, to involve the Church in immoral acts. The rancor
of political discourse on this law and others like it in various states, however, has
fueled precisely the kind of anger and vitriol regarding "religion as bigotry" that
the Conference anticipated in its Obergefell amicus brief. 412
While the contours of the political-legal compromise on this topic
remain to be seen, it appears that broad exemptions like those in FADA could
have the effect of thwarting the rights of others. Such impacts can be problematic
under the Establishment Clause 4 13 as well as under the Declaration, which notes
that a proper role of government is to ensure "that the equality of citizens before
the law . . . is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for religious

reasons." 4 14
4. Exemptions and Public Funding
Catholic institutions with public ministries that use public monies or
administer public funds for a government program bring together two
controversial issues: funding and exemptions. For well over a century, Catholic
nonprofits have been accepting public money for their charitable care to those in
need. As described in Part II above, in 1899, the Court in Bradfield v. Roberts
turned away an Establishment Clause challenge to a Catholic hospital's receipt
of public funds to build health care facilities.4 15 Catholic social service agencies
are among the most respected groups working with federal and state
governments, administering billions of dollars of social welfare programs; the
Court upheld this type of cooperation in Bowen v. Kendrick, which had been a
facial challenge to inclusion of religious groups under the Establishment
Clause. 4 16 Under President George W. Bush, the Faith-Based Initiatives
movement broadened the ability of religious groups to participate in funding
programs for the delivery of social services and emphasized the right of those

Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) at *14-18; see, e.g., Terri R.
Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBTRights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to Separatebut Equal, 65
412

DEPAUL L. REV. 907 (2016).
413
See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712-14 (2005) (holding that the statute at issue

does not, "exceed the limits of permissible government accommodation of religious practices");
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708-11 (1985) (holding that a Connecticut statute
providing Sabbath observers an "absolute and unqualified right" not to work on the Sabbath
violated the Establishment Clause).
414
Declaration,supra note 15, para. 6.
415
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899).
416
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) ("We conclude, however, that the statute is
not unconstitutional on its face . . . .").
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4 7
groups to maintain their religious identity and to hire co-religionists. 1 This
reinforced the notion that public funding can be consistent with religious
exemptions.
The social service arena has not been immune from the culture wars.
When Catholic agencies administer public funds for social service projectstypically providing numerous services to many different populations-they do
so on the condition that they and their sub-grantees not be required to provide
any reproductive services in a manner that contravenes their beliefs (abortion,
sterilization, contraception). The ACLU has brought two Establishment Clause
challenges against the government's practice of accommodating Catholic social
service agencies administering public monies. In the first case, the ACLU sued
HHS for allowing the Bishops' Conference (through its Office of Refugees and
Migration) to administer the entire $16 million contract to combat human
trafficking in such a way that exempted reproductive services from the scope of
the services it was required to deliver.4 18 The federal district court found that
federal funds were indeed being distributed in a way that was tailored to religious
teachings in violation of the Establishment Clause. 4 19 This contract provision
"delegated authority to a religious organization to impose religiously based
restrictions on the expenditure of taxpayer funds, and thereby impliedly endorsed
the religious beliefs of the USCCB and the Catholic Church." 4 2 0 The appellate
court vacated the holding on mootness grounds, as the contract had expired.42 1

To expand opportunities for service to more religious groups, President Bush in 2002
created the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, which gave religious social service
providers the ability to compete on an equal footing with one another and with secular groups for
grants and contracts in the delivery of social services. And in doing so, they could maintain their
religious identity and hire co-religionists. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based
Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (2005).
418
See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F.Supp.2d 474, 477-78 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated, 705
F.3d 44, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2013) (case moot because government contract with USCCB had ended).
417

419

Id. at 488.

Id. This argument runs counter to a letter from the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel, which opined that grant funding for a religious organization can be an "exercise of
religion" under RFRA and that forcing the religious organization to comply with secular standards
in administering the grant can be a "substantial burden." See Application of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to the Award of a Grant Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
(2007),
162,
190
Op.
O.L.C.
31
Act,
Prevention
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2015/06/01/op-olc-v03 1p0162.pdf.
421
ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2013).
Interestingly, the criteria for the new contract required provision of reproductive services, thereby
shutting Catholic agencies out of the process, despite the fact that HHS staff argued strongly that
the Conference's Office of Refugees and Migrants has been an outstanding grant manager for many
years. For a detailed description, see Berg, Partly Acculturated, supra note 355, at 1371-74. But
note that the bulk of funding seems not to be threatened; even funding increases totaling hundreds
of millions of dollars in grants (e.g., food assistance, prisoner reintegration, global health services)
for Catholic organizations occurred contemporaneously. See Press Release: Setting the Record
420
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The ACLU is moving forward with a similar Establishment Clause challenge to
a grant given to Catholic agencies that refuse to provide information, access or
referrals concerning abortion and contraception when providing social services
to unaccompanied immigrant minors in federal custody. 42 2
The focus in these cases is on "third-party harms," 4 23 as it has been on
most of the exemption challenges in the abortion, transgender, and same-sex
marriage areas. 424 While critics of exemptions place great emphasis on such
harms as a limiting concept, it is important to note that the Declaration, and
Murray's commentary on it, do so as well: restrictions on religion are legitimate
when religious practices violate "the public peace or commonly accepted
standards of public morality, or the rights of other citizens." 425 Eliminating or
mitigating third-party harms that result from exemptions-particularly in the
context of public funding-will likely be a part of the jurisprudential
compromise.
5.

Health Insurance Coverage of Contraception, Abortion, Gender
Transition

Many Catholic institutions also seek exemptions from providing certain
types of health insurance to their employees and to students in their colleges and
universities.4 26 Twenty years ago, Catholic entities had no concerns about
coverage of any drug, device, or procedure considered immoral; they simply
negotiated with their health insurers to tailor benefit offerings according to
church teaching.4 27 But by the late 1990s, more than half the states required
contraceptive coverage in employee health insurance packages as part of
women's contraception equity acts. 428 If an employer offered prescription drug

Straight on Federal Funding for Catholic Organizations, NETWORK (Jan. 31, 2012),
https://networklobby.org/news/2012013 Ibudget/.
422
ACLU of N. Cal. v. Burwell, 2016 WL 6962871, at *1, *11 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying
government's motion to dismiss and finding ACLU has taxpayer standing).
423
See id.; ALCU of Massachusetts, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79.
424
See supra Sections IV.B. 1-3.
425
Murray, The Problem ofReligious Freedom, supra note 165, at 153; see also Declaration,
supra note 15, at 3.
426
Stanley Carlson-Thies, Religious Employer Exemptions, FEDERALIST Soc'Y (Aug. 6, 2012),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/which-religious-organizations-count-as-religiousthe-religious-employer-exemption-of-the-health-insurance-law-s-contraceptives-mandate.
427
See Sampling of Catholic-Affiliated Institutions that Provide Contraceptive Coverage,
NAT'L WOMEN'S

L. CTR.

[hereinafter

WOMEN'S

L.

CTR.],

https://www.nwlc.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/08/catholic affiliated institutionsthatLprovide-contraceptivescoveragec
hart.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
428
See Julie Rovner, Rules Requiring ContraceptiveCoverage Have Been In Force For Years,
NPR (February 10, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2012/02/10/146662285/rulesrequiring-contraceptive-coverage-have-been-in-force-for-years.
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coverage, contraceptives had to be included. 42 9 The bishops, through state

conferences, fought hard to prevent the enactment of these laws, arguing
vigorously that contraception was not health care. 43 0 After more than a decade of
state and federal litigation on the matter of contraception coverage, laws
requiring coverage for abortions and for gender reassignment are now on the
doorstep.43 1
The story regarding contraception insurance is instructive. After failing
to stop the Women's Equity legislation, Church leaders lobbied for broad
religious exemptions applicable to all its entities.4 32 Most of these laws do
contain some kind of accommodation for religious employers.43 3 But heavy
Catholic advocacy in New York and California did not produce a broad
exemption for all Catholic institutions.434 Both states provided instead a narrow
one that exempted only church employers; a broader exemption of religious
nonprofits was rejected because it would have left over 100,000 employees
without coverage. 4 35 For the states with narrow exemptions, Catholic entities
found themselves in the position of having to decide to cover contraceptives as
part of their prescription plans or drop prescription coverage altogether.4 3 6 One
Wisconsin diocese told its employees that if anyone actually used the
prescription coverage for contraception, that person would be fired.43
429

Tamar Lewin, Judge Says Some Employers Must Cover Contraceptives, N.Y. TIMES (June
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/13/us/judge-says-some-employers-must-cover13,
2001),
contraceptives.html?mcubz=3.
430
Griffin, What Might Have Been, supra note 311, at 642-45.
431
Bans
on
Insurance
Coverage
of
Abortion,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/reproductive-freedom/abortion/bans-insurance-coverage-abortion

(last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
432

Griffin, What Might Have Been, supra note 311, at 645.
Twenty-eight states have contraception requirements; twenty-one of these statutes exempt
religious employers from having to cover contraceptives. See Insurance Coverage for
433

Contraception

Laws,

NAT'L

CONF.

STATE

LEGISLATURES,

www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-contraception-state-laws.aspx (last updated
Feb. 2012). But note that the definition of "religious employer" can vary, and may include only
the church itself and not church-affiliated institutions. Id.
434

See Griffin, What Might Have Been, supra note 311, at 643-45.

435
436

Id. at 643.
See Sharon Otterman, Archdiocese Paysfor Health Plan That Covers Birth Control, N.Y.
TIMEs (May 26, 2013) [hereinafter Otterman, Archdiocese Pays for Health Plan]
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/nyregion/new-york-archdiocese-reluctantly-paying-forbirth-control.html. An added complication was that not all contraception is prescribed for
contraceptive purposes. Carrie Johnson Weimar, Women Taking Birth ControlPillsfor Reasons
Other
than
Contraception,
UF
HEALTH
CoMM.
(Feb.
1,
2012),
http://news.health.ufl.edu/2012/18504/multimedia/health-in-a-heartbeat/women-taking-birthcontrol-pills-for-reasons-other-than-contraception.
437

Richard S. Myers, The Right to Conscience andthe FirstAmendment, 9 AvE MARIA L. REv.

123 (2010) (discussing Diocese of Madison, Wisconsin).
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Several Catholic Charities organizations, which were not eligible for
narrow church exemptions, sued for an exemption on Free Exercise Clause,
Establishment Clause and Autonomy grounds.438 They argued that the distinction
between churches and nonprofits was an unconstitutional redefining of the
Church. 4 39 The highest courts of California and New York held under Smith that
religious nonprofits had no constitutional right on any of these grounds to be
included within the exemption, primarily because they had a religiously diverse
workforce, and that the exemption structure was valid."o Church institutions
came into compliance, and have been providing the coverage "under protest"
ever since. 4 41 Thus, these losses established the principle that an exemption could
be narrowly tailored to protect only the religious employers whose employees
likely share their beliefs.
When HHS issued implementing regulations under the ACA in 2012, it
required employers to provide insurance coverage for contraceptive and
sterilization services at no cost to the employee.44 2 Among a variety of
exemptions was a narrow religious employer exemption, much like that in New
York and California, for churches and their close affiliates.4 3 Catholic leaders
were by no means alone in voicing their outrage, but they played a key role. After
considerable comment through administrative law channels, the Obama
Administration "ultimately recognized that religious nonprofits could employ or

438
Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y. 2006);
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 76 (Cal. 2004).

439

NYS Bishops Statement on Religious Liberty Litigation, N.Y. STATE CATH. CONF. (Dec. 30,

2002), http://www.nyscatholic.org/2002/12/nys-bishops-statement-on-religious-liberty-litigation/
(noting that Catholic hospitals, nursing homes, schools and universities, homes for unwed mothers,
foster care programs, AIDS residences, immigration outreach centers, shelters for runaways and
drug treatment programs "are not allowed to be Catholic"). The New York Bishops issued a
statement:
We asked only for an exemption for religious reasons from the contraception
portion of the mandate. However, our pleas for tolerance were ignored. The
law we now challenge has extraordinarily grave implications for all religious
faiths. For the first time, by using an unconstitutional, arbitrary and
unworkable set of criteria to characterize what is religious, the state has
attempted to define what is and is not Catholic.
Id.
44
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 76 (Cal. 2004);
Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468-69 (N.Y. 2006).
4'
See WOMEN's L. CTR., supra note 427; see also Otterman, Archdiocese Pays for Health
Plan, supra note 436 (stating that union workers have been covered since the 1990s and others
covered since 2002 under state gender equity law).
442
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-63 (2014); see also Laycock,
Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 852, notes 74-75.
44
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2763, discussing 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 1(a); see also Laycock, Culture
Wars, supra note 2, at 855.
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serve others and still deserve religious freedom protection." 4 44 The amended rule
did not broaden the exemption to include religious nonprofits but instead
established a separate "accommodation" for them ("the Accommodation")."
Under the Accommodation, religious nonprofits that objected to providing the
coverage were required to notify the government; the obligation to provide the
44 6
coverage would then shift to their insurers or third-party administrators.
7
Refusal to comply with the notice requirement would result in massive fines.4
Over 100 lawsuits were filed, about half by for-profit businesses that enjoyed
neither exemption nor Accommodation, and the rest by religious organizations
challenging the Accommodation.44 8 Every plaintiff sought a full exemption from
the mandate under RFRA.44 9 Two of the closely-held businesses prevailed in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 4 50
The Bishops' Conference thought the HHS regulation was the ultimate
conscription of church institutions to promote a secularist agenda-both in its
original form and even after the Accommodation was added. 4 5 1 The fact that
Catholic institutions at the time already provided contraceptive coverage under
protest (in states that required it) was of no moment. More than half of the 56
religious nonprofits to challenge the Accommodation were Catholic or Catholic-

44

Berg, Partly Acculturated, supra note 355, at 1351.

4s

45 C.F.R. 147.13 1(b) (2015).
Id. 147.131(c).

446

447
44

Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775-76; see also supra note 39.
See Robinson, supra note 37, at 761; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, ISSUE BRIEF: THE

CONTRACEPTION MANDATE ACCOMMODATED: WHY THE RFRA CLAIM IN ZUBIK V. BURWELL FAILS,

(2016),
Soc'v.
CONST.
https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/TheContraception MandateAccommodated.pdf
(discussing Zubik prior to the case appearing before the Supreme Court).
AM.

Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 853.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (recognizing that under RFRA
the businesses' religious exercise was burdened; there were less restrictive alternatives to advance
the government's compelling interest in providing free contraception--one of them being the
Accommodation). In fact, the Accommodation was extended to include closely-held, for-profit
businesses. 45 C.F.R. 147.131(b) (2015); see also Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under
the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41318 (Dep't of the Treasury July 14, 2015) (codified at 26
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A (2017)). The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops filed an
amicus brief in support of the businesses, arguing that rights of conscience should not be excluded
from the market place. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae in
support of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., et al., Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356), 2014 WL 316721 at *11. The brief also offered the proper
interpretation of substantial burden test: After determining sincerity, a court must determine
whether government has placed substantial pressure on the plaintiff to violate its beliefs. Id. at * 10.
This was quite similar to the test adopted in Hobby Lobby.
449

450

451

MOST CHERISHED LIBERTY, supra note 40.
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affiliated entities.452 Based on one interpretation of the doctrine of cooperation
with evil,453 these Catholic institutional plaintiffs argued that the
Accommodation did not relieve them of immoral participation in the provision
of contraception and abortifacients but rather still required them to play an
"integral role in the regulatory scheme" of delivering objectionable coverage.4 54
They sought a full exemption; the result, of course, would be no coverage of
contraceptives for their employees. Eight out of nine federal courts of appeal
rejected the argument, finding no substantial burden on petitioners' religious
exercise, as RFRA requires.455
In the consolidated cases that made it to the Supreme Court, petitioners
argued that the regulations force them to sign a document and maintain a
relationship with the insurer that involves them in the delivery of contraceptive
coverage to their employees.45 6 Contrary to the government's characterization of
the program as an opt-out that would absolve the nonprofits of moral
responsibility, petitioners "would be facilitating and encouraging wrongdoing on
an ongoing basis in violation of Catholic teachings on 'scandal' and 'material
cooperation."' 45 7 One bishop asserted that "the self-certification
form takes only
458
'a few minutes to sign, but the ramifications are eternal."'
After oral argument, the Court requested supplemental briefing on
"whether contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners' employees,

HHS Case Database, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/hhs-infocentral/hhs-case-database/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (stating that of the various plaintiffs fifteen
were dioceses).
453
Theologians debated whether the Accommodation violated the cooperation doctrine. Some
argued that the decisions to bring suit were based on a scrupulous understanding of cooperation
with evil, coming at a time when Benedict XVI appeared to be moving toward a smaller, more
perfectionist church. Kaveny, Law, Religion, and Conscience, supra note 31, at 2-3 (asserting the
distortion of the moral tradition for the sake of success in litigation).
454
Brief for Petitioners at 51, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 141453 & 14-1505), 2016 WL 93988 at *51 [hereinafter Petitioners' Zubik Brief].
455
See, e.g., Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2016); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207,
210 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d
449, 452 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Geneva Coll. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557
(2016) (per curiam); Grace Sch. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct.
2011 (2016); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d
1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam); Mich. Catholic
Conference v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); Univ.
of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016);
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 237 (D.C. Cir.
2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
456
Petitioners' Zubik Brief, supra note 454, at 1.
457
Id. at 37.
458
Id. at 43.
452
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through petitioners' insurance companies, without any such notice from
petitioners." 4 59 This was likely done because a 4-4 split was predictable, given
Antonin Scalia's death in February of 2016. After reviewing the briefs, the Court,
in a per curiam decision, took no view on the merits but instead vacated and
remanded the cases to their respective courts of appeal to work out an approach
that would satisfy both sides. 4 6 0 The Court was confident that this could happen;
in the new round of briefing, "[b]oth petitioners and the [g]overnment []
4 61
The ultimate outcome of Zubik
confirm[ed] that such an option is feasible."
462
but one thing is clear: both sides made significant
remains to be seen,
concessions during the course of the litigation. Catholic institutions abandoned
three arguments that had been important in earlier stages of the litigation.463 First,

459

460
461

Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559-60 (2016).
Id. at 1560.

Id.

The Obama Administration decided that the Accommodation would remain in place,
unchanged. Timothy Jost, Administration Sticks with Current Accommodation for Employers
10,
2017),
Objecting to Contraceptive Coverage, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan.
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/01/10/administration-sticks-with-current-accommodation-foremployers-objecting-to-contraceptive-coverage/. President Trump signed an Executive Order
asking relevant departments to consider amending the regulations to address conscience claims.
See PresidentialExecutive Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, WHITE HOUSE
(May 4, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/04/presidential-executiveorder-promoting-free-speech-and-religious-liberty.
New interim final rules have been issued that change the exemption and accommodation structure.
These rules expand the exemption to include not only religious objectors but those who object to
contraception on moral grounds as well. The exemption is further expanded beyond churches and
their close affiliates to include most non-governmental entities (e.g., nonprofits, universities, forprofits, and health insurers) as well as individuals. Thus, in place of a narrow religious exemption
and an Accommodation for religious nonprofits and some for-profits, the new interim final rules
establish a broad religious-moral exemption and convert the Accommodation into an optional
process available for any exempt entity to use on a voluntary basis. DEP'T OF TREASURY, DEP'T OF
LABOR, AND HHS, RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS FOR COVERAGE OF CERTAIN
462

PREVENTIVE

SERVICES

UNDER

THE

AFFORDABLE

CARE

(2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/13/2017-21851/religiousexemptions-and-accommodations-for-coverage-of-certain-preventive-services-under-theaffordable-care-act; DEP'T OF TREASURY, DEP'T OF LABOR, AND HHS, MORAL EXEMPTIONS

ACT

AND

ACCOMMODATIONS FOR COVERAGE OF CERTAIN PREVENTIVE SERVICES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT (2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/13/2017-21852/religious-

exemptions-and-accommodations-for-coverage-of-certain-preventive-services-under-theaffordable-care-act.
These interim final rules are in effect but may be modified once the comment period has closed
on December 5, 2017. They are being challenged in court on a variety of constitutional and
statutory grounds. See ACLU v. Wright, No. 3:17-cv-05772 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/american-civil-liberties-union-et-al-v-wright-et-alcomplaint.
463
Petitioners' supplemental brief had refused any arrangement that would require them to
provide notice to effectuate coverage. Supplemental Brief for Petitioners, Zubik v. Burwell, 136

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/4

86

Carmella: Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Politica

2017]

CatholicInstitutions in Court

87

they stopped arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally defining the Church
by treating diocesan and nonprofit institutions differently (as they had vigorously
asserted in the state litigation). 4 6 Second, they relinquished the claim that their
employees not be covered, admitting that their own insurer could provide the
coverage separately. 465 And finally, they conceded that the mandate was a
legitimate government goal.466
The more recent issue on the horizon involves state laws that require
employers to provide employees with other forms of insurance that Catholic
entities find (or could find) objectionable, such as insurance coverage for
abortions, gender transition, same-sex spouses, and assisted reproduction.4 67
While the ACA did not include such a requirement, several states have moved in
this direction, including California and New York.468 California does not allow
insurers to offer coverage that excludes or limits abortions for some
employers. 46 9 When pro-life groups complained to the HHS Office for Civil
S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, & 15-191), 2016
WL 1445914 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief].
464
465

See generally id.
Supplemental Brief, supra note 463, at 17.
466
"Petitioners have clarified that their religious exercise is not infringed where
they 'need to
do nothing more than contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some or all forms of
contraception,' even if their employees receive cost-free contraceptive coverage from the same
insurance company." Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Petitioners further conceded:
Although Petitioners, as Roman Catholic entities, disagree with the
Government's goal of providing the mandated coverage, they do not challenge
the legality of this goal. Indeed, they have proposed less-restrictive alternatives
where women could receive such coverage without involving Petitioners.
Rather, Petitioners ask only that they not be forced to participate in this
regulatory scheme in a way that violates their religious beliefs.
Petitioners' Zubik Brief, supra note 454, at 3. For a discussion of the government's concessions,
see Mark L. Rienzi, Fool Me Twice: Zubik v. Burwell and the Perils of Judicial Faith in
Governmental Claims, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 123 (2015-2016).
467
[California] law now requires all policies in the individual and small group
markets to cover abortion. Other states have taken steps to guarantee abortion
coverage in healthcare. Massachusetts requires health insurers to cover
'medically necessary' care, which often can apply to abortions. New York has
proposed a regulation that would mandate insurers to cover medically
necessary abortions requiring a co-pay. But no state is as comprehensive in
requiring private insurers to cover abortion as California.
Melanie Mason, Most California insuranceplans could be ineligiblefor tax credits under the
GOP's new proposal, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-taxcredits-abortion-20170308-story.html.
468

Id.

469

David G. Savage, Obama's health advisors reject 'right of conscience' challenge
to
California's required
abortion
coverage,
L.A.
TIMES
(June
21,
2016),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fi-california-abortion-insurance-20160621-snap-story.html.
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Rights that this law violated the Weldon Amendment (one of the many federal
conscience protections for abortion refusal), the federal office found that no
violation had occurred because the Weldon Amendment does not apply to health
insurance. 47 0 New York's requirements are being challenged by several dioceses
and other religious groups on the grounds that the state lacks the authority to
impose them and that it is unconstitutional coercion of religious institutions and
47
individuals to act against beliefs and conscience. 1 In addition, the 2016 HHS
Rule regarding gender transition, discussed above, requires employee health
472
Although the
insurance to cover transition procedures and surgeries.
47 3
requirement,
this
insurance
includes
Rule
the
against
injunction
nationwide
state laws may begin to mirror the Rule's language, with modifications. Further,
Catholic entities might object to recent state laws that require health insurance
for same-sex spouses of employeeS 474 or coverage for assisted reproduction for
both heterosexual and same-sex couples.

4 75

470

Id.

471

See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, Roman Catholic Diocese

of Albany, N.Y. et. al. v. Vullo, (No. 2070-16) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2016),
http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisionsl6/051616complaint.pdf (including other plaintiffs such
as the Diocese of Ogdensburg and Catholic Charities of Brooklyn Diocese, and several other
Catholic and Protestant churches).
472
See Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp.3d 660, 674-75 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
In Franciscan,the Catholic health system argued that providing this insurance to its 15,000
473
employees violated its beliefs under RFRA. Id. at 660; see also Complaint, Religious Sisters of
Mercy, supra note 402.
On the issue of provision of insurance, for instance, see generally, Catholic Charities of
474
Maine, Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Me. 2004) (requiring insurance in order to
participate in city program on Smith rationale); Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 849
(discussing one agency ending provision of insurance); Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell,
Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 1, 45-46 (2015)
(discussing available exemptions); Joan Frawley Desmond, Spousal Benefits for Same-Sex
Partners at Catholic Universities and Hospitals, NAT'L CATH. REG. (Oct 20, 2014),
http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/spousal-benefits-for-same-sex-partners-at-catholicsuniversities-and-hospit (Notre Dame providing same-sex spousal insurance); Sharon Otterman,
Employee Sues for Benefits to Cover Same-Sex Spouse, N.Y. TIMEs (June 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/nyregion/st-josephs-medical-center-sued-over-benefits-bysame-sex-couple.html; see also Michael Sean Winters, USCCB & LGBT Non-Discrimination,
NAT'L CATH. REP. (July 21, 2014), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/usccb-lgbtnon-discrimination (noting that "conscience" for reproductive issues does not carry over well in
non-discrimination context).
California, Maryland, and New Jersey have laws requiring equity in coverage for all or some
475
forms of assisted reproduction. See Michael Booth, New State Law MandatesFertility Coverage
2017),
3,
(May
J.
L.
N.J.
Couples,
Same-Sex
for
http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=l202785181364/New-State-Law-Mandates-Fertility-Coveragefor-SameSex-Couples.
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C. PossibleMiddle Ground
Culture war issues seem particularly intractable, because both sides
believe so strongly in the rightness of their claims. The Church's antagonists seek
to legally require Catholic institutions with public ministries to engage in direct
and indirect acts that violate church teaching-or to withdraw from the area of
ministry. And Catholic institutions demand total exemption from any connection
to problematic activities, regardless of negative impacts on third parties that may
result from those refusals and regardless of how attenuated or implausible the
complicity may be. Given the fact that there are so many stakeholders involved
in the work of the Catholic nonprofits with articulated missions-employees,
patients, service beneficiaries, students, taxpayers, and the broader public-how
might the jurisprudential compromise work out over time?
Of course, one answer-the answer the bishops offer-is that a robust
exemption regime is the compromise, in a system with explicit free exercise
protection and respect for religious freedom. But as it is with education funding
and employment autonomy, discussed in Parts II and III, maximal religious
freedom claims are not consistently successful; many articulate voices describe
competing views. Compromise is an inevitable outcome of the political and
litigation processes. Professor Cole Durham understands this dynamic when he
urges caution against excessive religious freedom claims and describes "the selflimiting character of religious freedom." 476 He writes,
It is as though religious freedom is elastic, but elastic with a
drawback. As you try to expand the scope of its coverage it
becomes attenuated at the edges, and simultaneously grows
thinner (and weaker) even in more central domains of its
coverage .... Stated differently, ifreligious liberty claims sweep
too broadly, it is virtually impossible to avoid situationswhere
most reasonable people would agree that secular concerns
trump arguably religious claims . . . . [T]here are. .. many

situations where it is reasonable to expect religious groups to
respect and be willing to accommodate the needs of surrounding
society." 4 7 7
The area in which "secular concerns trump religion" most commonly relate to
third-party harms. Indeed, what seems to be emerging as a consensus, at least
among many academics and public actors, is that narrow exemptions that affect
only church members are generally acceptable, but exemptions that burden nonmembers are not.478

476

DAVIS
477

478

W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C.
L. REV. 665, 676 (1999).
Id. at 676-77 (emphasis added).
The Author is grateful to Kathleen Brady for this observation.
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How might a grand jurisprudential compromise bring peace to the
culture wars? Given the normative appeal of concern for third parties affected by
exemptions, perhaps that compromise will favor legal structures that mitigate or
eliminate those third-party impacts while respecting religious objections. Such
structures offer models of a "middle ground": Church entities are not required to
provide objectionable services, but those services are provided to the public by
some alternate means. One model is based on the "refuse but refer" principle,
which is promoted inter alia by professional associations of pharmacists, for
those who have conscientious objection to dispensing certain drugs, like
contraception. 4 79 The pharmacist may refuse, but must refer the customer to
another pharmacist on duty or to another pharmacy to ensure ease in obtaining
the prescription; coordination of schedules (for sufficient staffing) and
collaboration among pharmacies (for sufficient stocking of items) allows this to
operate smoothly so that a conscientious objector may "step away . .. but not
step in the way" of patients' or customers' access to their legally prescribed
medication.4 80 Referral is itself highly problematic as possible "complicity" in
objectionable conduct, but this model might suggest ways of protecting Catholic
institutions from direct involvement in problematic practices while ensuring that
those options are available to the communities being served.
Another model is the framework used in the Accommodation, which
allowed the religious nonprofit to refuse to provide the insurance coverage, but
required another entity (the insurer or third party administrator) to provide
coverage to employees or students. This framework suggests a way of protecting
Catholic institutions from participating in activity they consider immoral while
ensuring that the insurance is available to employees or students. Although the
Bishops' Conference rejected the Accommodation, the Catholic Health
Association, which represents hospitals and health care entities, found it to be a
48
reasonable compromise and supported it. 1
Models like these might be crafted by legislators or regulators, or urged
by courts; they may be opposed by both Church institutions and their opponents.
But for Catholics, there is precedent for considering adjustments. In hospital
mergers and affiliations with individuals and secular entities, "carve outs" have
been used in the past to permit some objectionable practices to be provided under
the auspices of affiliated secular entities.482 The body of literature describing the
Richard Anderson, et al., Pharmacistsand Conscientious Objection, Scope Note 46, THE
479
BIOETHICS RES. LIB., 2-3 (Dec. 2006) (stating prior notice to the public is necessary for informed
consent).
480
Id. at 3.
Michael Sean Winters, Catholic Health Association Says It Can Live with HHS Mandate,
481
NAT'L CATH. REP. (July 9, 2013), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/catholichealth-association-says-it-can-live-hhs-mandate.
482
The American bishops have voted to revise merger guidelines under the ERDs, based on
Vatican principles, to avoid immoral cooperation and scandal. See Catholic BishopsApprove New
Principlesfor Mergers with Non-Catholic Hospitals, ADVISORY BOARD (Nov. 12, 2014, 10:59
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ways in which principles of cooperation apply to mergers and affiliations (when
Catholic hospitals work with non-Catholic entities and individuals)4 83 could form
the basis for internal discussions and reflection on a variety of problematic
activities. If there is warrant for creative structuring of operations when the
financial health of the institution is at stake, then surely there is such a warrant
when the legal and moral claims of others are at stake.
Additionally, government entities responsible for deciding on hospital
mergers and on grants to religious social service agencies have a duty to the
public to ensure that there is sufficient public access to those services that will
not be provided by Catholic institutions. Of significance is the degree of control
over a program that one social service provider might exercise. Where a Catholic
agency administers an entire grant, there is greater concern over the third-party
impacts than when a Catholic agency is one of several.4 84 Likewise, in the
hospital context, if a Catholic hospital is the only health care facility serving a
given population, there is greater concern over third-party impacts than when a
Catholic hospital is one of several.485 This has led Professor Laycock to
discourage Catholic monopolies on health care in geographic areas.486
Although the Church has the right to advocate on moral-political issues
and to seek exemptions for its own religious freedom, its own teaching
recognizes and accepts that the proper functioning of the polity involves
adjustments and compromises that inhere in law and politics.

487

The Declaration

requires all people and institutions, including the Church, to protect the religious
freedom of all; it also requires the Church to accept the state's duty to curtail
AM),
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/20 14 /11/12/catholic-bishops-to-revise-mergerguidelines-for-hospitals. The ability to devise solutions will depend heavily on those revisions.
483
Michael R. Panicola, Ph.D. & Ron Hamel, Ph.D., Catholic Identity and the Reshaping of
Health
Care
in
the
United
States,
CATH.
HEALTH
ASS'N
(2015),
https://www.chausa.org/publications/health-progress/article/september-october-2015/catholicidentity-and-the-reshaping-of-health-care; see also Patricia Connelly, A Hospital-Within-AHospital: Good for Hospitals, Good for Patients, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 546, 574-81 (2016)
(proposing "separateness" model for various religious-secular hospital arrangements to allow
delivery of certain reproductive services while ensuring Catholic hospital compliance with ERDs).
484
See, e.g., ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated 705
F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013). The funding in this case was structured in an unusual way. The Bishops'
Conference had a master contract, and through control of sub-grantees, could control access to
abortion and contraception options for every beneficiary of this program, which "appeared to deny
significant options to third parties because they lacked alternatives for pursuing those options."
Berg, PartlyAcculturated, supra note 355, at 1373. More typically, the Catholic agency is one of
a number of social service providers and does not have total control over an entire program.
485
Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 847-48.
486
487

Id. at 879.

Forming Consciencesfor Faithful Citizenship - PartI - The U.S. Bishops'
Reflection on
Catholic Teaching and Political Life, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS paras. 31-33,
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/faithful-citizenship/forming-consciences-for-faithfulcitizenship-part-one.cfin (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
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4 88
religious freedom in certain circumstances. The Church therefore recognizes
that the norms that govern the state "arise out of the need for the effective
safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts
of rights," for "the right to religious freedom is exercised in human society; hence
4 89
its exercise is subject to certain regulatory norms" for public order. Of course,
the Declaration speaks powerfully to as broad a religious freedom as possiblebut it firmly recognizes the legitimate and appropriate role of government in
balancing competing rights and responsibilities and to the religious equality of
all citizens. Indeed, "[t]he Church declares itself to be a claimant and a supporter
of this order of liberty, both with respect to the duties of the state and the wider
and deeper order of human society." 490 And John Courtney Murray's counsel
regarding the limitations of law when it comes to making society "moral"
491
continues to speak to the issues of our time. The Church's emphasis on laws
against intrinsic evils does not always address the effectiveness of those laws,
their enforceability, their ability to promote justice, their prudential application,
or benefits to the common good-analyses that are deeply rooted in the Catholic

tradition.492

It is often said that the Church considers itself a bulwark against
secularism. To be clear, Catholic teaching recognizes the proper secularity of the
state and its institutions, which perform primarily a juridical function, "the
4 93
The
protection and promotion of the exercise of human and civil rights."
antiideologically
is
that
secularism to be resisted is a societal secularism
religious, hopeless, and soul-less. At mid-20th century, Murray certainly
believed that a vibrant religious life in America for all faiths was the best hope
to stave off this distorted kind of secularism. But today we may be dealing with
something quite different. As Cardinal Wuerl has observed, Pope Francis
Is recognizing what we have all come to see-that a pervasive
secularism is now the dominant cultural voice..

.

. [Y]ou can't

[have renewal of cultural institutions] without recognizing that
this is a different moment in history to 25 years ago, and the
people the church is talking to don't understand the words the
same way as we do..

.

. [T]his culture, this language--even the

words we use-they have a different meaning for this culture,
and we have to find a different way of demonstrating that we're
walking with them, so that we can hear them and they can begin
488

See, e.g., Hittinger,supra note 47, at 1044.

489

Declaration,supra note 15, § 7.

490
491

Hittinger, supra note 47, at 1044.
See generally supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.

492

KAVENY, LAW'S VIRTUES, supra note

321, at 225-36.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., The Declarationon Religious Freedom, in BRIDGING THE
493
SACRED AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., 187, 196 (J.

Leon Hooper, S.J. ed. 1994).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/4

92

Carmella: Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Politica

2017]

CatholicInstitutions in Court

93

to hear us. This concept of accompaniment is key here.
Accompaniment is essential to where we're going to be. The
voice of the faith, the voice of the Gospel, isn't going to be
announced today to crowds of people waiting to hear. Nor is it
going to be announced through the structures of culture,
society-all the routine elements that used be part of the
Christian culture. It's going to be heard because believers are
walking with others and saying, "You know I think there's a
better way; I have a different take on this than you do."4 94
It seems, then, that the Church is on the threshold of a new kind of engagement
with this dominant secular culture-and not simply in opposition to it. The
resources the Church has developed in 50 years of ecumenical dialogue with
other Christian churches and with non-Christian faiths may provide a fruitful
basis on which to build such engagement. Cardinal Tobin of the Newark
Archdiocese recently welcomed gay and lesbian members of the Interparish
Collaborative, a group of 15 parishes that minister to the LGBT community, to
tour the Sacred Heart Cathedral and hold a Mass in the chapel there.495 Over
time, this type of intentional engagement with unprecedented cultural change
will likely have implications for the Church's legislative and litigation agenda.
V.

CONCLUSION

The American Church has made an enormous contribution to shaping
the law through political and legal argumentation since the 19th century,
particularly in the last fifty years. In that time, it has been at the heart of many
political and legal controversies-parochial school funding, clergy sex abuse,
and culture war matters-all the while claiming maximum free exercise and
accommodation for its institutions. Through these battles, the boundaries of free
exercise and accommodation emerge-yet those boundaries are really
embodiments of jurisprudential compromise. In these intensely polarized times,
this Article has attempted to reflect on the Religion Clauses (and the complement
of related statutes) as "articles of peace." Given the necessity of ensuring a social
environment in which people of different faiths and different convictions "might
live together in peace," political and legal compromise is inevitable. Lobbying
494
Gerard O'Connel, Cardinal Wuerl: Pope Francishas reconnected the church with Vatican
II
AMERICA:
JESUIT
REV.
(Mar.
6,
2017),
https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2017/03/06/cardinal-wuerl-pope-francis-hasreconnected-church-vatican-ii.
495
Rev. Alexander Santora, N.J. Cardinal Offers Historic Welcome to LGBT Community,
NJ.coM
(May
7,
2017,
9:00
AM),
http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2017/05/cardinals historic-outreach toIgbt-community-f
ait.html; see also FR. JAMES MARTIN, S.J., BUILDING A BRIDGE: HOW THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND
THE LGBT COMMUNITY CAN ENTER INTO A RELATIONSHIP OF RESPECT, COMPASSION, AND
SENSITIVITY (2017).
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and litigation have their place and, when governed by prudence, are critical tools
for preserving religious freedom. But the Church-through its leaders and
lawyers-is well-positioned to reflect on ways to supplement these tools with
other forms of engagement within and outside the law, so that it may draw more
deeply on its role as "a sign and a safeguard of the transcendent character"-the
dignity-"of the human person." 4 96

496

Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, § 75.
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